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Essays on Labor Markets in Developing Countries
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays on distortions in labor market outcomes in
developing countries.
Chapter 1 tests for downward nominal wage rigidity in markets for casual daily agricultural
labor. It examines responses to rainfall shocks in 500 Indian districts from 1956-2008. First, nominal
wages rise in response to positive shocks but do not fall during droughts. Second, after transitory
positive shocks have dissipated, nominal wages do not fall back down. Third, inflation moderates
these eﬀects. Fourth, rigidities lower employment: landless laborers experience a 6% reduction in
employment in the year after positive shocks. Fifth, consistent with separation failures, rationing
leads to increased labor supply to small farms. New survey evidence suggests that agricultural
workers and employers view nominal wage cuts as unfair and believe that they reduce eﬀort.
Chapter 2 (with Michael Kremer and Sendhil Mullainathan) describes the results of a field
experiment that tests for self-control problems in labor supply. First, we find that workers will
choose dominated contracts—which pay less for every output level but have a steeper slope—to
motivate themselves. Second, eﬀort increases significantly as workers’ (randomly assigned) payday
gets closer. Third, the demand for dominated contracts (and their benefits) is concentrated amongst
those with the highest payday eﬀects. Finally, as workers gain experience, they appear to learn
about their self control problems: the correlation between the payday eﬀect and the demand for the
dominated contract grows with experience. These results together suggest that self-control, in this
context at least, meaningfully alters the firm’s contracting problem.
Chapter 3 empirically examines the impact of multiple market failures on allocative eﬃciency
in farm production in poor countries. In years when labor rationing is more likely in villages
(due to wage rigidity), there is a 63% increase in sharecropped and leased land by small farmers.
iii
This is consistent with the prediction that distortions from a failure in one market can be reduced
by reallocating other factors of production. In areas with worse credit access, there is less land
adjustment in response to labor rationing. These results provide evidence for separation failures
resulting from multiple missing markets.
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Introduction
Labor markets are central to economic activity in both poor and rich countries. They allocate
the use of labor in production. They enable individuals to trade what is usually their most abundant
resource—their labor—for income. As such, eﬃciency in these markets is intrinsically linked to firm
productivity and consumer welfare in any context. In addition, two features market structure in
developing countries augment the importance of labor markets in that context. First, given that
the poor often have worse access to smoothing mechanisms—credit, insurance, and savings—selling
labor is a way in which the poor cope with shocks (Kochar 1999; Jayachandran 2006). Second,
a distinguishing feature of economic organization in developing countries is that there is often
little distinction between the household and the firm (Banerjee and Duflo 2006). This creates a
direct channel through which changes in household welfare may impact firm production decisions
(Benjamin 1992).
This dissertation empirically documents two sources of labor market distortions: wage rigidity
and self-control problems. It examines the implications of these distortions for employment, output,
and contract structure.
Chapter 1 documents downward nominal wage rigidity by examining wage and employment
responses to rainfall shocks in 500 Indian districts over the past 50 years. Such rigidities lower
employment, with the biggest employment reductions for the poorest village residents—those with
little or no land. As a result, rigidities reduce total labor use in production. When households
with small landholdings are rationed out of the external labor market, they increase labor supply
to their own farms. This is consistent with separation failures and is expected to create a wedge in
the returns to labor on small and large farms. An implication of this is that gains from trade can
potentially be realized by redistributing land from large to small farms until the marginal product
of labor is equalized across farms.
Chapter 3 provides evidence that this does indeed occur. In years where labor rationing is more
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likely, small farmers increase the amount of land they lease and sharecrop from large farmers. This
is consistent with the idea that a failure in one factor market can be mitigated by reallocating
other factors of production. However, land requires substantial capital outlays (Shaban 1987). The
acquisition of land by poor households requires the presence of well-functioning credit markets. As a
result, in areas with worse credit access, there is less land adjustment in response to labor rationing.
Thus, when there are multiple market failures (i.e. labor and credit), it is not necessarily possible
to achieve allocative eﬃciency.
Chapter 2 (joint with Michael Kremer and Sendhil Mullainathan) documents a way in which
labor outcomes can be distorted even when factor markets function perfectly. Using a year-long
field experiment with data entry workers in India, it shows that self-control problems reduce labor
supply, earnings, and output. Workers are willing to pay to overcome these problems: they select
dominated contracts—which pay less for every output level but have a steeper slope—in order to
motivate themselves. This highlights a way in which firms can use incentives to increase worker
welfare and output, even in the presence of individual production and perfect information. This
motivates an additional view of the role of the firm.
Collectively, the above results have implications for how labor productivity evolves through the
process of development. To the extent that growth is accompanied by improvements in financial
markets, this reduces the consequences of labor market failures. For example, farmers can use credit
to reallocate land, mitigating the distortions from labor rationing (Chapter 3). Access to financial
services provides a (potentially less distortionary) way for households to cope with shocks. Thus, an
inability to supply as much labor as they would like—due to rationing or self-control problems—has
potentially lower welfare consequences for the poor.
In addition, industrialization and growth generally involve substantial changes in labor market
arrangements themselves, which have bearing on labor productivity. Notably, workers move from
self-employment (in farming or cottage industry production) to employment in larger firms such
as factories. This decouples the consumption and production decisions, potentially weakening the
feedback loop through which household shocks directly aﬀect production decisions (Chapters 1 and
3). Employment in firms can also mitigate self-control problems through the provision of incentives,
increasing worker productivity (Chapter 2). The subsequent chapters examine wage rigidity and
self-control problems in more detail and discuss their implications for the study of poverty.
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1 Nominal Wage Rigidity in Village Labor Markets
1.1 Introduction
This article empirically examines downward nominal wage rigidity and its employment conse-
quences in a developing country context. Under such rigidities, wages are expected to exhibit three
features. First, wages are rigid—they do not adjust fully to productivity shocks. Second, the rigidity
is asymmetric—adjustment is hindered particularly in the downward direction. Third, the rigidity
applies to nominal wage reductions—real wage cuts are not impeded if they occur through inflation.
Put simply, wages resist falling from their current values in nominal terms. Such rigidities, if present,
can deepen the impact of recessions and heighten employment volatility. As a result, they have been
a focus of much debate in a broad literature on unemployment and business cycle dynamics.1 In
addition, they could help explain apparent labor market imperfections in poor countries, such as
labor rationing and diﬀerences in labor allocation on small and large farms.2
Establishing the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity has posed an empirical challenge.
A literature in OECD countries finds evidence based primarily on examining distributions of wage
changes (e.g., McLaughlin 1994; Kahn 1997; Dickens et al. 2006). While this approach yields
compelling documentation, it is vulnerable to measurement error and requires limiting analysis to
workers employed by the same firm in consecutive years.3 Importantly, it also does not allow for
analysis of the employment eﬀects of rigidities. A more direct test would involve examining how
wages react to changes in the marginal revenue product of labor, but shifters of this are typically
1 For overviews, see Tobin (1972); Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987); Blanchard (1990); Clarida, Galì, and Gertler (1999);
Akerlof (2002); and Galì (2002).
2 See Rosenzweig (1988) and Behrman (1999) for reviews of the debate on labor market imperfections in this context.
3 Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) and Card and Hyslop (1997) provide excellent discussions of measurement
challenges associated with the histogram approach.
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diﬃcult to isolate.4
To overcome this challenge, I exploit a feature of agricultural production in developing countries.
In this setting, local rainfall variation generates transitory labor demand shocks. I focus on markets
for casual daily agricultural labor—a major source of employment in poor countries. To test for
rigidity, I examine market-level wage and employment responses to rainfall shocks in 500 Indian
districts from 1956 to 2008.
Wage responses are consistent with downward rigidities. First, wage adjustment is asymmetric.
While nominal wages rise robustly in response to positive shocks, they do not fall during droughts
on average. Second, transitory positive shocks cause a persistent increase in wages. When a positive
shock in one year is followed by a non-positive shock in the following year, wages do not adjust back
down—they remain higher than they would have been in the absence of the lagged positive shock.
Third, particularly consistent with nominal rigidity, inflation moderates these wage distortions.
When inflation is higher, droughts are more likely to result in lower real wages. In addition,
transitory positive shocks are less likely to have persistent wage eﬀects. For example, when inflation
is above 6%, positive shocks have no impact on future wages. Since local rainfall is uncorrelated
with inflation levels, these tests have a causal interpretation.5 The findings support the hypothesis
that inflation “greases the wheels” of the labor market (see, e.g., Tobin 1972; Akerlof, Dickens, and
Perry 1996; Card and Hyslop 1997).
When nominal rigidities bind—keeping wages above market clearing levels—this distorts em-
ployment. For a given non-positive shock in the current year, a transitory positive shock in the
previous year raises current wages without aﬀecting current productivity. This causes a 3% average
drop in total worker-days spent in agriculture. This magnitude is equivalent to the employment
decrease during a drought. There is heterogeneity in these eﬀects: workers with less land are consid-
erably more likely to be rationed out of the labor market. This is because landed households exhaust
their own labor supply on their farms before hiring outside labor, whereas those with little or no
4 Holzer and Montgomery (1993) perform analysis in this spirit. They examine correlations of wage and employment
growth with sales growth, which they assume reflects demand shifts. They find that wage changes are asymmetric
and are small compared to employment changes. Card (1990) uses a diﬀerent approach in the context of unionized
Canadian firms. When nominal wages are explicitly indexed to expected inflation, real wages do not adjust to
inflation surprises. As a result, these firms adjust employment down (up) when inflation surprises raise (lower) real
wages.
5 Rainfall shocks are local to small geographic areas and do not aﬀect national price levels—a fact I verify empirically
in Section 1.4.
4
land must supply to other farms at the prevailing wage. As a result, landless laborers experience
a 6% average drop in employment. Overall, these employment dynamics are consistent with boom
and bust cycles in village economies. They also match observations from other contexts that labor
markets exhibit relatively large employment volatility and small wage variation.
When workers face rationing in external employment, they increase labor supply to their own
farms. Specifically, households in the bottom tercile of landholdings supply 7% more labor to their
own land in the year after a positive shock than if the positive shock had not occurred. This
is consistent with the prediction that in the presence of labor market failures, a household’s labor
supply decision will not be separable from its decision of how much labor to use on its farm (see, e.g.:
Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986; Benjamin 1992; Udry 1996). The fact that smaller farms tend to use
more labor per acre and have higher yields per acre than larger farms has been widely documented
in the development literature (e.g. Bardhan 1973). These results support the hypothesis that this
relationship can be attributed to separation failures, which lead the marginal product of labor to
be lower on smaller farms than larger ones.
Could the above findings be explained by factors other than nominal wage rigidity? For example,
if positive shocks have persistent productivity eﬀects, this could explain why wages remain high in
the following year. However, in this case, employment should not fall in the next year. Alternately,
inter-temporal substitution in labor could explain why positive shocks increase future wages and
lower future employment. However, this is not consistent with the inflation results—labor supply
shifters should not be aﬀected by inflation. In addition, small farms respond to the decrease in
external employment by supplying more intensively to their own farms—this is also inconsistent with
the idea that the wage dynamics are driven by a decrease in labor supply in the year after a positive
shock. Similar arguments imply that factors such as income eﬀects, migration, or capital investment
are also not driving the empirical findings. I argue the pattern of results is most consistent with
nominal rigidities.
There is some evidence that wages are less rigid in areas where the costs of rigidity are likely to
be higher. Certain crops are especially sensitive to the amount of labor hired—for example, they
experience large output losses if not harvested immediately upon reaching maturity. In areas with
such crops, price flexibility is particularly important because ineﬃcient labor allocation will lead to
especially large profit losses. Consistent with this, districts that grow more labor-sensitive crops are
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more likely to experience nominal wage cuts during droughts. In addition, while these districts are
equally likely to raise wages in response to transitory positive shocks, such shocks are less likely to
have persistent wage eﬀects. These results provide suggestive evidence that rigidity is endogenous
to local economic conditions.6
Having established the presence of nominal rigidity, I explore possible mechanisms using a survey
I conducted in rural India. A growing body of evidence argues that nominal wage cuts are perceived
as unfair, causing decreases in worker productivity.7 Following Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
(1986), I presented 400 agricultural laborers and landed farmers in 34 villages with scenarios about
wage setting behavior, and asked them to rate the behaviors as fair or unfair on a 4-point scale. The
results suggest that wage cuts strongly violate fairness norms. For example, 62% of respondents
thought it was unfair for an employer to cut wages after a surge in unemployment. To examine
diﬀerences between nominal and real wages, I presented a scenario in which employers cut real
wages by 5%, but varied whether this was achieved through a nominal wage cut or inflation. 64%
of respondents thought it was unfair to cut nominal wages by 5% during a period of no inflation.
In contrast, only 9% of respondents thought it was unfair to raise nominal wages by 5% during
a period of 10% inflation. Respondents also displayed a strong belief that workers decrease eﬀort
when fairness norms are violated. Consistent with the crop heterogeneity results, in villages with
more labor-sensitive crops, respondents were considerably less likely to view wage cuts as unfair.
This suggests that fairness norms may form, at least in part, endogenously.
The results point to the relevance of nominal rigidities in a setting with few of the institutional
constraints that have received prominence in the existing literature. For example, in villages, mini-
mum wage legislation is largely ignored and formal unions are rare (Rosenzweig 1980; 1988). Wage
contracts for casual laborers are typically of short duration (on the order of days) and can more
easily reflect recent changes in market conditions. Observing rigidity in such a context is consistent
with the potential importance of non-institutional forces such as fairness norms in labor markets.
6 These findings are only suggestive since planting decisions are endogenous. The causality could also run in the
opposite direction: farmers could be more likely to plant labor sensitive crops in areas where there are weaker
norms for rigid wages.
7 Individual responses to a range of scenarios suggest the relevance of nominal variables (Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky
1997). Employers express perceptions that nominal wage cuts damage worker morale, with potential consequences
for labor productivity (Blinder and Choi 1990; Bewley 1999). Lab and field studies validate the survey evidence
(Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993; Fehr and Falk 1999; Gneezy and List 2006). See Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder
(2009) for a broader discussion of the relevance of fairness preferences in labor markets.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents a model of nominal wage rigidity.
Section 1.3 lays out the empirical strategy that will be used to test the model’s predictions. Section
1.4 presents the results. Section 1.5 evaluates whether explanations other than nominal rigidity
can explain the results. Section 1.6 discusses mechanisms for nominal rigidities and presents survey
evidence for the role of fairness norms in villages. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
In this section, I model a small open economy with decentralized wage setting and exogenous
product prices. Rigidities arise because workers view wage cuts below a nominal reference wage as
unfair, and retaliate to such cuts by decreasing eﬀort.8 In the empirical work, the reference wage
will be the average nominal wage in the market in the previous period. I use this framework to
develop testable implications of fairness preferences on labor market outcomes.
1.2.1 Set-up
The labor force is comprised of a unit mass of potential workers. All workers are equally
productive. They are indexed by parameter  i, which equals worker i’s cost of supplying 1 unit of
eﬀective labor. This parameter is distributed uniformly over the interval
⇥
0, 
⇤
. The worker’s payoﬀ
from accepting a nominal wage oﬀer of w equals the utility from consuming her real wage minus
the disutility of working:
u
✓
w
p
◆
   ie
⇢
1 +
1   
 
I{w<wR}
 
,
where p is the price level. The disutility of work equals  i times the amount of eﬀort, e, exerted by
the worker. The term in brackets captures fairness preferences. Workers view working for a wage
below an exogenous nominal reference wage, wR, as unfair. The worker’s disutility of work is scaled
up by 1    I{w<wR}, where I{w<wR} is an indicator for whether the wage is below wR and   2 (0, 1].
When   = 1, the disutility of work is the same regardless of whether w < wR. As   decreases,
working for a wage below the reference wage imposes larger costs.
A market-wide fairness norm governs workers’ eﬀort behavior. The worker usually exerts a
8 In Section 1.6, I provide support for this modeling assumption using survey evidence on village fairness norms. I
also discuss whether other micro-foundations for rigidity are consistent with the context of the study and empirical
results.
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standard amount of eﬀort: e = 1. However, when she feels treated unfairly by the firm, she reduces
her eﬀort to exactly oﬀset the disutility from the fairness violation:
e =
8>><>>:
1 w   wR
  w < wR
. (1.1)
In the model, I take this fairness norm as exogenous.9 More generally, it can be conceptualized as
the reduced form for a strategy in a repeated game. Worker i’s payoﬀ from accepting wage oﬀer w
reduces to u
⇣
w
p
⌘
   i. I normalize the payoﬀ from not working as 0. When all firms oﬀer wage w,
aggregate labor supply is given by:
LS =
1
 
u
✓
w
p
◆
. (1.2)
There are J firms (indexed by j), where J is large so that each firm’s wage contributes negligibly
to the average market wage. Firm j’s profits from hiring Lj workers at nominal wage wj equals:
⇡j = p✓f (eLj)  wjLj , (1.3)
where ✓ is a non-negative stochastic productivity parameter whose realization is common to all
firms and f (•) is a continuous, increasing, twice-diﬀerentiable concave function. Note that output
depends on eﬀective labor—the number of workers times the eﬀort exerted by each worker.
1.2.2 Benchmark Case: No Rigidity
I begin by solving the benchmark case in which there are no fairness preferences, i.e., when
  = 1. In this case, e = 1 for all w. Firm j’s profits are given by:
⇡j = p✓f (Lj)  wjLj . (1.4)
9 This is similar to the conceptualization of worker retaliation in Akerlof and Yellen (1990). They assume an exogenous
eﬀort rule according to which workers reduce eﬀort in proportion to how far their wage falls below a perceived fair
wage, and examine the implications of this in an economy with inelastically fixed labor supply.
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I focus on the symmetric pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, in which all firms oﬀer the same wage:10
wj = w
⇤ (✓, p) 8j,
where w⇤ (✓, p) will be used to denote the benchmark equilibrium wage level at ✓ and p. Since firms
are identical, they all demand the same amount of labor, L⇤ (✓, p). The firm’s first order condition
is:
p✓f 0 (L⇤) = w⇤. (1.5)
This pins down the optimal choice of labor at w⇤; since this condition is the same for all firms, all
firms will demand the same amount of labor L⇤. The market clearing condition is characterized by:
JL⇤ =
1
 
u
✓
w⇤
p
◆
. (1.6)
This condition simply equates the amount of aggregate labor demand with aggregate labor supply
at (w⇤, L⇤).
Proposition 1.1: Market clearing in benchmark case
If workers do not exhibit fairness preferences, the unique pure strategy symmetric Nash
Equilibrium will satisfy conditions (1.5) and (1.6). The labor market will clear for all
realizations of ✓.
Proof: See Appendix A. ⌅
Note that equations (1.5) and (1.6) correspond exactly to the conditions in a competitive equilib-
rium. Combining these equations and taking the derivative of w⇤ with respect to ✓ gives @w
⇤(✓,p)
@✓ > 0
for all values of ✓. Consequently, any decrease in ✓ will lead to a reduction in the equilibrium wage
level.
10 In villages, it is common for employers to conform to a single prevailing wage for agricultural workers. Section 1.4
(Table 1.5) presents evidence in support of this. It is therefore reasonable in this setting to focus on pure strategy
symmetric equilibria.
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Corollary 1.1: Complete adjustment to negative shocks in benchmark case
If workers do not exhibit fairness preferences, the wage will adjust downward with a
decrease in ✓ over all ✓-values.
1.2.3 Downward Rigidity at the Reference Wage
I now turn to examine the implications of fairness preferences on labor market outcomes. Firm
profits are given by expression (1.3). Note that for any (wj , Lj) combination, profits are always
weakly lower in the fairness case than the benchmark case.
In the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium:
wj = w (wR, ✓, p) 8j,
where w (wR, ✓, p) will be used to denote the equilibrium wage level corresponding to reference
wage wR, TFP ✓, and price p in the fairness case. All firms demand the same amount of labor,
L (wR, ✓, p). For a given w, this is pinned down by the firm’s first order condition, which exhibits a
discontinuity around wR :
w =
8>><>>:
p✓f 0
 
L
 
w   wR
p✓ f 0
 
 L
 
w < wR
. (1.7)
When w   wR, this corresponds exactly to the first order condition in the benchmark case. However,
when w < wR, retaliation by the firm’s workers makes them less productive. I assume:
f 0
 
L
 
>  f 0
 
 L
 
for   < 1. (1.8)
Condition (1.8) implies that for a given wage level w < wR, firms demand less labor than in
the benchmark case. This condition always holds, for example, under Cobb-Douglas production:
f (eL) = (eL)↵ .
Define ✓R as the unique value of ✓ at which wR is the equilibrium wage and the labor market
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clears. Specifically, ✓R is pinned down by the the following two conditions:11
w (wR, ✓R, p) = wR
JL (wR, ✓R, p) =
1
 
u
✓
wR
p
◆
.
The next proposition establishes asymmetric adjustment in wages around ✓R.
Proposition 1.2: Asymmetric adjustment to shocks
In the unique pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium:
(i) There exists a ✓0R < ✓R such that for all ✓ 2 (✓0R, ✓R):
w (wR, ✓, p) = wR and JL (wR, ✓, p) < 1 u
⇣
w(wR,✓,p)
p
⌘
.
In addition, lim
 !0
✓0R = 0.
(ii) For ✓   ✓R, the wage will correspond to the benchmark case and the labor market
will clear:
w (wR, ✓, p) = w⇤ (✓, p) and JL (wR, ✓, p) = 1 u
⇣
w(wR,✓,p)
p
⌘
.
Proof: See Appendix A. ⌅
11 Note that these two conditions imply that ✓R is the value of ✓ for which wR is the equilibrium wage in the benchmark
case: w⇤ (✓R, p) = wR.
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θ 
wR 
θR 
€ 
w (wR,θ,p)
Equilibrium Wages 
θ 
θR 
Labor supply 
Labor demand 
Equilibrium Employment 
€ 
L (wR,θ,p)
€ 
L (wR,θR,p)
Figure 1.1: Asymmetric Adjustment to Shocks
Notes: This figure illustrates the relationship between wages and ✓, and employment and ✓ (Proposition 1.2). The
figure is drawn for the case of l ⇡ 0.
For values of ✓ above ✓R, firms will increase wages smoothly as ✓ rises. However, for values of ✓
below ✓R, if firms cut nominal wages, they will suﬀer profit losses from decreases in worker eﬀort. For
suﬃciently small decreases in ✓ below ✓R, it will be more profitable to maintain wages at wR. Since
the wage will remain the same, aggregate labor supply will remain the same. However, the firm’s
first order condition (1.7) implies labor demand will fall due to ✓ < ✓R, leading to excess supply in
the market. Once ✓ falls to a suﬃciently low level, below ✓0R, wR can no longer be sustained as an
equilibrium; equilibrium wages will be below wR and the labor market will clear. Note that ✓0R will
be lower for smaller values of  : as   approaches 0, firms will never find it profitable to lower wages
below wR. As a simple illustration, Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between realizations of ✓ and
labor market outcomes for the case of   ⇡ 0.
1.2.4 Impact of Increases in the Reference Wage
The above analysis implies that increases in the reference wage will expand the range of ✓-values
at which distortions occur. In addition, if   is small so that wage cuts below the reference wage are
rare, then reference wage increases will be particularly distortionary.12
Proposition 1.3: Distortions from reference wage increases
12 In the empirical work, reference wage increases will arise from transitory positive shocks in the previous year—which
raise the wage in the previous year and therefore lead to a higher reference wage in the current year.
12
Suppose the reference wage increases to wS > wR. For any ✓ < ✓S and   suﬃciently
small:
w (wS , ✓, p) > w (wR, ✓, p)
L (wS , ✓, p) < L (wR, ✓, p).
Proof: See Appendix A. ⌅
θS 
θ 
wR 
θR 
wS 
€ 
w (wS,θ,p)
€ 
w (wR,θ,p)
Impact on Wages 
θS 
θ 
θR 
€ 
L (wS,θ,p)
€ 
L (wR,θ,p)
Impact on Employment 
€ 
L (wS,θS,p)
€ 
L (wR,θR,p)
Figure 1.2: Distortions from Reference Wage Increases
Notes: This figure illustrates the impact of an increase in the reference wage on equilibrium wages and employment
(Proposition 1.3). The figure is drawn for the case of l⇡0.
Since ✓R < ✓S , the wage distortions for ✓  ✓R will now be larger under wS than they were
under wR. This will cause a particularly large excess supply of labor for ✓  ✓R: labor demand will
now be lower (leading to a drop in employment) while labor supply will actually be higher due to
the wage increase. Figure 1.2 illustrates the impact of a reference wage increase on labor market
outcomes for the case of   ⇡ 0.
1.2.5 Impact of Inflation
In the benchmark case, prices are neutral. It is straightforward to verify from conditions (1.5)
and (1.6):
@w⇤ (✓, p)
p
=
w⇤
p
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@L⇤ (✓, p)
p
= 0.
Firms raise nominal wages to exactly oﬀset the change in real wages from a price increase, keeping
real wages constant and employment at the same level.
In contrast, when workers have fairness preferences over a nominal wage, inflation will no longer
be neutral. When price levels rise, a given real wage level is associated with a higher nominal wage.
As a result, for any wR, a price increase means that the value of ✓ at which wR is the market clearing
nominal wage will now be lower. The rigidity will bind to the left of this lower ✓ value; this means
distortions will aﬀect a smaller portion of the ✓-distribution.
Proposition 1.4: Inflation will mitigate distortions from nominal rigidity
For any fixed ✓ = e✓ and p = ep such that:
w
⇣
wR, e✓, ep⌘ = wR and JL⇣wR, e✓, ep⌘ < 1 u✓w(wR,e✓,p˜)p ◆,
9p0 > ep such that 8p   p0:
w
⇣
wR, e✓, p⌘ = w⇤ ⇣e✓, p⌘ and JL⇣wR, e✓, p⌘ = 1 u✓w(wR,e✓,p)p ◆
Proof: See Appendix A. ⌅
For any fixed e✓ at which the nominal rigidity binds (i.e. the wage is at the reference wage and there
is excess supply), a suﬃciently large increase in prices will lead to nominal wages rising above the
reference wage. This will enable real wages to fall without incurring eﬀort retaliation from workers.
The wage at e✓ will correspond to the benchmark case and the labor market will clear.
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Figure 1.3: Inflation Mitigates Wage Distortions
Notes: This figure illustrates the impact of inflation in moderating wage distortions (Proposition 1.4). The graph on
the left demonstrates the impact of an increase in price levels on equilibrium wages. The graph on the right illustrates
the impact of inflation under an increase in the reference wage. The figure is drawn for the case of l⇡0.
Figure 1.3 illustrates how inflation moderates the distortions described in Propositions 1.2 and
1.3 for the case of   ⇡ 0. By Proposition 2, at a fixed ep, there will be a ✓A around which adjustment
will be asymmetric. For p > ep, the wage outcomes for ✓-values just below ✓A will adjust so
that: w⇤ (✓, p) = w (wR, ✓, p) < w
 
wR, ✓A, p
 
= w⇤
 
✓A, p
 
. In other words, inflation will lead to
symmetric adjustment around ✓A. In addition, inflation can also oﬀset distortions from reference
wage increases (Proposition 3). For any set of reference wages wR and wS , at a given e✓, a suﬃciently
high p will cause nominal wages to be above wS . Then, whether the reference wage is wR or wS
will clearly have no impact on the equilibrium wage, which will correspond to the benchmark.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Context: Rural Labor Markets in India
Agricultural production in India, as in most developing countries, is largely undertaken on
smallholder farms. The median farm size is 1 acre, with considerable variation in landholdings.13
The composition of farm employment varies and is often a mix of household and hired labor. Markets
13 This, along with the remaining statistics in this sub-section, are from India’s National Sample Survey data (1982-
2008), described in Section 1.3.3 below.
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for hired labor are active: most households buy and/or sell labor.14 Workers are typically hired for
standard tasks such as plowing, sowing, weeding, and harvesting.
The vast majority of hired labor is traded in decentralized markets for casual daily workers. For
example, 97% of agricultural wage contracts are reported as casual wage contracts. In addition,
67% of landless rural workers report casual employment as their primary source of earnings.
There are few institutional constraints in these markets. Contracts are usually negotiated bi-
laterally between landowners and laborers in a decentralized manner; unions or other formal labor
institutions are rare. Wage contracts are typically of short duration (on the order of days).15 As
a result, they can more easily reflect recent changes in market conditions and time worked is more
flexible than in other contexts. Minimum wage policies are in practice ignored and there is little
government intervention in the labor market (Rosenzweig 1980; 1988).
Agricultural production is heavily rainfall dependent and exhibits considerable seasonality in
work intensity. The major rainfall episode is the yearly monsoon. The monsoon typically arrives
between June-July in most parts of the country and marks the beginning of the agricultural year. For
rice (the major crop in India) as well as some other crops, this is when field preparation and planting
occur. The subsequent months involve various maintenance activities such as fertilizer application
and weeding. Rice harvesting typically occurs between November and January, followed by post-
harvest activities such as threshing and processing. March-May is the lean season. As discussed in
Section 1.3.4, the monsoon aﬀects labor demand in the various seasons over the agricultural year
through impacts on planting levels, harvest yields, and the intensity of post-harvest tasks.
1.3.2 Empirical Tests
Testing the model’s predictions requires identifying variation in both total factor productivity,
✓, and in the nominal reference wage, wR. I exploit rainfall variation to isolate shifters of both
parameters in rural labor markets. A distinct labor market is defined as an Indian district (an ad-
ministrative geographic unit). The empirical implementation will focus on discrete rainfall shocks:
in each year, a labor market can experience a positive shock, no shock, or a negative shock (corre-
14 See, for example, Table I of Rosenzweig (1980) for evidence from India, Tables I-III in Benjamin (1992) for evidence
from Indonesia, and Bardhan (1997) for a broader discussion of the composition of agricultural employment.
15 Of course, this does not rule out longer-term informal implicit contracts.
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sponding to a high, medium, or low realization of ✓, respectively). These shocks have no persistent
productivity impacts: the value of ✓ in each year is determined solely by the rainfall shock in that
year.16 In addition, I assume the reference wage in a season equals the average market wage during
that season in the previous year. A positive shock in the previous year would on average have raised
wages in each season in the previous year, leading to a higher reference wage in each season this
year.
This implies that examining the joint impact of lagged and current shocks on current wages can
be used to test the model’s predictions. Since there are 3 possible shocks in a given year, over every
consecutive 2-year period, there are 9 possible realizations of shocks. This gives rise to the following
estimating equation for wages:
widst = ↵i0 + ↵
ii
0 S
{ ,0}
dt + ↵
i
1S
{0,+}
dt + ↵
ii
1 S
{ ,+}
dt + ↵
iii
1 S
{+,+}
dt + ↵
i
2S
{0, }
dt + ↵
ii
2 S
{ , }
dt
+ ↵i3S
{+, }
dt + ↵
ii
3 S
{+,0}
dt + 'Xidst +  d + ⌘t + ⌧s + "idst,
(1.9)
where widst is the nominal wage of worker i in district d in season s of year t; Xidst is a vector of
controls;  d, ⌘t, and ⌧s are vectors of district, year, and season fixed eﬀects, respectively.
Each of the remaining 8 covariates is an indicator for the realization of a particular sequence of
shocks. The indicators take the form S{i,j}dt , where i denotes district d’s shock in year t   1 and j
denotes the district’s shock in year t. The i and j take the values  , 0, and +, which correspond
to the realization of a negative shock, no shock, and a positive shock, respectively. Each indicator
equals 1 if that particular sequence of shocks was realized and equals 0 otherwise. For example
S{+,0}dt , equals 1 if district d had a positive shock last year and no shock this year, and equals 0
otherwise. The sequence S{0,0}dt , which is the case when the district experienced no shock last year
and no shock this year, is omitted and serves as the reference case. Shocks are drawn from an
iid distribution each year and are uncorrelated with the residual error, "idst. Thus, each of the
coeﬃcients on the indicator functions in equation (1.9) represents the reduced form average eﬀect
of that particular sequence of shocks on year t wages relative to S{0,0}dt .
Proposition 1.2 of the model predicts asymmetric adjustment in wages.
16 This is a standard assumption in prior work that exploits rainfall shocks to investigate a range of outcomes in India
(e.g., Paxson 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Townsend 1994; Jayachandran 2006). In Section 1.5, I use the
results to rule out persistent productivity impacts of shocks.
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Prediction 1.1: Wage distortions: negative shocks
If there is no rigidity, wages will fall in response to negative shocks. In the presence of
downward rigidities, wages may not fall in response to negative shocks.
I test this prediction by checking whether wages fall in response to contemporaneous negative
shocks—the sequences S{0, }dt , S
{ , }
dt , and S
{+, }
dt —relative to the reference case of S
{0,0}
dt . Note
that in the presence of downward rigidities, S{+, }dt may cause wages to be even higher than the
reference case, as discussed in Prediction 1.2 below.
Test 1.1:
H0 : ↵i2 < 0, ↵ii2 < 0, and ↵i3 < 0.
H1 : ↵i2 = ↵
ii
2 = 0 and ↵i3   0 under suﬃciently severe downward rigidities.
Under the null of no rigidities, only current shocks should predict wages: for S{i,j}dt , the sign of the
coeﬃcient should be determined solely by j. However, under rigidities, lagged shocks can matter
through their impact on the current reference wage (Proposition 1.3 of the model).
Prediction 1.2: Wage distortions: lagged positive shocks
If there is no rigidity, lagged positive shocks will have no impact on current wages. In
the presence of downward rigidities, when a positive shock last year is followed by a non-
positive shock this year, this may lead to higher current wages than if the lagged positive
shock had not occurred.
I test this by checking whether the sequences S{+, }dt and S
{+,0}
dt raise wages relative to the reference
case of S{0,0}dt .
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Test 1.2:
H0 : ↵i3 < 0 and ↵ii3 = 0.
H1 : ↵i3 > 0 and ↵ii3 > 0 under suﬃciently severe downward rigidities.
Note that Tests 1.1 and 1.2 only have power under suﬃciently large costs of worker retaliation (i.e.
suﬃciently small l). If this cost is suﬃciently low, firms will cut wages in response to decreases in ✓
and this estimation strategy may fail to produce a rejection of the null even though rigidities exist.
The remaining sequences of shocks in model (1.9) do not distinguish downward nominal rigidity
from the benchmark case—they will have the same eﬀects on wages in both cases. Specifically,
when a negative shock is followed by no shock, wages should be the same as in the reference case:
↵ii0 = 0. In addition, contemporaneous positive shocks will increase wages relative to the reference
case: ↵i1 > 0, ↵ii1 > 0, and ↵iii1 > 0. These sequences are included for completeness in the estimating
equations.
To simplify the empirical analysis, the below alternate specification combines sequences of shocks
into groups with common predictions:
widst =  0 +  1
h
S{0,+}dt + S
{ ,+}
dt + S
{+,+}
dt
i
+  2
h
S{0, }dt + S
{ , }
dt
i
+  i3S
{+, }
dt +  
ii
3 S
{+,0}
dt
+ 'Xidst +  d + ⌘t + ⌧s + "idst.
(1.10)
The omitted category in model (1.10) is the sequences S{0,0}dt and S
{ ,0}
dt . Each term in brackets
constitutes a new indicator function:
h
S{0,+}dt + S
{ ,+}
dt + S
{+,+}
dt
i
equals 1 if district d experienced
a contemporaneous positive shock in year t and equals 0 otherwise, and
h
S{0, }dt + S
{ , }
dt
i
equals 1
if the district had a non-positive shock last year followed by a negative shock this year. All other
covariates are the same as in (1.9). Tests 1.1 and 1.2 imply that under suﬃciently severe rigidities,
 2 = 0,  i3 > 0, and  ii3 > 0.
In the presence of rigidities, inflation will enable symmetric wage adjustment and moderate the
eﬀects of reference wage increases (Proposition 1.4 of the model):
Prediction 1.3: Impact of inflation on wage distortions
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In the absence of rigidities, inflation will not alter the impact of shocks. In the presence
of rigidities, when inflation is higher, wages will be more likely to be lower during negative
shocks. In addition, when inflation is higher, lagged positive shocks will be less likely to
raise current wages.
The following regression model adds interactions of each of the shock categories with the inflation
rate:
widst =  0 +  1
h
S{0,+}dt + S
{ ,+}
dt + S
{+,+}
dt
i
+  1Idt
h
S{0,+}dt + S
{ ,+}
dt + S
{+,+}
dt
i
+  2
h
S{0, }dt + S
{ , }
dt
i
+  2Idt
h
S{0, }dt + S
{ , }
dt
i
+  i3S
{+, }
dt +  
ii
3 S
{+,0}
dt +  
i
3IdtS
{+, }
dt +  
ii
3 IdtS
{+,0}
dt
+ 'Xidst +  d + ⌘t + ⌧s + "idst,
(1.11)
where Idt is the percentage change in price levels in district d between years t  1 and t.
Test 1.3:
H0 :  1 =  2 =  i3 =  
ii
3 = 0
H1 :  1 = 0, while  2 < 0,  i3 < 0, and  ii3 < 0.
In the reference case, employers will raise nominal wages by the inflation rate to keep real wages
constant. In cases where rigidities cause wage distortions—contemporaneous negative shocks and
lagged positive shocks—employers can simply not adjust nominal wages upward, thereby achieving
real wage reductions. As a result, when inflation is higher, nominal wages will be more likely to be
lower in these cases relative to the reference case.
For a given non-positive shock in the current year, a transitory positive shock in the previous
year raises current wages without aﬀecting the current value of ✓. This wage distortion should
generate a distortion on employment:
Prediction 1.4: Employment distortions: lagged positive shocks
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If there is no rigidity, lagged positive shocks will have no impact on current employment.
In the presence of downward rigidities, when a positive shock last year is followed by a
non-positive shock this year, this will lead to lower employment than if the lagged positive
shock had not occurred.
The following model allows for tests for the impact of shocks on employment:
eidst = ⇢0 + ⇢1
h
S{0,+}dt + ⇢
{ ,+}
dt + ⇢
{+,+}
dt
i
+ ⇢2
h
S{0, }dt + S
{ , }
dt
i
+ ⇢i3S
{+, }
dt + ⇢
ii
3 S
{+,0}
dt
+ 'Xidst +  d + ⌘t + ⌧s + "idst,
(1.12)
where eidst is the employment level of worker i in district d in season s of year t, and all other
covariates are the same as in model (1.10). As tests of Prediction 4, sequences S{0,0}dt and S
{ ,0}
dt
(which are the omitted category) serve as counterfactuals for S{+,0}dt —the value of ✓ is the same in
the current year, the only diﬀerence is whether there is a wage distortion from a lagged positive
shock. Similarly, S{0, }dt and S
{ , }
dt serve as counterfactuals for S
{+, }
dt —while employment should
fall under all these sequences, the fall should be relatively more severe for S{+, }dt due to the added
wage distortion from the lagged positive shock.17
Test 1.4:
H0 : ⇢i3 = ⇢2 < 0 and ⇢ii3 = 0
H1 : ⇢i3 < ⇢2 < 0 and ⇢ii3 < 0.
In villages, those who own land have the option to exhaust their own labor supply on their farms
before hiring external non-household labor. In contrast, the landless must sell their labor externally
17 The model predicts employment distortions from all contemporaneous negative shocks. However, testing for distor-
tions under the sequences S{0, }dt and S
{0, }
dt requires a counterfactual benchmark of how much employment would
have fallen if wages were flexible. However, there is no clear benchmark for this; constructing one would require
imposing assumptions about the parameters of the production function and labor supply elasticity. Consequently,
I focus in the employment tests on the eﬀect of lag positive shocks, which have clear counterfactuals with clean
qualitative predictions.
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to other farms at the prevailing wage. As a result, when nominal rigidities bind, those with less
land will be most likely to be rationed out of the labor market.
Prediction 1.4A: Employment distortions will be more severe for those with
less land
Those with less land will be relatively more likely to suﬀer employment losses after lagged
positive shocks.
This prediction is readily tested by adding interactions of land size with the shock categories in
regression model (1.12) and checking if the distortions from S{+, }dt and S
{+,0}
dt are higher for those
with less land.
1.3.3 Data
Wage and employment data for over 500 Indian districts during the years 1956-2008 is con-
structed using two primary datasets.
The first source is the rural sample of the Employment/Unemployment rounds of the Indian
National Sample Survey, a nationally representative survey of over 500 Indian districts.18 House-
holds in each district are sampled on a rolling basis over the agricultural year (July to June). The
agricultural years 1982, 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, 2004, 2005, and 2007 are covered. The survey elicits
daily employment and wage information for each household member over the 7 days preceding the
interview. I compute the daily agricultural wage as paid earnings for casual agricultural work di-
vided by days worked.19 I measure agricultural employment as the total percentage of the interview
18 A district is an administrative unit in India, with an average of 17 districts per state. Like counties in the US,
districts vary greatly in size. On average, a district has approximately 2 million total residents.
19 Agricultural work is identified in the questionnaire as work activity corresponding to one of 6 possible agricultural
operations such as plowing, sowing, weeding, etc. The wage data is restricted to observations in which a worker
was paid for work performed; these do not include imputed wages for self-employment. I use total wage earnings:
cash plus in-kind wages. 93% of wage observations in the sample have some cash component. Given potential
measurement error in the valuation of in-kind wages, as a robustness check, I have also performed the analysis
using log cash wages as the dependent variable in the wage regressions. The results are similar.
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reference period during which a worker was employed in agricultural activities (own farm work plus
hired out labor). This employment variable is constructed for members of the agricultural labor
force (i.e. individuals who report agriculture as their primary or subsidiary source of employment).
The second source is the World Bank Agriculture and Climate dataset, which provides yearly
panel data on 228 Indian districts in 13 states over the agricultural years 1956-1987.20 The unit of
observation is a district-year. The reported wage variable equals the mean daily wage for a male
ploughman in the district-year.21 Data on 20 crops, including acres planted and yields, is also
included.
Rainfall data is taken from Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-2008 Gridded Monthly Time Series
(version 2.01), constructed by the Center for Climatic Research, University of Delaware. Rainfall
estimates are constructed for 0.5 by 0.5 degree latitude-longitude grids by interpolating from 20
nearby weather stations. I match the geographic center of each district to the nearest latitude-
longitude node in the rain data. These district coordinates are included in the World Bank data;
for the NSS data, I have obtained them using district boundaries from the Indian census. The
measure of interest is rainfall in the first month when the monsoon typically arrives in a district,
which ranges from May to July for each district. Rainfall shock definitions, discussed below, are
constructed as deviations from the district’s usual rainfall in the sample. Rainfall distributions are
computed for each district separately for each dataset: they are based on the years 1956-1987 for
the World Bank wage data and the years 1982-2007 for the NSS data.
The national inflation rate is constructed from CPI indices from the government publication
Agricultural Prices in India. Inflation in year t is defined as the average change in monthly inflation
from July of year t-1 to June of year t. For 1965-1987, this is computed as the mean inflation level
across all states using the state CPI for Agricultural Workers. For 1956-1962, it is computed from
the national Working Class Cost of Living Index, since agricultural CPI numbers are not available
for these earlier years. There is no inflation data available for 4 of the years in the World Bank
20 The dataset includes data on 271 districts. I limit analysis to 228 agricultural districts, which I define as the districts
whose mean percentage of land area planted with rice in the sample is at least 1%. Since rice is the dominant crop
in India, districts that do not grow any rice are unlikely to engage in substantial agricultural activity. Performing
the analysis below with all 271 districts gives similar results, with slightly larger standard errors.
21 This information was collected from sampled villages within each district. A knowledgeable person in each village,
such as a school teacher or village oﬃcial, was asked the prevailing wage rate in the village. In years when the data
for a male ploughman are not available, wages for a general male agricultural laborer are used instead.
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data: 1960, 1963, 1964, and 1975.
1.3.4 Definition of Shocks
Figure 1.4 shows the non-parametric relationship between rainfall levels and 3 outcomes: crop
yields, agricultural employment, and agricultural wages. The yield and wage graphs use observations
from the World Bank data. The employment results are from the NSS data since the World Bank
dataset does not contain employment information. I regress each dependent variable on controls
(including year and district fixed eﬀects) and rainfall decile dummies.22 Each decile dummy is an
indicator for whether the district’s rainfall in the first month of the monsoon that year fell within
the given decile of the district’s rain distribution. The graphs plot the coeﬃcients for the decile
dummies.
Figure 1.4 indicates that on average, high rainfall levels are associated with increased crop yields,
higher agricultural employment, and wage increases. Note that even rainfall in the uppermost decile
is a positive productivity shock. In contrast, low rainfall levels (droughts) are associated with lower
average yields and employment; there is weak evidence that wages are lower. In the wage regression
shown in Panel C, the F-test for joint significance of the ninth and tenth decile coeﬃcients has a
p-value of 0.066, while the F-test for the first and second deciles has a p-value of 0.357.
Panels A and B are consistent with the presumption that high (low) rainfall levels constitute
positive (negative) shocks to the marginal product of labor and increase (decrease) labor demand. I
create discrete categories for positive and negative shocks to reflect the non-linear eﬀects of rainfall
on productivity and to increase statistical power. A positive demand shock is defined as rainfall
above the eightieth percentile for the district; a drought as rainfall below the twentieth percentile;
and no shock as rainfall between the twentieth and eightieth percentiles.23 Jayachandran (2006)
also uses rainfall to identify labor demand shifts and employs the same percentile cutoﬀs in defining
shocks. Table 1.1 provides summary statistics on rainfall shocks in the sample.
22 District identifiers are not available for the first three rounds of the NSS data. For these years, the smallest
geographic identifier is the region—there are on average 2.6 regions per state in the NSS data, and a region is
comprised of 8 districts on average. As a result, for all regressions using the NSS dataset, the geographic fixed
eﬀects are region fixed eﬀects for the first three rounds and district fixed eﬀects for the remaining rounds. This is
equivalent to using two pooled panels with separate fixed eﬀects for analysis. Using a common set of region fixed
eﬀects for all rounds gives similar (though slightly less precise) results in the regressions.
23 Although the cut-oﬀs are symmetric, this does not presume that the magnitude of shocks from the upper and lower
tails of the rainfall distribution is symmetric.
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Figure 4 
Impact of Rainfall on Agricultural Outcomes  
 
Panel A: Log Crop Yield 
 
 
Panel B: Agricultural Employment Rate 
 
 
Panel C: Log Nominal Agricultural Wage 
 
 
Notes:  
1. This figure shows the impact of rainfall on 3 outcome measures—log agricultural yields (from 
the World Bank data), the employment rate for workers in the agricultural labor force (from the 
NSS data), and the log nominal daily agricultural wage (in the World Bank data).   
2. The panels plot coefficients from a regression of each outcome on dummies for each decile of the 
rainfall distribution and district and year fixed effects. Each decile dummy equals 1 if the district’s 
rainfall in the current year fell within the given decile of the district’s usual rainfall distribution and 
equals 0 otherwise. The 5th decile is the omitted category in each regression.  The coefficients on 
the decile dummies are shown, along with 95% confidence intervals. The confidence interval for 
the 5th decile is computed by averaging the confidence intervals for the 4th and 6th deciles. 
3. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Figure 1.4: Impact of R infall on Agricult ral Out omes
Notes:
1. This figure shows the impact of rainfall on 3 outcome measures—log agricultural yields (from the World Bank
data), the employment rate for work rs in th agricultural labor force (f om the NSS data), a d the log nominal daily
agricultural wage (in the World Bank data).
2. The panels plot coeﬃcients from a regression of each o tcome on dummies for each decile of the rainfall distribution
and district and year fixed eﬀects. Each decile dummy equals 1 if the district’s rainfall in the current year fell within
the given decile of the district’s usual rainfall distribution and equals 0 otherwise. The 5th decile is the omitted
category in each regression. The coeﬃcients on the decile dummies are shown, along with 95% confidence intervals.
The confidence interval for the 5th decile is computed by averaging the confidence intervals for the 4th and 6th deciles.
3. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year.
Rainfall is serially uncorrelated. I verify this in Appendix Table B.1. To allow for the possibility
that shocks across districts may be correlated within a given year, standard errors are clustered by
region-year in all regressions, using the region definitions provided in the NSS data.24
24 Appendix Table B.1 provides some evidence for negative serial correlation in rainfall. Clustering standard errors
by region makes minor diﬀerence in the results, and slightly improves precision in some cases. To be conservative,
I cluster by region-year.
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Table 1:1: Summary Statistics 
Variable     Observations   
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
District-
years 
Individual-
years Source 
Rainfall shocks      
 % Positive Shocks (1956-1987) 0.222 0.416 7,296  -- Univ of Delaware 
 % Droughts (1956-1987) 0.150 0.357 7,296  -- Univ of Delaware 
 % Positive Shocks (1982-2008) 0.178 0.383 3,419  -- Univ of Delaware 
 % Droughts (1982-2008) 0.186 0.389 3,419  -- Univ of Delaware 
       
Wage and employment variables      
 Log nominal wage (1956-1987) 1.200 0.815 7,296  -- World Bank 
 Log nominal wage (1982-2008) 3.279 0.890  -- 154,578 Natl Sample Survey 
 Agricultural employment rate 0.494 0.484  -- 1,003,431 Natl Sample Survey 
       
Other measures      
 Log crop yields index 0.237 0.271 7,296  -- World Bank 
 Acres per adult in household 0.776 8.260  -- 1,003,431 Natl Sample Survey 
  Inflation rate 0.074 0.079 6,384  -- Agricultural Prices 
in India, Consumer 
Price Indices 
Notes:   
1. This table presents summary statistics for variables used in the analysis.  Means and standard deviations 
are presented for each variable. 
2. % Positive shocks and % Droughts gives the percentage of district-years in the data in which there was a 
positive rainfall shock or drought, respectively.  A positive shock is defined as rainfall in the first month of 
the monsoon above the 80th percentile of the district’s usual distribution and a drought is defined as rainfall 
below the 20th percentile of the district’s usual distribution. 
3. Log nominal agricultural wage is the log of the mean nominal daily wage for a male ploughman in the 
World Bank data during a district-year, and the log of the nominal daily wage for agricultural activities for 
an individual in the National Sample Survey data. 
4. Log crop yields index is defined as the log of a composite index measure of the yields variable.  The index 
is a weighted mean of yields of all 20 crops for which yields data are available, where the yield has first 
been normalized by the mean yield of that crop in the district.  Weights are the mean percentage of landarea 
planted with a given crop in a district. 
5. The national inflation rate is defined as the mean change in the CPI in the past agricultural year. For 1956-
1962, this is computed from the national Working Class Living Index.  For 1965-1987, this is computed by 
taking the average of the state CPI for Agricultural Workers across all states in the World Bank sample. 
 
 
While shocks occur at the start of the agricultural year, the empirical approach assumes their
impact persists over the entire year. Appendix Table B.2 examines diﬀerential impacts over calendar
quarters. The variation in employment levels across quarters attests to the substantial seasonality
in agriculture. However, I cannot reject that the impact of shocks on wages and employment is
the same across quarters. As a result, in the analysis that follows, I pool observations within each
agricultural year and examine mean impacts of shocks over the entire year.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Distributions of Wage Changes
Before moving to the main empirical tests, I examine the distribution of wage changes for
evidence of wage stickiness. Figure 1.5 displays histograms of year-to-year percentage wage changes
in the World Bank panel. Panel A shows the distribution of nominal wage changes. The figure
shows a bunching of mass to the right of nominal zero, with a discontinuous drop to the left of zero.
17 percent of observations are zero nominal changes. Since the district wage data is computed by
averaging wages from sampled villages, this likely underestimates the percentage of zero changes in
the underlying micro-data. In an economy experiencing a continuous distribution of shocks (from
rainfall or other events) to the marginal product of labor, one would not expect a large discrete
jump at zero in the absence of nominal rigidities (Kahn 1994; McLaughlin 1994). Consequently,
this figure provides prima facie evidence for nominal rigidity. However, an important concern with
this approach is measurement error in reported wages. If wages are reported in round increments
(while actual wages vary continuously) or there is recall bias in reporting, this would make observing
nominal zero changes more likely.
Panel B displays the distribution of real wage changes, using the local state CPI to compute real
wages. Only 0.07% of observations are zero real wage changes. In addition, the mass is distributed
fairly smoothly to the left and right of zero. There is little evidence of real wage rigidity.
Panels C-D examine whether real wage cuts are more likely when inflation is higher. I define
high inflation years state inflation above 6% (slightly below the sample median). Both panels use
observations in which real wage cuts should be especially likely. The histograms in Panel C limit
observations to district-years with contemporaneous droughts. Only 29% of observations are real
wage cuts in low inflation years, contrasted with 64% of observations in high inflation years.25 The
histograms in Panel D limit observations to district-years in which the district experienced a positive
shock in the previous year, which would have caused an increase in wages in the previous year. These
25 Of course, not all districts would be expected to cut wages since rainfall shocks are not the only determinants
of labor productivity. Indian agriculture has gone through periods of strong national and localized growth—for
example, from the adoption of green revolution technologies or infrastructure investments. Rainfall shocks are
uncorrelated with these developments. Real wage increases are therefore expected even in the presence of negative
rainfall shocks.
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districts would on average have experienced a productivity decrease in the current year: real wages
should be likely to fall. Again, the histograms show that real wage cuts are considerably more likely
in high inflation years (67% of observations) than in low inflation years (30% of observations).
1.4.2 Tests for Wage Distortions
Table 1.2 tests for wage distortions from rigidities. The dependent variable is the log of the
nominal daily wage for agricultural work. Columns (1)-(3) show results from the World Bank
district data, covering the years 1956-1987. Columns (4)-(6) shows results from the NSS individual
data, covering the years 1982-2008. Columns (1) and (4) provide estimates of regression model
(1.9).26 The results are qualitatively similar in both columns. As expected under both rigidity and
flexible wage models, the coeﬃcient on the sequence S{ ,0}dt (row 2) is indistinguishable from zero
and contemporaneous positive shocks (rows 3-5) raise wages. For example, a zero shock last year
followed by a positive shock this year increases wages by approximately 2.1% in the World Bank
data and 4.5% in the NSS data.
The coeﬃcients on S{0, }dt , S
{ , }
dt , and S
{+, }
dt (rows 6-8) estimate the impact of contemporane-
ous droughts (Test 1.1). Consistent with downward rigidity, there is little evidence of wage decreases
under droughts in both datasets. While the S{0, }dt and S
{ , }
dt coeﬃcients have a negative sign,
they are generally small in magnitude and I cannot reject they are zero; the S{+, }dt coeﬃcient is
actually positive.
Finally, the coeﬃcients on S{+, }dt and S
{+,0}
dt (rows 8-9) test for eﬀects of lag positive shocks
(Test 1.2). In the World Bank data, a positive shock followed by no shock raises wages by 2.1%
(significant at the 5% level). Even when a positive shock is followed by a drought, wages are 3.8%
higher than the reference case (significant at the 10% level). These results bear out in the NSS data
as well: this year’s wages are about 2.6% and 11.5% higher on average when a positive shock last
year is followed by a zero shock or drought, respectively, this year.27
26 There is a small change in the specification for the World Bank data. Since the unit of observation is a district-year,
the dependent variable is wdt, the log nominal wage in district d in year t, and there are no individual-level controls
or season fixed eﬀects.
27 This coeﬃcient of 0.115, which measures the mean impact of a positive shock followed by a negative shock in the
NSS data, is surprisingly large. However, this seems to be a result of sampling variation in the data. One cannot
reject, for example, that this coeﬃcient is the same as the measured impact of a negative shock followed by a
positive shock in the NSS data.
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Figure 5 
Distributions of Wage Changes 
 
Panel A: Nominal Wage Changes -- Entire Sample 
 
 
Panel B: Real Wage Changes -- Entire Sample 
 
 
Panel C: Real Wage Changes -- Contemporaneous Droughts 
  
 
Panel D: Real Wage Changes -- Lag Positive Shocks 
  
Notes:  
1. This figure shows distributions of year-to-year percentage changes in agricultural wages in the World Bank dataset. 
2. The unit of observation is a district-year. Real wages are computed as the nominal wage divided by the state CPI for agricultural 
workers. Low (high) inflation years are defined as years in which the state inflation rate was below (above) the sample median of 6%. 
Droughts and positive shocks are defined as rainfall in the first month of the monsoon below the 20th percentile and above the 80th 
percentile, respectively, of the district’s usual rainfall distribution in that month. 
3. Panel A shows nominal wage changes in the entire sample (8,401 district-years). The observations in Panels B-D are drawn from 
the 4,642 district-years for which state CPI data is available. Panel B shows real wage changes in this sample. Panel C uses 
observations in which a district experienced a drought in that year. Panel D uses observations in which a district experienced a positive 
shock in the previous agricultural year. Panels C and D show distributions separately for low and high inflation years. 
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Figure 1.5: Distributions of Wage Changes
Notes:
1. This figure shows distributions of year-to-year percentage changes in agricultural wages in the World Bank dataset.
2. The unit of observat on is a dist ct-year. Real wages re computed as the nom nal wag divided by the state
CPI for agricultural workers. Low (high) inflation years are defined as years in which the state inflation rate was
below (above) the sample median of 6%. Droughts and positive shocks are defined as rainfall in the first month of
the monsoon below the 20th percentile and above the 80th percentile, respectively, of the district’s usual rainfall
distribution in that month.
3. Panel A shows nominal wage changes in the entire sample (8,401 district-years). The observations in Panels B-D
are drawn from the 4,642 district-years for which state CPI data is available. Panel B shows real wage changes in this
sample. Panel C uses observations in which a district experienced a drought in that year. Panel D uses observations
in which a district experienced a positive shock in the previous agricultural year. Panels C and D show distributions
separately for low and high inflation years.
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Table 1.2: Effect of Shocks on Equilibrium Wages 
Dependent Variable: Log Nominal Daily Agricultural Wage 
      Source:  
World Bank Data (1956-1987)   
Source:  
NSS Data (1982-2008) 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  Shockt-1 Shockt               
1 Zero Zero Omitted Omitted Omitted  Omitted Omitted Omitted 
          
2 Drought Zero 0.003 
(0.011) 
Omitted Omitted  0.002 
(0.015) 
Omitted Omitted 
           
3 Zero Positive 0.021 
  (0.010)**   
0.045      
(0.012)*** 
      
4 Drought Positive 0.064   
(0.019)***  
0.079   
(0.028)*** 
      
5 Positive Positive 0.014 
(0.016) 
0.026    
(0.009)*** 
0.026      
(0.009)*** 
 
0.066     
(0.023)*** 
0.052    
(0.011)*** 
0.052    
(0.011)*** 
                    
6 Zero Drought  -0.006 
 (0.013)  
0.006 
(0.016) 
      
7 Drought Drought  -0.015 
 (0.018) 
 -0.010 
  (0.011) 
 -0.010 
  (0.011) 
 
 -0.025 
 (0.028) 
 -0.003 
  (0.013) 
 -0.002 
  (0.013) 
          
8 Positive Drought 0.038 
 (0.021)* 
0.037 
  (0.020)* 
  0.115     
(0.018)*** 
0.114     
(0.019)*** 
        
9 Positive Zero 0.021 
  (0.010)** 
0.021 
  (0.010)** 
0.024   
(0.010)** 
 0.026 
 (0.014)* 
0.025 
 (0.015)* 
0.056   
(0.013)*** 
          
District and year FE? Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls? No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs: district-years 7,296 7,296 7,296   --  --  -- 
Obs: individual-years  --  --  --  154,476 154,476 154,476 
Dependent var mean 1.197 1.197 1.197   3.261 3.261 3.261 
Notes:  
1.This table tests for the impacts of sequences of shocks on the agricultural wage. 
2. The dependent variable is the log of the nominal daily agricultural wage. 
3. The shocks are defined as drought, zero, or positive, and correspond to rainfall below the 20th percentile, 
between the 20th-80th percentiles, and above the 80th percentile, respectively.  The covariates are indicators 
that equal 1 if a given sequence of shocks was realized and zero otherwise.  The sequences are presented as 
the shock in the previous year and the shock in the current year.  
4. Columns (1) and (3) omit the sequence {Zero, Zero} and include separate dummies for each of the 
remaining 8 combinations of shocks.  The remaining columns group shocks into categories with similar 
predictions.  Columns (2) and (4) also omit the sequence {Drought, Zero}; combine rows 3-5 into one 
indicator function for whether the district experienced a contemporaneous positive shock; and combine rows 
6-7 into an indicator function for whether the district had a zero shock or drought last year followed by a 
contemporaneous drought. Columns (3) and (6) repeat this specification, but also combine rows 8-9 into one 
indicator for whether the district had a positive shock last year followed by a drought or zero shock this year. 
5. Each regression also contains year and district fixed effects.  Regressions (4)-(6) from the NSS data also 
include fixed effects for calendar quarters of the year and a dummy for gender.   
6. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Columns (2) and (5) of Table 1.2 repeat this analysis for the simpler specification in regression
model (1.10). The results are similar to the previous columns. Finally, columns (3) and (6) repeat
this specification, but also collapse the sequences used for the lag positive shock tests (S{+, }dt and
S{+,0}dt ; rows 8-9) into one cell. The results in these columns indicate that in both datasets, wages
are on average the same this year regardless of whether the positive shock occurred last year or this
year.28
For simplicity, the main specification focuses on shocks in the current year and previous year
only. Appendix Table B.4 examines the duration of persistence of shocks. In the World Bank
data—positive shocks raise nominal wages for up to 5 years. In the NSS data, they do not sig-
nificantly impact wages for more than 1 future year on average. This is consistent with higher
levels of real agricultural growth in India during the NSS data years. As expected, droughts have
no persistent eﬀects in either dataset. Note that focusing on only last year’s shocks in the main
specification makes a rejection in Test 1.2 (lag positive shocks) less likely—the main specification
therefore enables simplicity without biasing the results towards finding rigidity.
1.4.3 Impact of Inflation on Wage Distortions
To test whether inflation moderates the wage distortions documented above, I use the World
Bank data since it covers 32 years, providing substantial variation in inflation. Column (1) of
Table 1.3 shows estimates of model (1.10) for the restricted sample for which inflation data is
available for comparison purposes. The regressions in columns (2)-(3) add interactions of each of
the shock categories with measures of the national inflation rate. In column (2), the measure is the
continuous inflation rate–this corresponds to the specification in model (1.11). In column (3), the
inflation measure is an indicator that equals 1 if the inflation rate is above 6% (slightly below the
sample median) and equals 0 otherwise.
28 In Appendix Table B.3, I use an alternate specification to test for the impact of shocks on wages in both datasets.
Instead of the 9 discrete cells, I include dummies for positive shocks and droughts in current and previous periods,
along with a full set of interactions between current and lagged shocks. The model oﬀers 2 sets of predictions under
the null of no rigidity. First, contemporaneous droughts should lead to wage decreases. As in Table 1.2, there is no
support for this. Second, lag shocks should not predict current wages. The F-test p-values reported at the bottom
of the table test this restriction for covariates involving lag positive shocks and also for covariates involving any lag
shocks—these tests are significant at the 5% level or less in each case.
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Consistent with Test 1.3, contemporaneous droughts and lag positive shocks are less likely to
cause wage distortions when inflation is higher. For example, the results in column (3) indicate
that when a non-positive shock is followed by a drought, wages are the same as the reference cell
on average when the inflation rate is below 6% (row 3). In contrast, when inflation is above 6%,
wages are 3.6% lower than the reference cell (row 4). The F-test for whether, under high inflation,
wages are the same during droughts as the reference cell has a p-value of 0.027 (reported at the
bottom of the table). Thus, wages are indeed lower under droughts when inflation is suﬃciently
high. Similarly, when inflation is low, lag positive shocks increase current nominal wages (rows 5
and 7). When inflation is high, lag positive shocks do not cause persistent eﬀects on future wages
(the interactions in rows 6 and 8 are negative). For example, when a positive shock is followed by
no shock, I cannot reject that wages are the same as the reference cell when inflation is above 6%
(p-value 0.678).
The regressions in columns (4)-(6) repeat this analysis, with one change in the definition of
shocks. To exploit the fact that positive shocks persist over many years in the World Bank data, I
define a lag positive shock as at least one positive shock anytime in the past 3 years.29 The remaining
shock definitions remain the same. This yields qualitatively similar results to the regressions in
columns (1)-(3), but increases precision.
In Appendix Table B.5, I rule out two sets of potential concerns. The first is that rainfall shocks
may influence the inflation rate. Columns (1)-(2) show regressions of the national inflation rate
on the shock categories (as defined in column (1) of Table 1.3). There is little correlation between
shocks and inflation—the coeﬃcients on contemporaneous droughts and lag positive shocks (rows 3,
5, and 7) are especially small and insignificant. As a further check, column (3) shows a regression of
the log nominal wage on the shock categories and an interaction with inflation, where the inflation
rate has been computed as the mean inflation rate across all states except the district’s own state.
This is a useful robustness check since a district’s local rainfall is especially unlikely to be correlated
with inflation in other states. The results are similar to those in Table 1.3, though are less significant
since state-level inflation data is available for a limited number of years. The second concern is that
there are co-trends in inflation and the impact of rainfall shocks. For example, if inflation and the
29 The results are similar if other definitions for lag positive shocks are used instead, such as at least one shock in the
past 2 years or 4 years.
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adoption of irrigation (which makes crops less reliant on rainfall) both trend upward over time, this
could create a spurious correlation. I check for such co-trends by interacting the shocks with a linear
time trend in column (4) and a dummy for whether the year is after 1970 (the sample mid-point
and the beginning of India’s green revolution) in column (5). The interaction coeﬃcients in both
columns are extremely small and insignificant, indicating that the inflation results are not driven
by co-trends.
1.4.4 Tests for Employment Distortions
Figure 1.6 compares kernel density estimates of mean employment in district-years with and
without lagged positive shocks in the NSS data. The observations are limited to district-years in
which there was no contemporaneous positive shock. Consistent with Prediction 1.4, lagged positive
shocks cause the employment distribution to shift to the left. This provides initial evidence that
downward rigidity reduces aggregate employment.
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Figure 6 
Employment Distortions from Rigidity: Impact of Lag Positive Shocks 
 
Notes: 
1. This figure displays the impact of lag positive shocks on the distribution of agricultural 
employment in the NSS data.  
2. The outcome variable is the mean of the percentage of days in the interview reference period in 
which agricultural workers were employed in agricultural work (own farm work plus hired out 
work) in each district-year.  
3. A positive (non-positive) shock in a district-year is defined as rainfall above (below) the 80th 
percentile of the district's rainfall distribution. 
4. The solid line plots kernel density estimates of the outcome variable for district-years in which 
there was a non-positive shock in the previous year and a non-positive shock in the current year. 
The dashed line plots kernel density estimates for district-years in which there was a positive 
shock in the previous year and a non-positive shock in the current year.  
5.  The estimates use the Epanechnikov kernel function. The bandwidth minimizes the mean 
integrated squared error assuming a Gaussian distribution and kernel. 
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Figure 1.6: Employment Distortions from Rigidity – Impact of Lag Positive Shocks
Notes:
1. This figure displays the impact of l g positive shocks on agricultural employment in the NSS data.
2. The outcome variable is the mean of the percentage of days in the interview reference period in which agricultural
workers were employed in agricultural work (own farm work plus hired out work) in each district-year.
3. A positive (non-positive) shock in a district-year is defined as rainfall above (below) the 80th percentile of the
district’s rainfall distribution.
4. The solid line plots kern l densit estim tes of the out ome variable for district-years in which there was a non-
positive shock in the previous year and a non-positive shock in the current year. The dashed line plots kernel density
estimates for district-years in which there was a positive shock in the previous year and a non-positive shock in the
current year.
5. The estimates use the Epanechnikov kernel function. The bandwidth minimizes the mean integrated squared error
assuming a Gaussian distribution and kernel.
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Table 1.4: Effect of Shocks on Employment 
Dependent variable: Total worker-days in agriculture 
Sample 
Full Sample Full Sample 
Lean Season 
Excluded 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
Panel A: Average Impact of Lag Positive Shocks 
 Lag positive shock  -0.111 
(0.046)** 
 -0.217 
(0.049)*** 
 -0.220 
(0.052)*** 
 Lag positive shock x 
    Acres per adult in household  
0.141 
(0.029)*** 
0.139 
(0.028)*** 
     
Panel B: Full Specification 
 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero; Shockt=Zero} Omitted Omitted Omitted 
     
1 {Shockt-1=Drought, Zero, or Positive}; {Shockt=Positive} 0.078 
(0.047)* 
0.078 
(0.047)* 
0.104 
(0.051)** 
2 {Shockt-1=Drought, Zero, or Positive}; {Shockt=Positive} x 
      Acres per adult in household 
  -0.006 
(0.005) 
 -0.005 
(0.004) 
     
3 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Negative}  0.116 
(0.049** 
 -0.112 
(0.050)** 
 -0.095 
(0.051)* 
4 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
     Acres per adult in household 
  -0.001 
(0.015) 
 -0.001 
(0.013) 
     
5 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Drought}  -0.244 
(0.076)*** 
 -0.352 
(0.073)*** 
 -0.365 
(0.074)*** 
6 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
     Acres per adult in household 
 0.123 
(0.037)*** 
0.135 
(0.038)*** 
     
7 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Zero}  -0.107 
(0.058)* 
 -0.213 
(0.064)*** 
 -0.205 
(0.072)*** 
8 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Zero} x 
     Acres per adult in household 
 0.151 
(0.040)*** 
0.132 
(0.038)*** 
     
9 Acres per adult in household 0.047 
(0.015)*** 
0.007 
(0.002)*** 
0.037 
(0.014)*** 
10 (Acres per adult in household)2  -1.04x10-5 
(3.37x10-6)*** 
 -1.50x10-6 
(5.40x10-7)*** 
 -7.73x10-6 
(3.02x10-6)** 
F-test p-value: Coefficient 3 = Coefficient 5 0.117 0.002*** 0.001*** 
Observations: individual-years 1,003,030 1,003,030 755,347 
Dependent variable mean 3.48 3.48 3.62 
Notes:  
1. This table tests for employment impacts of shocks. The dependent variable is the number of worker-days in the last 7 
days in which the worker was employed in agricultural work (own farm work plus hired out work). Columns (1)-(2) 
include all observations for agricultural workers (workers whose primary or subsidiary work activity is agriculture). 
Column (3) excludes observations for the lean quarter (April-June). 
2. Shocks are defined as drought, zero, or positive, and correspond to rainfall below the 20th percentile, between the 
20th-80th percentiles, and above the 80th percentile, respectively.  
3. Panel A shows regressions of the dependent variable on an indicator for whether the district experienced a positive 
shock in the previous year, and an interaction of this indicator with acres per adult in the household. 
4. In Panel B, covariates 1,3,5, and 7 are of the form {Shockt-1=X};{Shockt=Y}; they are indicators that equal 1 if the 
district experienced shock X in the previous year and shock Y in the current year, and equal 0 otherwise. The other 
covariates are interactions of these sequences of shocks with acres per adult in the household.   
5. Each regression also contains year fixed effects, district fixed effects, fixed effects for calendar quarters of the year, a 
gender dummy, and a quadratic function of acres per adult in the household.  
6. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Table 1.4 provides statistical tests of employment distortions and quantifies their magnitude.
The dependent variable is the number of worker-days in the last 7 days in which the worker was
employed in agricultural work (own farm work plus hired out work). Panel A begins by examining
the mean impact of lagged positive shocks on employment. Agricultural laborers and farmers
experience an average decrease in employment of 0.111 days per week if their district experienced
a positive shock in the previous year (relative to no positive shock in the previous year). This
constitutes a 3% decrease in agricultural activity. Column (2) adds an interaction with a measure
of landholding: acres per adult in the household. In the year after a positive shock, landless laborers
experience a 6% decrease in employment (significant at the 1% level). In contrast, those with land are
less likely to face rationing. Column (3) repeats the analysis in column (2) but excludes observations
from the lean quarter (April-June), when there is limited agricultural activity; the results are quite
similar.
Panel B examines employment eﬀects using the full specification. Column (1) provides estimates
of regression model (1.12). Contemporaneous positive shocks (row 1) raise average employment by
0.078 days per week, or 2.2 percent. Contemporaneous droughts—which did not lead to wage
cuts—do decrease employment. The S{0, }dt and S
{ , }
dt sequences (row 3) reduce employment by
0.116 days; this constitutes a 3.3% reduction and is significant at the 5% level.
The coeﬃcients in row 5 and 7 provide tests of Prediction 1.4. When a drought is preceded by a
positive shock, employment drops by about 0.25 days per week (row 5). This magnitude is twice as
large as the decrease that occurs when a drought is not preceded by a lag positive shock (row 3). In
addition, when a lag positive shock is followed by no shock (row 7), the average worker experiences
a drop in employment of about 0.107 days (or 3%) relative to the reference cell.30
The regression in column (2) add interactions of acres per adult with each of the shock categories.
The results conform to Prediction 1.4A. When a positive shock last year is followed by a drought
in the current year (sequence S{+, }dt , row 5), landless laborers are predicted to experience an
employment decrease of 0.352 days per week; this corresponds to 10% of the mean employment
level (significant at 1%). This magnitude is significantly larger than the 0.112 day decrease that
results from a drought that wasn’t preceded by a positive shock last year (row 3). The F-test for
30 Appendix Table B.6 repeats this analysis, showing the impact of each of the 9 sequences of shocks on employment
separately.
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equality of the two coeﬃcients has a p-value of 0.002. Note that diﬀerence in these coeﬃcients is
0.240—about twice as large as the magnitude of the baseline employment eﬀect of a drought. As
expected, these employment decreases are less severe for those with more land: each additional acre
of land per household adult is associated with an increase in employment of 0.123 days per week.
Similarly, when a positive shock last year is followed by no shock in the current year (S{+,0}dt , row
7), the employment of landless agricultural workers is 0.213 days lower than if there hadn’t been
a positive shock in the previous year. It constitutes a 7% employment reduction and is significant
at the 5% level. Again, this eﬀect is about twice as large as the decrease in employment under a
drought. Also in this case, landholdings mitigate these adverse employment eﬀects. Finally, column
(3) excludes observations from the lean quarter; the results are quite similar to column (2), and
slightly stronger.31
In Appendix Table B.7, I investigate a potential concern with the interpretation of the em-
ployment results: the possibility that rainfall shocks alter the composition of the agricultural labor
force. In the presence of compositional eﬀects, the employment variable will not accurately estimate
changes in aggregate employment levels. For example, if lag positive shocks cause in-migration, in-
creasing the number of agricultural workers, the percentage of days worked by each worker could
decrease even if the aggregate number of worker-days has gone up. Appendix Table B.7 investigates
two ways in which shocks could create compositional changes—through migration into the village
and by altering the probability that respondents identify agriculture as their occupation. There is
little evidence that lag positive shocks influence either of these outcomes.32
31 While landholding is an important determinant of worker-days spent in agriculture, it does not impact the wage
received by workers. When the log nominal daily agricultural wage is regressed on the covariates in the regression in
Column (2) of Table 1.4, the coeﬃcients on the landholding controls and interactions terms are all extremely small
in magnitude (between 0.00-0.002) and insignificant. These results are consistent with the presence of a prevailing
market wage, which is the same for all agricultural workers who sell their labor externally on the market.
32 There is evidence that individuals are less likely to migrate into the village during contemporaneous droughts—in
the main specification (Panel B), migration falls by 0.1%. However, the fact that the labor force is relatively smaller
during droughts is unlikely to be the reason wages don’t fall during these shocks. As a simple calibration, since
the mean employment rate is 0.498, this can explain only a 0.001*0.498 = 0.000498 percentage point change in the
number of worker-days.
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1.4.5 Separation Failures Test: Compositional Eﬀects on Household Employment
When employment is rationed, the household’s labor supply decision will no longer be separable
from its decision of how much labor to use on its farm. Households with less land, who cannot find
external employment when rigidities bind, will supply more intensively to their own farms. Table
1.5 provides a test of this prediction. It decomposes total household agricultural employment into
worker-days in the external labor market (as a paid agricultural labor) and worker-days on the
household’s own farm.
Panel A begins by examining the average impact of lagged positive shocks by landholding.
Households are defined as having small, medium, and large landholdings, corresponding to the the
lower, middle, and upper terciles of the sample distribution of acres per adult in the household,
respectively. The sample is limited to agricultural households with positive landholding. The
dependent variable in column (1) is the total number of days spent by household members in
external employment (as a hired agricultural laborer on someone else’s farm). Consistent with the
results in Table 1.4, households with small landholdings face reductions in external employment
after lagged positive shocks, while households with medium and large landholdings do not.
Column (2) provides the key test of the separation failure prediction. The dependent variable
is the number of days spent by household members on their own farm. In the year after a positive
shock, households with small landholdings—who are rationed out of the external market—increase
labor supply on their own farms by half a day a week on average. This is a 7% increase relative to the
mean, and is about the same as how much these households increase own-farm production during
a contemporaneous positive shock (see Panel B below). In contrast, own-farm labor supply does
not change after lagged positive shocks for medium-landholding households and actually decreases
for large landowners (perhaps due to decreased supervision time in the field since less external
labor is being hired). Column (3) shows the sum of oﬀ-farm and own-farm employment (the same
dependent variable as in Table 1.4). Because households supplement decreased external employment
with increases in own-farm work, there is little aggregate movement in total household employment
after lagged positive shocks.
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Table 1.5: Separation - Compositional Effects on Employment 
  Dependent Variable Worker-days as 
agric laborer 
Worker-days 
on own farm 
Total worker-
days in agric 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Average Impact of Lag Positive Shocks 
 Lag positive shock  -0.797 
(0.283)*** 
0.502 
(0.228)** 
 -0.230 
(0.269) 
 Lag positive shock x 
      Medium landholding 
0.641 
(0.270)** 
 -0.523 
(0.240)** 
0.118 
(0.269) 
 Lag positive shock x 
      Large landholding 
0.870 
(0.321)*** 
 -1.216 
(0.288)*** 
 -0.346 
(0.314) 
     
Panel B: Full Specification 
1 {Shockt-1=Drought, Zero, or Positive}; {Shockt=Positive} 0.446 
(0.303) 
0.599 
(0.299)** 
1.045 
(0.289)*** 
2 {Shockt-1=Drought, Zero, or Positive}; {Shockt=Positive} x 
      Medium landholding 
 -0.392 
(0.315) 
 -0.170 
(0.336) 
 -0.562 
(0.283)** 
3 {Shockt-1=Drought, Zero, or Positive}; {Shockt=Positive} x 
      Large landholding 
 -0.580 
(0.339)* 
 -0.238 
(0.392) 
 -0.818 
(0.369)** 
     
4 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Drought}  -1.506 
(0.427)*** 
 -0.014 
(0.269) 
 -1.521 
(0.401)*** 
5 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
      Medium landholding 
1.192 
(0.439)*** 
 -0.126 
(0.324) 
1.066 
(0.420)** 
6 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
      Large landholding 
1.556 
(0.448)*** 
0.118 
(0.367) 
1.673 
(0.430)*** 
     
7 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Drought}  -0.913 
(0.392)** 
0.322 
(0.326) 
 -0.592 
(0.401) 
8 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
      Medium landholding 
0.812 
(0.439)* 
 -0.274 
(0.381) 
0.538 
(0.392) 
9 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
      Large landholding 
0.938 
(0.472)** 
 -1.047 
(0.439)** 
 -0.109 
(0.495) 
     
10 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Zero}  -1.234 
(0.444)*** 
0.701 
(0.313)** 
 -0.533 
(0.426) 
11 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Zero} x 
      Medium landholding 
0.896 
(0.379)** 
 -0.676 
(0.333)** 
0.220 
(0.401) 
12 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Zero} x 
      Large landholding 
1.328 
(0.499)*** 
 -1.402 
(0.388)*** 
 -0.073 
(0.491) 
Dependent variable mean 3.31 7.06 10.38 
Notes:  
1. This table tests if household labor supply is consistent with separation failures. Dependent variables are number of 
worker-days employed as an agricultural laborer (col 1), in own-farm work (col 2), and total labor supply (own farm 
work plus hired out) (col 3) by the household in the past 7 days. The sample comprises agricultural households with 
land and excludes lean quarter observations (April-June); it contains 203,073 household-year observations. 
2. Shocks are defined as drought, zero, or positive, and correspond to rainfall below the 20th percentile, between the 
20th-80th percentiles, and above the 80th percentile, respectively. Medium and large landholding are indicators for 
whether acres per adult in the household is in the second or third tercile of the sample distribution, respectively. 
3. Panel A shows regressions of the dependent variable on an indicator for whether the district experienced a positive 
shock in the previous year, and an interaction of this indicator with landholding terciles. 
4. In Panel B, covariates 1,3,5, and 7 are of the form {Shockt-1=X};{Shockt=Y}; they are indicators that equal 1 if the 
district experienced shock X in the previous year and shock Y in the current year, and equal 0 otherwise. The other 
covariates are interactions of these sequences of shocks with landholding terciles.   
5. Each regression contains year, district, and calendar quarter fixed effects, quadratic functions of the number of males 
and females in the household. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Panel B repeats this analysis using the full specification. Rows 7 and 10 provide the coeﬃcients
of primary interest. When a positive shock is followed by no shock (row 10), households with small
landholdings experience an average decrease in external employment of 1.23 days per week. In these
years, they increase their supply of labor to their own farm by 0.701 days, or 10% of mean own-farm
labor supply. The impacts on households with medium and large landholdings (rows 11-12) are
similar to the pattern shown in Panel A.
In addition, when a positive shock is followed by a drought (row 7), households with small farms
do not decrease own-farm labor supply, despite the negative productivity shock–the coeﬃcient is
positive (though insignificant). However, I cannot reject that this coeﬃcient is equal in magnitude
to the eﬀect of a non-positive shock followed by a drought (row 4).
As a whole, these results provide evidence that households respond to rationing by increasing
labor supply on their own farms. However, a full test of whether rationing leads the marginal
product of labor on small farms to be lower than that on large farms requires farm-level data on
total labor inputs. Farms in the bottom tercile of the landholding distribution are quite small and
unlikely to hire much labor, so own-farm employment is likely highly correlated with total farm labor
use. However, if these farms do hire some external labor, then some of the increase in own-farm
supply may be oﬀsetting decreases in labor hired by the farm. Farm-level labor use data is needed
for a more complete understanding of how rationing aﬀects the allocation of labor across farms.
1.4.6 Heterogeneity in Wage Rigidity: Crop Variation
Districts exhibit substantial heterogeneity in the extent of rigidity. To test for heterogeneity,
in the World Bank panel data, I regress the log nominal wage on the three main categories of
shocks (contemporaneous positive shocks, contemporaneous droughts preceded by a non-positive
shock, and lag positive shocks followed by a non-positive shock), year fixed eﬀects, district fixed
eﬀects, and an interaction of each of the district dummies with the contemporaneous droughts
indicator. This is the same specification as in column (3) of Table 1.2 plus the interaction terms.
The coeﬃcient on each interaction term provides an estimate of that district’s mean wage change to
a drought in the sample (relative to the omitted district). If the eﬀect of droughts is the same across
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all districts, then the coeﬃcients on the interactions should be 0. The F-test of joint significance of
the interaction coeﬃcients has a p-value of 0.000, indicating heterogeneity in the extent to which
districts respond to droughts. Repeating this analysis by instead interacting each district dummy
with the lag positive shock indicator also suggests heterogeneity in the extent to which lag positive
shocks influence future wages (the F-test of joint significance of the interaction coeﬃcients has a
p-value of 0.000).
Districts in India diﬀer substantially in crops grown. The World Bank dataset contains data on
20 crops, including the percentage of land area in each district-year planted with each crop. Five of
these twenty crops—soybeans, sesame, rapseed/mustard, sunflowers, and sugarcane—are extremely
sensitive to the amount of labor hired during harvest.33 For example, if the first three are not
harvested quickly upon reaching maturity, their pods burst, spilling their seeds onto the ground and
leading to large output losses.34 In these areas, price flexibility is particularly important because
ineﬃcient labor allocation will lead to especially large profit losses.
I investigate whether rigidities are lower in areas where the costs of rigidity are likely to be higher
due to crop characteristics. Specifically, I test whether districts with a greater percentage of land
area planted with labor-sensitive crops are more responsive to shocks. The crop sensitivity measures
were constructed as follows. For each of the five crops, the percentage of land-area planted with the
crop in each district-year was regressed on year fixed eﬀects to remove national time trends. The
residuals for each of the five regressions were then summed to give the total adjusted percentage of
land planted with these crops in each district-year.
33 These crops were identified in the following manner. A researcher with a background in agricultural extension work
in India compiled a timeline of work activities for each of the 20 crops, along with identifying which activities were
particularly important for output. This information was based on consultations with an expert at an agricultural
research university and numerous field interviews with farmers. The researcher identified these 5 crops as extremely
sensitive to timely labor inputs for the reasons listed below. He did not know how this information would be used
and did not have access to the World Bank dataset.
34 Similarly, sunflower seeds will fall to the ground when they become over-ripe. A bigger practical concern, however,
is that birds are relentless in eating the seeds as soon as they reach maturity. This poses such a large threat that
farmers in richer countries like the US cut sunflowers early and let the seeds ripen indoors, or cover each sunflower
head with protective covering to protect it from birds. These practices are not often followed in India, where farming
is less capital intensive. Harvesting sunflowers quickly is therefore important for output levels. The constraint on
sugarcane is institutional. Each sugarcane mill in India is assigned a command area; all growers within that area
are required by law to sell their crop to that mill. To manage supply chains, mills assign farmers a harvest date on
which they are allowed to sell their output to the mill; output is not accepted on other dates. Therefore, farmers
must ensure their crop is prepared for delivery to the mill on their assigned date.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneity in Wage Rigidity - Sensitivity of Crops to Labor Inputs 
Dependent Variable: Log Nominal Wage 
  Average over Last 5 Years  Average over Sample 
 
District Crop Sensitivity Measure % Land with Sensitive 
Crops 
% Land with 
Sensitive 
Crops is > 
Median 
 % Land with Sensitive 
Crops 
% Land with 
Sensitive 
Crops is > 
Median 
    (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Zero} Omitted Omitted  Omitted Omitted 
       
1 {Shockt-1=Drought, Zero, or Positive}; {Shockt=Positive} 0.027 
(0.009)*** 
0.020 
(0.010)** 
 0.025 
(0.009)*** 
0.028 
(0.009)*** 
2 {Shockt-1=Drought, Zero, or Positive}; {Shockt=Positive} x 
      District crop sensitivity measure 
 -0.061 
(0.137) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
  -0.130 
(0.146) 
 -0.005 
(0.014) 
       
3 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Drought}  -0.009 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
  -0.010 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
4 {Shockt-1=Drought or Zero}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
      District crop sensitivity  measure 
 -0.425 
(0.200)** 
 -0.045 
(0.020)** 
  -0.263 
(0.184) 
 -0.039 
(0.018)** 
       
5 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Drought} 0.044 
(0.021)** 
0.069 
(0.032)** 
 0.036 
(0.020)* 
0.033 
(0.021) 
6 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Drought} x 
      District crop sensitivity  measure 
 -0.351 
(0.325) 
 -0.042 
(0.036) 
  -0.148 
(0.293) 
0.008 
(0.033) 
       
7 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Zero} 0.022 
(0.010)** 
0.017 
(0.011) 
 0.020 
(0.010)* 
0.028 
(0.010)*** 
8 {Shockt-1=Positive}; {Shockt=Zero} x 
      District crop sensitivity  measure 
 -0.142 
(0.160) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
  -0.206 
(0.166) 
 -0.015 
(0.017) 
       
9 District crop sensitivity measure  -0.375 
(0.205)* 
 -0.028 
(0.012)** 
  --  -- 
Observations: district-years 6,840 6,840  7,296 7,296 
F-test p-value: Coefficient 3 + Coefficient 4 + Coefficient 9 = 0  -- 0.001***   -- 0.061* 
F-test p-value: Coefficient 5 + Coefficient 6 + Coefficient 9 = 0  -- 0.970   -- 0.175 
F-test p-value: Coefficient 7 + Coefficient 8 + Coefficient 9 = 0  -- 0.962   -- 0.398 
Notes:  
1. This table tests whether districts with crops that are more sensitive to labor inputs have less rigid wages. Observations are 
from the World Bank dataset. The dependent variable is the log of the district's mean nominal daily wage. 
2. Shocks are defined as drought, zero, or positive, and correspond to rainfall below the 20th, between the 20th-80th, and 
above the 80th percentiles, respectively. Covariates 1, 3, 5, and 7 are of the form {Shockt-1=X};{Shockt=Y}; they are 
indicators that equal 1 if the district experienced shock X in the previous year and shock Y in the current year, and equal 0 
otherwise. The other covariates are interactions of these sequences of shocks with district crop sensitivity measures.   
3. Crop sensitivity measures capture the % of landarea planted with crops that are highly sensitive to the amount of labor 
hired (soybeans, sesame, rapseed/mustard, sunflowers, and sugarcane). These measures were constructed as follows. For 
each of the 5 crops, the % of land planted with the crop in each district-year was regressed on year fixed effects to remove 
national trends.  The residuals for the 5 regressions were then summed for each district-year. Columns (1)-(2) use the 
district’s mean of this sum over the last 5 years.  Columns (3)-(4) use the district's mean in the sample as a whole.  In both 
cases, the percentage values from the current year and previous year are excluded when computing means.  In columns (1) 
and (3), the measure is the continuous mean percentage.  In columns (2) and (4), it is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the 
mean percentage is above the sample median and equals 0 otherwise.  
4. Each regression contains district and year fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected to allow clustering by region-year. 
5. The last 3 rows report p-values of F-tests for sums of coefficients as indicated.  For the regressions in columns (3)-(4), 
coefficient 9 is absorbed by the district fixed effects; this coefficient is therefore not included in the sums in column (4). 
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Table 1.6 shows results from OLS regressions of the log nominal wage on indicators for each
shock category, interactions of each shock category with a measure of the district’s crop sensitivity,
and year and district fixed eﬀects. The measure in column (1) is the running average of the adjusted
percentage over the past 5 years in each district. The current year and previous year are omitted
when computing means, to preclude any possibility that current or lag rainfall shocks influence the
crop sensitivity measure (via eﬀects on planting decisions). The regression in column (2) shows
interactions with a binary version of this measure, which equals 1 if the district’s running average
over the last 5 years is above the sample median and 0 otherwise.
The results indicate that districts with more labor-sensitive crops are substantially more likely
to cut wages in response to droughts (row 4). For example, during droughts, wages are about 4.5%
less in districts in the upper half of the distribution in terms of land area planted. The F-test for
whether, in these high crop sensitivity districts, wages are the same during droughts as the reference
cell has a p-value of 0.001 (reported at the bottom of the table). In addition, I cannot reject that
lag positive shocks have no persistent wage eﬀects in these districts.
The regressions in columns (3)-(4) repeat this analysis, but the crop sensitivity measure is
constructed by averaging the adjusted percentage over the entire sample for each district. As before,
current year and previous year are omitted when computing means. This reflects the time-invariant
proportion of land planted with sensitive crops in a district. Column (3) uses the continuous
percentage measure, while column (4) uses a binary indicator that equals 1 if the percentage is
above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The results are similar to those in columns (1)-(2).
One potential concern with the interpretation of these results is that rainfall shocks may impact
the marginal product of labor more in high sensitivity districts—the results could stem from diﬀerent
productivity eﬀects of shocks. Alternately, if workers in these diﬀerent types of districts have
diﬀerent labor supply elasticities, this may alter the equilibrium wage response. However, wages in
high and low sensitivity districts are equally responsive to contemporaneous positive shocks (rows
1-2). But the eﬀects of positive shocks only carry over to future wages in low sensitivity districts.
This should not be the case if the results are due to diﬀerences in productivity eﬀects or labor
supply elasticities.
As a whole, these results are consistent with less rigidity in areas where crops are more sensitive
to labor inputs. However, this evidence is only suggestive since crop choice is endogenous. It may
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be more profitable for farmers to grow labor-sensitive crops in less rigid areas, which could influence
their planting decisions.
1.5 Alternate Explanations
Could the results be explained by reasons other than downward nominal wage rigidity? In this
section, I discuss potential alternate explanations. I focus on three sets of competing explanations:
alternate models of equilibrium unemployment, the possibility that rainfall shocks have persistent
eﬀects in future periods, and measurement error.
Eﬃciency wage models with micro-foundations that do not involve nominal rigidities—such as
moral hazard, screening, labor turnover, or nutrition—also predict that wages may remain above
market clearing levels in equilibrium. However, these models do not predict rigid wages—they
generally predict that wages will decrease when labor productivity declines. For example, none of
these models can account for why wages would rise under a positive shock but then not come back
down to their prior level once the shock has dissipated, or why this should be influenced by inflation.
Similar arguments apply to search friction models that do not incorporate some degree of nominal
rigidity.
The second set of concerns is that rainfall shocks are not actually transitory, but have future
eﬀects on the economy through channels other than wage rigidity. For example, one potential
confound arises if positive shocks have persistent productivity eﬀects in future years. If this is the
case, then lag positive shocks could raise future wages because they positively impact the marginal
product of labor in the next year. However, in this case, employment should also be higher in the
following year, whereas the results indicate substantial employment decreases.
Alternately, inter-temporal substitution of labor could cause an increase in future wages and
decrease in employment. However, such labor supply shifters are diﬃcult to reconcile with the
inflation results: it is not clear why any of these should be more likely when inflation is lower. These
explanations are also inconsistent with the heterogeneity in the employment results by landholding.
Reductions in external employment are especially likely for those with less land, and these households
respond by increasing labor supply on their own farms. It is therefore unlikely that the wage
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dynamics are driven by a decrease in labor supply in the year after a positive shock. Similar
arguments imply that factors such as income eﬀects, migration, or capital investment are also not
driving the empirical findings. In addition, such explanations do not account for why wages do not
fall in response to droughts.
A third concern is that measurement error—driven for example, by rounding error—could make
wages appear more sticky than they are. As discussed above, this is especially a concern when using
histograms of wage changes to document rigidity. However, the empirical tests in this paper are less
subject to biases from such errors. Specifically, measurement error will only confound the above
results if it is correlated in a very particular way with the random rainfall shocks: the error must
be more likely in years with negative shocks and in years after positive shocks than in other years.
It is not clear why respondents should be diﬀerentially more likely to round wages in these two
special cases. In addition, if the observed wage persistence associated with lag positive shocks was
simply due to reporting errors, we should not observe real employment eﬀects or variation caused
by inflation.
1.6 Mechanisms: Survey Evidence on Fairness Norms
The presence of nominal rigidities in markets for casual daily labor is perhaps especially surpris-
ing given the lack of institutional constraints in these markets. This suggests that non-institutional
mechanisms discussed in the literature—such fairness norms against wage cuts—may play a role in
maintaining rigid wages. To explore the relevance of fairness considerations, I conducted a survey
in 34 villages in the Indian states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. 396 respondents (196 agricultural
laborers and 200 landed farmers) were interviewed. Following Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
(1986), I presented workers with scenarios about wage setting behavior and asked them to rate the
actions described as “Very fair”, “Fair”, “Unfair”, or “Very unfair”. Table 1.7 presents the text of
these scenarios and reports the percentage of respondents who viewed each scenario as “Very unfair”
or “Unfair”. Any given respondent was asked only half the questions to prevent the survey from
becoming tedious. Some questions involve paired scenarios, which alter the text of the scenario
slightly (questions 1A/1B, 3A/3C, and 9A/9B in Table 1.7); for these questions, each respondent
was asked only one version of the scenario.
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Table 1.7: Fairness Norms in Rural Labor Markets 
  Proportion Selecting Unfair 
  Full 
Sample  Orissa 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Differ-
ence 
                                Panel A: Acceptability of Wage Reductions 
1 A farmer hires a laborer to weed his land for 1 day at a wage of Rs. 
120. There is a local factory that pays Rs. 100 per day. One month 
later, the factory shuts down and many people in the area become 
unemployed.  
     
 A) … After this, the farmer decides to do a second weeding and hires 
the same laborer as before at a wage of Rs. 100. 
0.62  0.74 0.49 0.24*** 
 B) … After this, the farmer decides to do a second weeding and hires 
one of the newly unemployed laborers at a wage of Rs. 100. 
0.55  0.72 0.36 0.36*** 
       
2 A farmer usually pays laborers Rs. 120 per day.  His son becomes sick 
and the medical bills are very expensive.  He lowers the wage to Rs. 
110 per day. 
0.79  0.79 0.79 0.00 
       
Panel B: Money Illusion 
3 Last year, the prevailing wage in a village was Rs. 100 per day. This 
year, the rains were very bad and so crop yields will be lower than 
usual. 
     
 A) … There has been no change in the cost of food and clothing. 
Farmers decrease this year’s wage rate from Rs. 100 to Rs. 95 per day. 
0.64  0.81 0.45 0.36*** 
 B) …. The price of food and clothing has increased so that what used 
to cost Rs. 100 now costs Rs. 105.  Farmers keep this year’s wage rate 
at Rs. 100. 
0.38  0.42 0.32 0.10 
 C) … The price of food and clothing has increased, so that what used 
to cost Rs. 100 now costs Rs. 110. Farmers increase this year’s wage 
rate from Rs. 100 to Rs. 105.  
0.09  0.08 0.09 0.00 
       
4 A farmer usually pays Rs. 100 per day plus food. There is not much 
work in the area and many are looking for work. He stops providing 
food but continues to pay Rs. 100. 
0.29  0.24 0.34  -0.11* 
       
Panel C: Market Clearing Mechanisms 
5 A farmer needs to hire a laborer to plough his land.  There is not much 
work in the area, and 5 laborers want the job.  The farmer asks each of 
them to state the lowest wage at which they are willing to work, and 
then hires the laborer who stated the lowest wage. 
0.61  0.75 0.45 0.29*** 
       
6 A farmer needs to hire a laborer to plough his land.  The prevailing 
rate is Rs. 120.  The farmer knows there is a laborer who needs money 
for a family expense and is having difficulty finding work.  The 
farmer offers the job to that laborer at Rs. 110 per day. 
0.53  0.65 0.38 0.27*** 
       
7 It is harvest time and all farmers pay laborers Rs. 120 per day. One 
large farmer decides to harvest some of his land immediately and 
needs to hire 10 laborers. To find enough laborers, he pays them Rs. 
150 per day for one week.  In the following weeks, he decides to 
harvest the rest of his land, and re-hires 5 of the laborers at Rs. 120 
per day. 
0.63  0.81 0.43 0.38*** 
       
8 There are 20 landowners in a village. The prevailing wage during 
plowing is Rs. 120. 10 landowners want to attract extra laborers, and 
they increase the wage they pay to Rs. 130. The other 10 landowners 
don’t need much labor and maintain the wage at Rs. 120. 
0.45  0.60 0.27 0.33*** 
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Table 1.7 (Continued) 
Panel D: Fairness Norms and Effort 
9 A farmer needs a laborer to weed his land. The prevailing wage is Rs. 120. There isn’t much work in the area 
and many want the job. A laborer named Balu has family expenses for which he needs money. The farmer 
knows of Balu’s situation, and so he offers him the job at:  A) Rs. 120   B) Rs. 100.   Given his need for money, 
Balu accepts the job.  How carefully will he do the weeding? 
                            More carefully than usual             With the normal amount of care             Less carefully than usual                
A) Rs. 120                          0.55                                                     0.44                                                       0.01 
B) Rs. 100                          0.06                                                     0.54                                                       0.40 
Notes:  
1. This table presents survey evidence on fairness norms. Respondents were asked to rate each scenario as “Very 
fair”, “Fair”, “Unfair”, or “Very Unfair”.  The percentage of respondents that selected “Unfair” or “Very Unfair” is 
shown.  Each respondent received half the scenarios.  For the paired scenarios (1A/1B, 3A/3C, and 9A/9B), each 
respondent was asked 1 scenario in each pair. 
2. The sample is comprised of 396 respondents (196 casual agricultural laborers and 200 landowning farmers) from 
34 villages in the Indian states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.  All respondents were males aged 20-80.  Interviews 
were conducted July-August 2011. 
The states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh were chosen because they diﬀer greatly in the type of
crops grown and other area characteristics. Orissa is poorer with a greater emphasis on staple crops;
rice is the dominant crop in the areas surveyed. In contrast, Madhya Pradesh is more aﬄuent; a
large portion of the districts in which surveys were conducted are dominated by soybean farming.
As discussed in Section 1.4.6, soybean output is substantially more sensitive to the amount of labor
hired than rice. The crop heterogeneity results suggest that if fairness norms aﬀect wage setting
behavior, norms may be weaker in areas where costs of rigidity are likely to be higher. To check for
suggestive evidence along these lines, Table 1.7 also reports responses to each scenario separately
for each state along with a test for whether whether the diﬀerences are significant.
Panel A establishes baseline norms relating to wage cuts in 2 sets of situations. Question 1
presents a scenario in which a farmer pays a worker Rs. 120 for a task, and then cuts the wage for
future work after a factory closure increases local unemployment. 62% of respondents believed it
was unfair for the farmer to rehire his old employee at a lower wage, and 55% felt it was unfair for the
farmer to hire one of the newly unemployed workers at a lower wage. Note that respondents in Orissa
were about 30 percentage points more likely to denote these actions as unfair than respondents in
Madhya Pradesh; the t-tests for equality of the means is significant at the 1% level. In Question
2, 79% of respondents indicated that it was unfair for a farmer who was facing personal financial
distress to cut the wage of his workers. These perceptions were the same in both states.
Panel B explores the extent to which fairness norms are anchored on the nominal wage rather
than the real wage. Question 3 investigates whether respondents are less likely to view real wage cuts
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as unfair if they do not involve nominal cuts. Respondents were told that last year the prevailing
wage was Rs. 100 and that this year real wages are cut by about 5% because a drought will lower
yields. However, the 5% real wage cut is presented in three diﬀerent ways. When the cut consists of
a 5% nominal decrease in a period of no inflation, 64% of respondents think it unfair. When the cut
consists of no change in the nominal wage during a period of 5% inflation, the percentage viewing
it as unfair drops to 38%. Finally, when the cut results from a 5% nominal increase in a period of
10% inflation, only 9% of respondents viewed it as unfair. This pattern is strongly consistent with
the idea that workers are averse to nominal (and not necessarily real) wage cuts. Such questions
produce comparable responses in other contexts like the US and Canada (Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler 1986; Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky 1997). Note that again there is a substantial diﬀerence
between the 2 states. 81% of Orissa respondents think the nominal wage cut is unfair, whereas 45%
of Madhya Pradesh respondents deem it as unfair. In contrast, when real wage cuts do not involve
a decrease in the nominal wage, responses from the two states are similar.
Question 4 provides further evidence for the relevance of the nominal wage. When a farmer
who pays workers a nominal wage plus food reduces real wages by eliminating food, only 24% of
respondents viewed this as unfair. This is sharply lower than the reactions to nominal wage cuts of
comparable magnitude in Panel A.35
Panel C demonstrates that several wage setting behaviors that are associated with market clear-
ing are at odds with expressed fairness norms. For example, 61% of respondents felt it would be
unfair if, during a period of high unemployment, a farmer asks workers for their reservation wage
and then oﬀers a job to the worker with the lowest reservation wage (Question 5). Question 7
presents a scenario in which a farmer raises the wage during a period of high labor demand to
attract enough workers, and then lowers it again in later weeks when demand is lower. 63% viewed
such behavior as unfair. As above, these behaviors violate norms in Orissa much more so than in
Madhya Pradesh.
Finally, Panel D investigates whether respondents think worker eﬀort depends on fairness per-
ceptions. Question 9 presents a scenario in which a farmer oﬀers a job to a worker in financial
distress. In one version of the question, the farmer oﬀers the prevailing wage rate; this would up-
35 The value of the food, expressed in the vernacular as high quality food during lunch and other bonuses, exceeds Rs.
10. The magnitude of the real wage cut in question 4 is therefore comparable or greater than the cuts in Panel A.
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hold fairness norms and possibly also show benevolence given the laborer’s distress. In another
version, the farmer sets the wage below the prevailing wage; this strongly violates fairness norms
(see Question 6). Among respondents who were told that the wage was set at the prevailing wage,
55% percent believed the worker would exert more eﬀort than usual and only 1% believed he would
exert less eﬀort than usual. In sharp contrast, when told the wage was below the prevailing rate,
only 6% believed the worker would exert extra eﬀort while 40% believed the worker would exert
less eﬀort than usual. This indicates a belief that worker eﬀort responds to violations of fairness
norms. Responses to this question were not substantially diﬀerent in the two states.
As further evidence along these lines, Table 1.8 tabulates responses from survey questions about
respondents’ views about their own behavior or those of their fellow villagers. For example, when
laborers were asked whether they oﬀer to work at a wage below the prevailing rate when they have
diﬃculty finding work (Question 2), only 31% said yes while 47% said no. As before, the diﬀerences
between Orissa and Madhya Pradesh are stark—76% of Orissa laborers said no while only 14%
of Madhya Pradesh laborers said no. Question 3 presents a more extreme scenario—whether the
worker would accept a wage cut if he had faced prolonged unemployment and was in urgent need
of money. Only 38% of Orissa laborers said yes, while 79% of Madhya Pradesh laborers said yes.
Responses by landowning farmers are consistent with these views. The overwhelming majority
state that they have not themselves ever hired a laborer at a wage below the prevailing wage
(Question 4).36 In addition, when farmers are asked if a worker in their village would accept a wage
cut if he had faced prolonged unemployment and was in urgent need of money, only 39% say yes.
This number is considerably larger for Madhya Pradesh (67%) than Orissa (14%).
Of course, responses to hypothetical scenarios may not reflect the actual actions people take
when the stakes are real. However, given the strength of the pattern of results, this evidence lends
support to the view that fairness norms are a plausible way in which rigid wages are maintained
in village labor markets. In addition, the stark diﬀerence in results between Orissa and Madhya
Pradesh is consistent with the findings in Table 1.6 that areas with crops that are more sensitive
to the amount of labor hired have more flexible wages. They suggest that labor market norms may
36 For this question, concerns that farmers may not truthfully answer a question about their past hiring behavior
are warranted. However, whether the answers are truthful reports of past behavior or are driven by a desire by
respondents to show that they conform to norms, at the very least, the results speak to the strength of the norms
against wage cuts.
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form, at least in part, endogenously in response to local conditions.
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Table 1.8: Survey Responses to Employment Scenarios 
    Proportion of Responses 
      State Breakup 
    Full 
Sample  Orissa 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Panel A: Laborers (N=196) 
1  Yes 0.61  0.53 0.70 
  Maybe 0.20  0.19 0.22 
 
If a laborer was willing to accept work at a rate lower than the 
prevailing wage, would he be more likely to obtain work from 
farmers in the village?  No 0.19  0.28 0.09 
        
2  Yes 0.31  0.08 0.58 
  Sometimes 0.22  0.16 0.28 
 
When you have difficulty finding work at the prevailing wage, 
do you offer to work at a lower wage? 
 No 0.47  0.76 0.14 
        
3  Yes 0.58  0.38 0.79 
  Maybe 0.24  0.38 0.09 
 
Suppose the prevailing wage is Rs. 100 per day. You have 
been unemployed for a long time and are in urgent need of 
money. If a farmer offers you Rs. 95 for one day of work, 
would you accept the job? 
 No 0.18  0.23 0.12 
        
Panel B: Landowners (N=200) 
4  Yes 0.05  0.03 0.09 
 
In non-peak periods, have you ever hired a laborer for 
agricultural work at a wage below the prevailing wage?  No 0.95  0.97 0.91 
        
5  Yes 0.39  0.14 0.67 
  Maybe 0.25  0.38 0.09 
 
Suppose the prevailing non-peak wage rate is Rs. 100. There is 
a laborer in your village who has been unemployed for a long 
time and is in urgent need of money. If a farmer offers him Rs. 
95 for one day of work, would the laborer accept the job? 
 No 0.37  0.48 0.24 
        
6  Rs. 95 0.40  0.27 0.54 
 
Suppose you need to hire a laborer to work during the non-
peak period. The prevailing wage is Rs. 100. There is a laborer 
who would accept the job at Rs. 95 because of money 
problems. What wage rate would you offer him? 
 Rs. 100 0.60  0.73 0.46 
Notes:  
1. This table tabulates responses of agricultural workers and employers to survey questions. 
2. The sample is comprised of 396 respondents (196 casual agricultural laborers and 200 landowning farmers) from 
34 villages in the Indian states of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.  All respondents were males aged 20-80.  Interviews 
were conducted July-August 2011. 
 
 
 1.7 Conclusion
In addition to their broad implications for unemployment and business cycle dynamics, the
presence of nominal rigidities in village labor markets has particular relevance for the study of
developing country labor markets.
Such rigidities give rise to an additional route through which production volatility (e.g., rainfall
shocks) can have adverse consequences for the poor. One focus in the development literature has
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been that shocks cause shifts in the production frontier, leading to volatility in income; this aﬀects
welfare because the poor have limited ability to smooth income across periods. In the presence of
wage rigidity, volatility has an additional implication: production may often not be at the frontier
because labor markets do not adjust to optimize fully in each period. As implied by the employment
results, this means rigidities may lower the levels and increase the volatility of output and income—
they may compound the adverse consequences of production volatility.
The fact that those with less land respond to rationing by increasing production on their own
farms provides another channel through which rigidities impact eﬃciency and output. Specifically, it
suggests the presence of separation failures in rural labor markets. This is consistent, for example,
with the widely documented fact that smaller farms tend to use more labor per acre and have
higher yields per acre. This suggests that the distribution of landholdings in poor countries does
not have only distributional consequences—it can impact the allocation of labor use in production,
and through it, aggregate output.
Finally, the survey results suggest that fairness norms against wage cuts are strong, but they also
diﬀer substantially across areas. It is unclear whether such fairness preferences are inherent features
of utility or whether they arise endogenously—for example, in response to worker demand for wage
stability. The implicit insurance literature has discussed this as a potential source of wage rigidities
(see, e.g., Rosen 1985). Insurance demand may be especially relevant given the low income levels in
poor countries. In decentralized markets where it is diﬃcult to contract on real wages and explicit
contracts are diﬃcult to enforce, fairness norms around nominal wages could be a way to maintain
stable real wages. However, it is unclear why workers should be willing to accept employment losses
in exchange for wage stability. Ultimately, identifying the cause of nominal rigidities requires better
understanding of these factors. Further exploration of fairness norms in labor markets and the
underlying mechanisms that give rise to them is a promising direction for future research.
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2 Self-Control at Work
(With Michael Kremer and Sendhil Mullainathan)
2.1 Introduction
Agency theory emphasizes a tension between workers and firms: workers do not work as hard as
firms would like (Holmstrom 1979; Grossman and Hart 1983). Wages do not reflect the full benefits
of work—the employer provides some insurance—and so workers are imperfectly incentivized. Intro-
spection suggests another problem at work: self-control.1 Looking to the future, agents would like
to work hard. Acting in the moment, though, they would rather relax. This raises a new tension:
workers do not work as hard as they themselves would like.
This tension on the worker side changes the logic of contract design. A simple example illustrates
how. Suppose a firm earns revenue by entering data and faces a penalty C for not completing by
a certain date. It hires a worker to enter this data at some wage w and gives her a penalty c for
not meeting the deadline. The penalty creates risk for the worker: the data could turn out to be
complex to enter so that even at her best eﬀort the worker may not be able to meet the deadline.
This increased risk requires compensation. Self-control changes this simple logic. A worker with
self-control problems may see benefits to an increased penalty in tomorrow’s contract (assuming
she is sophisticated as in O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). An increased penalty will motivate her
to work harder tomorrow, which she values today. As a result, she may not need compensation.
This generates a striking prediction. Sophisticated workers with self-control problems may prefer a
dominated contract, one that pays less for every output realization. In eﬀect, the incentive scheme
can be an implicit commitment device (Laibson 1997; Ashraf et. al. 2006; Gine et. al. 2010).
1 Frederick et al (2002) and DellaVigna 2009 review the self-control literature. Prominent models include Laibson
(1996), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999; 2001), and Fudenberg and Levine (2006). Bernheim, Ray and Yeltekin
(2011) and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2009) examine it in the development context. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001;
2004) provide a diﬀerent account of the demand for commitment.
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This observation separates work from several other self-control domains that have been studied
(e.g. savings and smoking). An independent agent—the employer—has both the means and motives
to reduce worker self control. Sharp monetary incentives or firing for tardiness and inadequate
performance can ameliorate self-control problems. This could alter our understanding of work
arrangements. Employers can now actually increase productivity beyond what workers could achieve
as full residual claimants.2 This argument makes two key assumptions: self-control at work is
quantitatively important and workers are suﬃciently sophisticated as to value the implicit self-
control benefits of stronger incentives.
We performed a field experiment to test these assumptions.3 In the experiment, data entry
workers are paid weekly according to a piece rate that depends on the number of accurate fields
entered each day. Workers were randomized into two conditions. Workers in the Control condition
face the standard piece rate of w. Workers in the Choice condition are allowed to choose a target T
for the day: if they meet the target they receive the standard piece rate w; if they fail, they receive
half the piece rate, w/2. Like the penalty in the fictional example, the target increases penalty
without increasing reward. In this sense, a zero target contract dominates every positive target
contract. Workers were allowed to choose their targets either the evening before (for the next day)
or that morning; they were randomly assigned into these Morning and Evening choice conditions.
All contract assignments were randomly assigned daily for each worker.4 To measure the impact
of time horizon, workers were also randomized into diﬀerent payday groups: all were paid weekly
but the exact day of payment varied. These randomizations were at the worker level and paydays
once assigned were fixed. Our experiment takes place over 13-months in Mysore, India. Workers
were typically high school graduates for whom employment in the firm was their primary source of
2 Clark (1994) makes this case for the rise of the factory during the industrial revolution. O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999; 2006) formalize how firms use deadlines to motivate a procrastinator. They also produce interesting impli-
cations for screening which we examine only briefly here. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) also study contract
design in a diﬀerent context. Kaur et al (2010) discuss the work context. Firms could also increase output by
solving the free riding problem in team production (Cheung 1969; Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
3 Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) and Burger et. al. (2008) provide evidence of self control in work. Though quite
interesting, both papers involved student populations and smaller stakes. Shearer (2004), Gneezy and List (2006),
Bandiera et al (2007), Fehr and Goette (2008), and Hossain and List (2009) use field experiments to study other
features of worker psychology.
4 In addition to the control and two choice conditions above, we also randomize workers into one of three dominated
contracts without choice. While not useful for understanding self-control, these provide useful calibration benefits.
This is reported in greater detail below. We also randomized workers seats so that every 1 to 3 weeks they moved
to diﬀerent seats. This allows us to estimate peer eﬀects as discussed in Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan (2010,
2012).
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earnings.
We find three main results. First, workers work harder as the payday gets closer. They earn
8% more on paydays than at the beginning of the weekly pay cycle. This is not concentrated on
the payday: production rises smoothly through pay cycle.5 Second, dominated contracts are chosen
on 35% of the worker-days when they are oﬀered (among workers that are present). The ability to
choose a dominated contract increases productivity: the Choice condition shows a Local Average
Treatment Eﬀect of 6%. Third, these two eﬀects are related. We find significant heterogeneity in
the payday eﬀect and this heterogeneity predicts the impact of Choice. Workers with above mean
payday eﬀects are 49% more likely to choose the dominated contracts, and show a 20% treatment
eﬀect of Choice on output. The workers with the biggest self-control problems appear to value
the dominated contracts the most. We argue below that while any one of these findings may be
explained in some other way (e.g. workers trying to signal ability to employers), only the self-control
interpretation fits these three facts together.
We calibrate these eﬀects against two benchmarks. We compare their magnitudes to a simple
OLS estimate of the returns to education: the payday eﬀect is comparable to a little more than
a 1-year increase in education and the ability to choose the dominated contract increases output
at the same level roughly of two-thirds of a year of education. We also calibrate a simple model
to estimate the implied time inconsistency—the extent to which the discount rate changes. This
requires mapping out the cost of eﬀort curve, which we do using an exogenous change in the overall
piece rate that was implemented after the treatments ended. The payday eﬀect suggests a discount
rate of roughly 5% per day. The Choice treatment suggests that the diﬀerence in discounting of
benefits between the self that chooses the contract and the one that works appears to be at least
18%. For the workers with above average payday eﬀects, the impact of choice rises to roughly 2.5
years of education or a time inconsistency between the chooser and doer of 64%.
Two other findings stand out. First, workers seem to learn about their self-control problems.
Early on, many workers experiment with dominated contracts when in the Choice condition. As
they gain experience, workers diverge: some choose positive targets more while others choose zero
targets more regularly. The workers who increase demand are also those with the highest payday
5 To avoid selection bias due to selective attendance, we report production results with absent workers coded as zero
production. Workers are told the next day’s contract assignment before leaving for the day.
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eﬀects, suggesting accurate learning. The treatment eﬀect of Choice on productivity also increases
with worker experience: as workers sort better, the benefits of choice increase. In contrast, the eﬀect
of paydays neither declines nor increases with experience. These results suggest that workers learn
about the extent of their self-control problems but do not necessarily learn away these problems
(possibly suggesting the availability of external commitment devices to help with self control at
work is low).
Second, inconsistent with the simplest self-control models, we fail to find a diﬀerence between
Morning and Evening choice: targets chosen for the next day are the same as for the same day.
Ex post analysis of the data suggests a possible reason: workers may face uncertainty the evening
before that will be realized when they arrive at work. Variability in computer speed and time they
can reach work (e.g. due to uncertain buses) may oﬀset a greater desire for self control the evening
before. In fact, targets are higher the evening before when these measures of uncertainty are low
and this reverses when uncertainty is high. Self-control models that allowed for such uncertainty
that is revealed over time could easily explain these results but we ourselves did not make such a
prediction prior to running the experiment.6
Finally, we find mixed evidence of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects. Workers with above average
productivity were 40% more likely to demand dominated contracts but interestingly benefited less
from their provision. This hints at the possibility that there may be variability in the extent of
sophistication. At the end of the experiment, we conducted surveys to elicit subjective measures of
self-control at work and in other domains (such as smoking).7 As a whole, these measures, however,
showed little predictive power, either because of a lack of statistical power or because these abstract
measures are inherently noisy.
2.2 Model
We present a simple principal-agent model that incorporates worker self-control. Since our
empirical work will focus on the demand for contracts, we focus only on worker utility under
diﬀerent contracts: we do not explicitly derive the optimal contract here.
6 We were motivated to do this analysis when we noticed a significant drop in demand for the targets during days of
slow network speed. This led us to see whether this uncertainty mediated the evening-morning eﬀect.
7 For example, agreement with statements like, “Some days I don’t work as hard as I would like.”
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An agent exerts unobservable continuous eﬀort e to produce stochastic binary output, y. Output
equals 1 with probability p(e) and equals 0 otherwise. Output is perfectly observable, and the agent
is paid in period T as a function of it. Write L and H for the pay in the low and high states and
D = H   L. Agents exert eﬀort in period 1, output is realized and pay is given in period T , and
incentive contracts are signed in period 0.
Agents discount a payoﬀ at horizon t (i.e. t periods in the future) by d(t) where d(t) is decreasing
in t, d(t)  1 and d(0) = 1. For the time consistent case, we write d(t) =  t where   equals the
daily discount factor and t is measured in days. For time inconsistent agents, we assume that the
impatience for a delay of s periods d(t+s)d(t) is decreasing in t for any fixed s.
8 These assumptions
generate a discount function that matches what is used to model hyperbolic discounting: people are
particularly impatient for receiving a payment today versus tomorrow, less impatient for tomorrow
versus day after tomorrow and more generally their impatience falls with the horizon. For the
empirical work, we further implicitly assume that d(1) is suﬃciently less than 1. The agent is risk
averse, with concave utility, u(•), over income and a cost of eﬀort c(e) which is convex in e.9
We will write utility as U{C,I}0,1 to indicate the utility for either a time consistent (C) or time
inconsistent (I) agent at time 0 or 1. Based on our assumptions:
UC1 =  
T [p(e)u(H) + (1  p(e))u(L)]  c(e)
UC0 =  
T+1 [p(e)u(H) + (1  p(e))u(L)]   c(e)
U I1 = d(T )([p(e)u(H) + (1  p(e))u(L)]  c(e)
U I0 = d(T + 1)([p(e)u(H) + (1  p(e))u(L)]  d(1)c(e)
Note that UC0 =  UC1 but U I0 6= d(1)UC1 .
8 A hyperbolic discount factor d(t) = (1+at) g/a, where a captures deviations from exponential discounting (Lowen-
stein and Prelec 1992), will satisfy this property. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (see Laibson 1997) or more broadly,
present bias (see Benhabib et al 2007) satisfies these assumptions with one possible caveat. A quasi-hyperbolic
function has d(t) =   ⌧ so that d(1)d(0) =   and
d(⌧+1)
d(⌧) =   for t > 0. So the rate of time preference is strictly
decreasing between t = 0 and t = 1, and is the same between other periods. The conflict is purely about now
versus later with no conflict in future periods. For our purposes we are interested in conflict even in future horizons:
for example we will look not just at a payday eﬀect but also aﬀects as the payday gets closer.
9 In writing this utility function we are assuming that the agent only consumes pay when it is given. If agents
have access to perfect credit markets and suﬀer from no other psychological biases (e.g. mental accounting) then
consumption utility would not depend on the actually date of pay.
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Optimal eﬀort for the time consistent denoted by is given by the first order condition:
 T
⇥
p0(e⇤C)u
0(H) + (1  p0(e⇤C))u0(L)
⇤  c0(e⇤C).
For the time inconsistent, desired eﬀort diﬀers between time 0 and 1, is denoted by e⇤0 and e⇤1. Since
time 1 chooses eﬀort the realized eﬀort is given by the first order condition:
d(T )(
⇥
p0(e⇤1)u
0(H) + (1  p0(e⇤1))u0(L)
⇤  c0(e⇤1).
The diﬀerence in these formulas trivially illustrates the payday eﬀect. As T goes down (a closer
payday), for a time consistent agent, since   ⇡ 1 there should be no noticeable changes in e⇤C .10
Since we are assuming that d(1) < 1, e⇤1 will decrease in T .
Prediction 2.1: Timing of Compensation
As the lag between eﬀort and compensation decreases, a time inconsistent agent will
supply greater eﬀort. In contrast, there will be no noticeable changes in eﬀort provision
if the agent is time consistent.
Period 0’s desired eﬀort level is given by the first order condition:
d(T + 1)(
⇥
p0(e⇤0)u
0(H) + (1  p0(e⇤0))u0(L)
⇤  c0(e⇤0).
Since period 0 weighs the benefits of eﬀort relative to the costs more heavily than period 1
⇣
d(T+1)
d(T ) >
d(T )
1
⌘
,
period 0 desires more eﬀort than is provided: e⇤0 > e⇤1. This is the heart of the time inconsistency
problem.
This inconsistency changes period 0’s “demand” for diﬀerent contracts. Suppose we change the
10 When presenting results, we return to this assumption and explicitly calibrate the exponential discount rate that
is implied by our empirical results.
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payment in the low state L. For the time consistent worker at time 0 :
@UC0
@L =  
T+1 [1  p(e⇤C)]u0(L) +   @e
⇤
C
@L
 
 T [p0(e⇤C)u
0(H) + (1  p0(e⇤C))u0(L)]  c0(e⇤C)
 
=  T+1 [1  p(e⇤C)]u0(L)
> 0
.
This is intuitive: more pay in the low state generates an income eﬀect. The disincentive eﬀect can
be disregarded because of the envelope theorem—the agent was already equating marginal cost and
benefit of eﬀort. Importantly, period 1 who chooses the eﬀort has the same first order condition
as period 0 who is valuing the contract. As a result, a decrease in L lowers utility and an increase
raises utility.
A time inconsistent worker has a diﬀerent perspective. As far as she is concerned, the marginal
costs and benefits of eﬀort, as she weighs them, have not been equalized by period 1. So the impact
of a change in L on incentives must also be considered:
@U I0
@L
= d(T +1) [1  p(e⇤1)]u0(L)+ 
@e⇤1
@L
 
d(T + 1)
⇥
p0(e⇤1)u
0(H) +
 
1  p0(e⇤C)
 
u0(L)
⇤  d(1)c0(e⇤C)  .
As before the first term is positive: change L and income changes. The second term—the incentive
eﬀect—is negative. This is easiest to see for a reduction in L: lowering pay in the low state increases
eﬀort. Since 0 wants more eﬀort and this incentive eﬀect raises utility for 0 and oﬀsets the income
eﬀect. Thus, if the agent’s self-control problem is suﬃciently severe, in period 0 utility may rise
when L falls. This means that even holding pay constant in the high state (H ) she may be happier
with a contract that pays her less in the low state. Thus a dominated contract—one that pays less
in some states and no more in all states—can improve her utility. This leads to the next prediction.
Prediction 2.2: Demand for Dominated Contracts
A (sophisticated) time inconsistent agent may prefer a dominated contract that increases
the marginal returns to eﬀort. In contrast, a time consistent agent would never prefer
such a contract. Providing a (sophisticated) time inconsistent agent the option to select
a dominated contract will increase eﬀort, output, and earnings.
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Note that a direct implication of our model is that there will be a correlation between our first two
sets of predictions. Time consistent workers will not be aﬀected by the timing of compensation,
nor will they select dominated contracts. In contrast, sophisticated time inconsistent workers would
select a dominated contract:11
Prediction 2.3: Correlation between Compensation Eﬀect and Demand for
Dominated Contracts
An agent that is aﬀected by the timing of compensation will be more likely to select and
benefit from a dominated contract.
When will time inconsistent sophisticates be most likely to prefer the dominated contract? Trivially
in our model period 0 could choose a dominated contract, whereas period 1 would not. If we
expand our model to allow for s+ 1 periods prior to eﬀort the term in front of the incentive eﬀect
@e⇤1
@L would become
d(T+s+1)
d(T+s)   d(1) and would therefore be increasing in s. In other words, demand
for the dominated contract would increase with the horizon between the choice and eﬀort period.
Inconsistent individuals are more likely to choose a dominated contract for next week than for
tomorrow.12
Prediction 2.4: Horizon of Choice and Demand for Dominated Contracts
A time inconsistent agent will be more likely to prefer a dominated contract farther in
advance of the eﬀort period.
11 Note that paydays should lead to production increases among all time inconsistent workers, whereas only time
inconsistent sophisticates should demand commitment. In a model that incorporates naiveté, the naifs would
attenuate the correlation towards zero.
12 Our stylized model predicts that workers will only demand targets in advance of the eﬀort period. However, the
continuity of time means that even in the morning of the workday, workers may value targets—for example, because
the morning self wants the afternoon self to work hard. Thus, our prediction is simply that there will be less demand
for the dominated contract in the morning than the evening, not that there will be none. In addition, in a quasi-
hyperbolic model, this prediction would be more trivial: there will be demand for commitment for tomorrow but
no demand for commitment today. The horizon of commitment would not otherwise since the model is exponential
except for today versus tomorrow.
59
An implication of this observation is that the principal can use the incentive scheme to increase
productivity and utility of the period 0 self. Consider the case of a risk neutral agent where u(w)
is linear. In this case the optimal incentive scheme for a time consistent agent is L = 0 and H = 1,
that is, the agent owns the output.
From before, we know that for a time inconsistent agent, less eﬀort will be realized under this
scheme than 0 would like. Following the previous notation let e⇤ be the eﬀort when the agent owns
the output. Suppose the firm perturbs this scheme by x so that:
L =   xp(e⇤1)
H =   x1 p(e⇤1)
.
Since the probability of the low state is this merely increases incentives without producing an income
eﬀect (for constant eﬀort). The incentive eﬀect on period 1 is positive. As a result, we can see that
this scheme generates positive net benefits to both firm and the worker at time 0. The worker at
time 0 would prefer it and the firm would weakly prefer it (this can be made a strong preference by
letting the firm share in some of the increased revenues). This leads to the following implication:
Prediction 2.5: Full Incentives
A time consistent agent has maximum productivity when she owns the output. A time
inconsistent agent, however, will produce more with an employer providing a diﬀerent
incentive scheme than the agent simply owning the output.
In traditional agency theory, the firm provides insurance. Here we can see the firm can increase
productivity as well.
We do not directly test this implication but we see it indirectly when we examine nonlinear
(dominated) incentive contracts and examine impacts on productivity and workers’ willingness to
choose them. The derivation of this prediction implicitly shows another prediction. Time inconsis-
tency generates incentive schemes that give super-normal incentives: workers will be incentivized
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at a rate that is larger than the actual impact of eﬀort on output.13
2.3 Experiment Design
2.3.1 Experimental Context
We test these predictions within an Indian data entry firm in the city of Mysore, located in
one of the country’s major data entry hubs. In this firm, workers use data entry software to type
information from scanned images into fields on their computer screen. To control for quality, we
measured accuracy using dual entry of data, with manual checks by separate quality control staﬀ
when there were discrepancies. These are standard practices in the data entry industry. Workers
were paid piece rates for production as a function of how many accurate fields they entered every
day. The specific piece rate schedule depended on the contract assignment (see below) but all
contracts were functions of accurate fields entered. At all times, the screen showed the worker total
fields entered so far that day.
In this context, the physical production function itself is completely individualistic. This means
that incentive schemes do not need to be concerned about production externalities.14 Moreover, the
incentives to work came primarily from the piece rate contracts. There were no penalties for being
late or leaving early. There were also few reputational concerns or potential for promotion to drive
eﬀort since workers were hired for a fixed duration job as is common in this industry. Of course
there may be some residual career concerns and we discuss how this would aﬀect our findings in
Section 2.5.
Employees were recruited through the standard procedures used by the firm with which we
worked—from the pool of resumes submitted by walk-ins to the firm and solicitations via posters
and announcements in surrounding villages. Applicants were required to have completed tenth grade
education and be at least eighteen years of age. Employees were hired in order of application. Upon
13 Both these predictions are seen in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1996). The first is implicit in their Propositions 2 and
3 where the employer is able to increase probability of task completion. The second is a direct consequence of
employers in their model willing to give sharper penalties for missing a deadline than project value.
14 This does not rule out social externalities in production. See Kaur et al. (2010; 2012) for an analysis of those in
this context.
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joining the firm, workers received about 2 weeks of training. This included technical instruction
on the data entry software, the production task, and other aspects of computer usage. They were
also trained on the two types of incentive contracts and the four contract treatments. During the
initial part of training, workers were paid a flat stipend of Rs. 100/day while they learned the
task. Trainees then worked under assignment to the control contract. At the end of the training
period, they were assigned to the dominated contract for two days under the low and medium
targets, respectively. This gave them the opportunity to observe their production under both types
of incentive schemes before beginning contract randomizations.15
2.3.2 Treatments
To test Prediction 2.1, we randomized employees into three payday groups—Tuesday, Thursday,
and Saturday. One-third of workers were assigned to each group at the beginning of the study, and
these assignments determined which day of the week each worker received her full weekly pay. For
example, on Tuesday evening of each week, employees in the Tuesday payday group were paid for
work completed since the previous Wednesday. Randomly assigning paydays removes other reasons
that specific days might impact eﬀort. For example, workers might work less hard on Fridays since
they’d like to enjoy their Friday evening out with friends. Alternatively they might work harder
on Monday after a weekend’s rest. In this design, the same day is a payday for some (randomly
chosen) workers and not for others. As a result, we can identify the eﬀect of aligning compensation
with eﬀort by comparing production on paydays with production on non-paydays.16
To test Prediction 2.2, the demand for dominated incentive schemes, we focus on two types
of contracts. The first is a linear “control” contract that paid a piece rate wage of w for each
unit of production. The second is a nonlinear “dominated” contract that imposed a production
target. Under this latter contract, workers received the piece rate of w if they met the target, but
only received w/2 for each entered field if they fell short of the target. As shown in Figure 2.1,
the control contract dominates the treatment contract in earnings—for any given production level,
15 The training period for some workers (particularly those that were the first to joined the project) lasted longer than
2 weeks. However, the structure of the training remained the same, regardless of duration.
16 In a quasi-hyperbolic model, where time horizon is defined by a day, one can make a sharper prediction: production
will only be higher on the payday itself. Of course if the time horizon is longer than a day or if discounting is
hyperbolic (and not quasi-hyperbolic) this sharp prediction will fail.
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earnings are always weakly higher under the control contract.
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Figure 1 
Incentive Contracts 
 
Notes:  This figure displays the two types of incentive contracts offered to workers.  The 
linear “control” contract paid a piece rate wage of w for each accurate field entered.  The 
nonlinear “dominated” contract imposed a production target, X; workers were paid w for each 
accurate field if they met the target, but only received w/2 for each field if they fell short of 
the target.  Thus, earnings are equivalent under both contracts for output levels above X.  
However, if a worker fails to achieve X, earnings are substantially less under the dominated 
contract.  
 
 
 
Notes: This figure graphs the coefficients and confidence intervals from a regression of 
production on 6 binary indicators that capture distance from a worker’s next payday 
(payday, 1 day before payday, 2 days before payday, etc). The regression includes controls 
for lagged production as well worker, date, and seat assignment fixed effects. Confidence 
intervals are based on robust standard errors. Note these coefficients correspond to those 
shown in column (4) of Table 5. 
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Figure 2 
Production over the Pay Cycle 
Figure 2.1: Incentive Contracts
Notes: This figure displays the two types of incentive contracts oﬀered to workers. The linear “control” contract paid
a piece rate wage of w for each accurate field entered. The nonlinear “dominated” contract imposed a production
target, X; workers were paid w for each accurate field if they met the target, but only received w/2 for each field if
they fell short of the target. Thus, earnings are equivalent under both contracts for output levels above X. However,
if a worker fails to achieve X, earnings are substantially less under the dominated contract.
Every day one quarter of employees were placed in Control and simply received the linear con-
tract. One quarter were placed in Target and were assigned to the dominated contract, with an
exogenously chosen production target. The imposed target was selected from three target lev-
els—low, medium, or high.17 One quarter of workers were assigned to Evening choice, in which
they chose their own target the evening before (for the next day). They could always choose a
target of 0 (and many did), which is the equivalent of c oo ing the simple linear contract. One
quarter were placed in Morning hoice and chose their targets in the morning when they arrived to
work. To make the information workers have similar across these conditions, all workers were told
their treatment assignment for each day the evening before.
We randomized contract treatments daily at the individual level. We used a balanced design,
where every worker received each of the four contract treatments in random order exactly 25 percent
of the time over every 8-day or 12-day work period.18 This ensured that each of the four treatment
17 For about half the randomization period (mostly in the first half of the study), the Target Assignment treatment
consisted of assignment to “low” or “medium” targets only. Assignment to the “high” target was added later, as
worker production levels increased. These target levels are explained in greater detail in Appendix C.
18 During the period when the Target Assignment treatment consisted of assignment to only low or medium targets,
randomizations were on an 8-day cycle: 2 Control; 2 Target Assignment (1 low and 1 medium target); 2 Evening
Choice; and 2 Morning Choice. During the period when the Target Assignment treatment consisted of assignment
to low, medium, and high targets, randomizations were on a 12-day cycle: 3 Control; 3 Target Assignment (1 low,
1 medium, and 1 high target); 3 Evening Choice; and 3 Morning Choice. The proportional weight on each of the
four treatments therefore remained 25% at all times.
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cells had an equal number of observations, both within each worker and across the entire sample.
The vector of assignments was independent across workers. As an example, Appendix Table D.1
displays the contract assignments for 5 workers in the sample over a 24-day period. Daily variation
enables us to generate a large number of data points within the study period. This will give us
suﬃcient power for a richer set of analyses, such as looking at trends in behavior over time.19
Appendix Table D.2 shows that the 8,673 observations in the Analysis Sample are spread evenly
across the treatment cells due to the balanced randomization design; the minor diﬀerences in obser-
vations are caused by worker turnover—vacancy time until worker replacement, variation in start
day from first payday, and the random order of contract assignments.
In addition to the above predictions, our design provides the opportunity to test whether hetero-
geneity in treatment eﬀects is predicted by correlates of self-control that have been posed elsewhere
in the literature. These include preference reversals in estimated discount rates; workers’ own assess-
ments of their self-control problems; failed attempts at quitting addictive behaviors; and measures
of ability such as productivity, education and IQ. Appendix C provides additional details about the
experiment context and protocols.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2.1 displays participants’ characteristics. Most workers were males (74%). 63
workers reported their age on resumes or elsewhere in their application. These workers ranged in
age from 19 to 38 years, with a mean of 24. We collected information on educational attainment
and experience during baseline surveys administered to 101 of the 111 workers.20 Employees had
13 years of education on average. The majority had taken a computer course and had an email
address prior to joining the firm.
19 A drawback of daily randomization is the potential for bias from inter-temporal substitution in eﬀort. We empirically
test for this concern in Section 2.4.3. In addition, note that daily randomization reduces the likelihood of potential
Hawthorne eﬀects. It is unlikely that workers would persistently alter their behavior each day for a year in response
to knowledge of their treatment status.
20 In this and other information presented in Table 2, some of the employees that were hired in later stages of the
project were not surveyed because of clerical oversight.
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Table 2.1: Worker Characteristics and Survey Responses 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
10th 
pctile 
90th 
pctile Obs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Worker Characteristics 
Proportion female 0.26 0.44  --  -- 111 
Age 24 4 20 29 63 
Years of education 13 2 11 15 101 
Completed high school 0.84 0.37  --  -- 101 
Used computer prior to joining firm 0.67 0.47  --  -- 101 
Taken computer training course 0.70 0.46  --  -- 101 
Had email address prior to joining firm 0.60 0.49  --  -- 101 
B. Performance on Tests Administered During Experiment 
Contracts comprehension quiz: percentage score 93 13 80 100 79 
Raven's Matrix score 35 12 17 49 107 
Digit Span composite score 27 6 20 36 109 
IQ composite score (Raven's Matrix plus Digit Span) 62 15 40 84 106 
C. Discount Rate Measurement 
Proportion of times worker chose smaller immediate reward 0.31 0.28 0 0.67 58 
Proportion of times worker displayed preference reversal 0.17 0.23 0 0.67 58 
D. Endline Survey: Self-Reported Measures of Self-Control Problems 
Worker agreed or agreed strongly with the statement:      
"Some days I don’t work as hard as I would like to." 0.76 0.43  --  -- 70 
"At the end of the day, I get tempted to leave work earlier than I 
would like." 
0.40 0.49  --  -- 70 
"I wish I had better attendance at work." 0.86 0.35  --  -- 70 
"It would be good if there were rules against being absent 
because it would help me come to work more often." 
0.73 0.45  --  -- 70 
Self-control index: mean of responses to all 9 self-control 
questions (1=disagree strongly; 5=agree strongly) 
3.43 0.55 3.11 4.17 70 
Worker has tried to quit an addictive behavior and failed 0.12 0.33  --  -- 51 
Factor analysis: self-control factor 0.00 0.86 -1.37 0.72 70 
E. Endline Survey: Self-Reported Measures of External Constraints 
Worker agreed or agreed strongly with the statement:      
"If I miss one bus or train, the next one I can take is much later." 0.61 0.49  --  -- 70 
"I do not have much flexibility in how late I can stay in the 
office because I have to leave at a certain time." 
0.56 0.50  --  -- 70 
Constraints index: mean of responses to all 4 constraints questions 
(1=disagree strongly; 5=agree strongly) 
3.61 0.85 2.25 4.50 70 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the 111 workers that participated in the study. Panel A presents 
statistics on worker characteristics, gathered from a baseline survey. Panel B provides information on tests that were 
administered to workers: a quiz that tested their comprehension of the contract treatments; their performance on the 
Raven’s Matrix IQ test; their total score on the Digit Span test (administered forwards and backwards in each English 
and the local language); and the sum of their Raven’s Matrix and Digit Span score. Panel C describes worker behavior 
during a discount rate exercise in which they traded 3 sets of off cash awards (Rs. 20 vs. Rs. 24; Rs. 50 vs. Rs. 57; and 
Rs. 100 vs. Rs. 110) under 2 different horizons: short horizon (the smaller amount today vs. the larger amount in 3 
days) and long horizon (the smaller amount in 14 days vs. the larger amount in 17 days). Panel C reports statistics on 
the proportion of times the worker choose the smaller immediate reward out of the 6 questions, and the number of times 
the worker showed preference reversal (chose the smaller immediate reward in the short horizon but showed patience 
by choosing the larger reward in the long horizon). Panel D summarizes responses by workers to questions during the 
endline survey that asked them to agree or disagree with statements relating to their self-control behavior. It also reports 
summary statistics for the Self-Control Factor, which is determined using a Factor Analysis on all the endline survey 
questions. Panel E provides details of responses to 4 endline survey questions that asked about external constraints. 
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The key outcomes of interest are worker output and demand for dominated contracts. As defined
above, output is measured as the number of accurate fields entered in a day. We have 2 measures of
demand for dominated contracts under the Choice treatments—an indicator for whether a positive
target was chosen and the target level chosen.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Outcome Measures 
 
Analysis 
Sample 
Full 
Payday 
Sample 
  (1) (2) 
Attendance 0.88 
(0.33) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
Production 5337 
(3404) 
5665 
(3651) 
Production conditional on attendance 6094 
(2935) 
6433 
(3193) 
Indicator for whether positive target was selected under Choice 
treatment 
0.35 
(0.48) 
 -- 
Target level selected under Choice treatment 974 
(1502) 
 -- 
   
Number of workers in sample 102 111 
Number of observations in sample 8,423 11,744 
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for four outcome measures: attendance rates, 
production conditional on attendance (where production is measured as the number of 
accurate fields entered by a worker in a day), take-up rates for the commitment contract 
(where take-up is defined as whether a worker selected a positive target when assigned to 
Choice), and the target levels selected by workers when assigned to Choice (this includes 
observations where the worker selected a target of 0).  These statistics are summarized 
for each of 2 samples—the 11-month period during which payday treatments were run; 
the 8-month period during which both the contract and payday treatments were run. The 
table presents means for each measure and standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
 Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for measures of these outcomes. Column (1) provides means
and standard deviations for the 8-month period during which the contract randomizations were run.
This constitutes the main Analysis Sample—when both contract and payday treatments occurred
simultaneously—and is comprised of 102 workers and 8,423 observations. Attendance was 88 percent
and mean production conditional on attendance was 6,094 accurate fields per day in the Analysis
sample. This amounts to mean daily earnings of Rs. 183 (conditional on attendance). Column (2)
reports statistics for the entire 11-month period during which the payday randomizations were run.
This constitutes the Full Payday Sample and is comprised of 111 workers and 11,744 observations.
While mean attendance was the same in the full payday period, mean production was somewhat
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higher (6,433 fields). This diﬀerence stems from the fact that the payday period ran for 3 additional
months, and therefore reflects production increases over time by workers. For consistency of analysis,
we will use the Analysis Sample throughout the empirical analysis that follows. To demonstrate
that restricting analysis to this sample does not impact the payday results, all tables pertaining
to the payday treatments also contain a column showing regression estimates for the Full Payday
Sample.
2.4.2 Payday Eﬀects on Production (Prediction 2.1)
We now turn to our first prediction: productivity should increase as the payday increases. We
estimate an OLS model of the form:
Yi,t = ↵0 + ↵1Paydayi,t + ↵2Wi + ↵3Dt + ↵4Si,t + µi,t. (2.1)
Paydayi,t is an indicator for whether worker i had a payday on date t. Wi, Dt, and Si,t are vectors of
worker, date, and seat assignment dummies, respectively, and are included to increase the precision
of the payday coeﬃcient estimate. mi,t is the residual error. Yi,t is the number of accurate fields
entered by worker i on date t. When workers are absent, this variable is coded as 0.21 Random
assignment of paydays ensures that: E[Paydayi,tmi,t] = 0. ↵1 is therefore interpretable as the causal
impact of paydays on production.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.3 provide estimates of the payday eﬀect on output in the Analysis
Sample. Column (1) estimates the specification in regression model (2.1). It shows that workers
produce 215 fields more on average on paydays than non-paydays (significant at the 1% level).
There is persistent serial correlation in output, which we control for in column (2), and continue to
find a positive and significant eﬀect of the payday. Average output is roughly 5,300 fields. These
coeﬃcients (and the rest in the Table) suggest a treatment eﬀect of 2.6% to 10% increased production
depending on the specification and whether we are comparing paydays to all days or to the day
furthest from the payday.
21 Simply dropping absentee observations from the sample would produce selection and could bias estimates. In this
context, the zero assignment has an economic interpretation: it also corresponds to the workers’ earnings that day.
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In columns (3) and (4) we examine in detail the dynamics of the payday cycle. Instead of a
single dummy for the payday, we include dummies for each of the days leading up to the payday:
Yi,t =  0 +
X
k
 k1Payday
 k
i,t +  2Wi +  3Dt +  4Si,t +  5Yi,t 1 +  6Yi,t 2 + µi,t, (2.2)
where Payday ki,t are dummies indicating that the payday is k days away and Yi,t 1 and Yi,t 2 are
lag production controls.22 Figure 2.2 graphs the regression coeﬃcients from column (4) of Table 5.
The days that immediately follow a payday, and are therefore furthest from the next payday, are
when employees are least productive. Production then rises steadily through the pay cycle.23
 1!
Figure 2.1: Incentive Contracts 
 
Notes:  This figure displays the two types of incentive contracts 
offered to workers.  The linear “control” contract paid a piece rate 
wage of w for each accurate field entered.  The nonlinear 
“dominated” contract imposed a production target, X; workers were 
paid w for each accurate field if they met the target, but only 
received w/2 for each field if they fell short of the target.  Thus, 
earnings are equivalent under both contracts for output levels above 
X.  However, if a worker fails to achieve X, earnings are 
substantially less under the domin ted contract.  
 
 
 
Notes: This figure graphs the coefficients and confidence 
intervals from a regression of production on 6 binary indicators 
that capture distance from a worker’s next payday (payday, 1 day 
before payday, 2 days before payday, etc). The regression 
includes controls for lagged production as well worker, date, and 
seat assignment fixed effects. Confidence intervals are based on 
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Production over the Pay Cycle 
Figu 2.2: P duction ov r the Pay Cycle
Notes: This figure graphs the coeﬃcie ts and confidence intervals from a regression of production on 6 binary
indicators that capture distance from a worker’s next payday (payday, 1 day before payday, 2 days before payday,
etc). The regression includes controls for lagged production as well worker, date, and seat assignment fixed eﬀects.
Confidence intervals are based on 1 Production Impact (regression coeﬃcient) robust standard errors. Note these
coeﬃcients correspond to those shown in column (4) of Table 5.
22 We will look at earnings as the primary outcome. In Panel A of Appendix Table D.3 we show how our results
decompose into hours and productivity conditional on hours worked.
23 Figure 2.2 shows that production steadily increases as the payday approaches. It does not, however, pin down the
shape of this increase—one could fit a linear, convex, or concave curve through the confidence intervals. Some time
inconsistency models predict convexity. At the extreme, b-d and dual-self models where time periods are defined
as days would predict that all the eﬀect should be concentrated on the payday itself; our results would seem to
refute this special case. However, this is not necessarily true under alternate ways of conceptualizing time periods
or the horizon of b and d. More generally, predictions in any model will be sensitive to how the discount function
is defined and how time periods are specified. We are interested in testing core predictions that are common across
self-control models. We therefore focus here on the qualitative prediction that production should be higher closer
to paydays—a result that bears out strongly in the data.
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Since our output measures includes both attendance and productivity while at work, we sep-
arately examine the impact on attendance using both the Analysis (columns 5 to 8) and the Full
Sample (9 and 10) and varying the inclusion of controls. All are linear probability models except for
column 8, which uses a probit estimator. Unsurprisingly, people are more likely to show up to work
on the payday (by 4.8 percentage points); if nothing else, the benefit of collecting one’s pay should
increase attendance. In columns (6) and (7), however, we see this “check collection” motive is an
incomplete explanation: attendance increases steadily in the days before as well. This is consistent
with our model since the benefits of showing up at work will appear larger when the payday is
closer. This eﬀect is magnified by the fact that the workers know they will also earn more because
they work harder once at work.
These payday eﬀects might imply that paying people daily will increase total output. But in
what we have shown some (or all) of the increased eﬀort on paydays may reflect a substitution of
eﬀort from other days. Such substitution will happen whenever the cost of eﬀort is not separable
across days; for example, workers may be tired from prior days’ work eﬀort or may be less motivated
if they had high income recently. In Section (2.4.3) below, we test directly for these substitution
eﬀects. Our results suggest that in fact eﬀort across days is independent. While this hints that
more frequent payments would increase outputs (that the payday eﬀects reflect net new output),
one should keep in mind that we have no direct experimental data on payment frequency. Even if
this were true, there might be several reasons for not paying workers daily. In our particular case, for
example, there are costs of making more frequent payment that are substantive. Cash management
poses significant costs to the employer. On a diﬀerent note, even if more frequent payment solves
the work self control problem, it may exacerbate the consumption self control problem. Specifically
infrequent payment may be an implicit savings commitment device.
Calibration of Eﬀect Sizes
How can we understand these eﬀect sizes? To calibrate these eﬀects, throughout the paper we
will compare the production increases to two other values. The first calibration is straightforward.
An OLS estimate in our data finds a return to an additional year of education of 501 fields, or 9%
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of mean production. Calibrated in this way, these results suggest that the timing of pay alone has
the equivalent of 29% to 112% of the impact of a year of education.
A more theoretically insightful calibration would be to use our payday coeﬃcients to calibrate
the implied discount rate. Let eP be the eﬀort on paydays and eN be the eﬀort on non-paydays; P
refers to the payday time index and N is the index in time for the non-payday. Write p’(e) to be the
marginal return to the worker of a unit of eﬀort. In the model above p’(e) = p’(e)[u’(H)   u’(L)].
Since the subjects face continuous output and a linear pay scheme, the original model does not
match this context. Since we have a linear pay scheme for the experiment we can model p’(e) as
u’(•)k where k is the coeﬃcient on the linear pay scheme.
From the first order condition above we can write:
d(P )p0(eP ) = c0(eP )
d(N)p0(eN ) = c0(eN )
.
Assuming a linear approximation for utility of money, for small changes we can write:
[d(P )  d(N)] p0(eP ) ⇡ c0(eP )  c0(eN ).
Our data only gives us the output impact of the payday. This formula suggests that converting the
output impact into an estimate of the discount rate (d(P )) requires knowledge about the marginal
cost of eﬀort. Producing this requires another treatment. The easiest way to do this would be
to use variation in the linear pay scheme. For this reason, at the end of the study (after contract
randomizations were finished), we randomized workers into two piece-rate wages: Rs. 3 (their usual
wage) and Rs. 4 per 100 accurate fields. Each worker received each piece rate 5 times over a 10-day
period in random order, with approximately half the workers in the oﬃce assigned to each wage
within any given day. If we write these two pay schemes as p1(e) and p2(e) we can write:
d(N)p01(e1) = c0(e1)
d(N)p02(e2) = c0(e2)
) d(N) [p02(e2)  p01(e1)] = c0(e2)  c0(e1)
.
We find that the higher piece rate increases productivity by 11%. Thus a 33% increase in wages
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increases output by 11% or an elasticity of 0.33. By assuming a constant elasticity, we can use
the change in pay impact to calibrate the output change due to the payday (or any intervention).
Assuming e2 is chosen in this way we can write:
[d(P )  d(N)] p0(eP ) ⇡ d(N) [p02(e2)  p01(e1)]
) d(P ) d(N)d(N) ⇡ p
0
2(e2) p01(e1)
p01(e1)
.
This tells us that the percentage change in discount rate can be estimated by the percentage change
in slope needed to get the same output eﬀect as the payday scheme. In Table 2.3, the production
diﬀerence between paydays and the beginning of the pay cycle is 428 fields, or 8%. Thus, the
production increase on paydays is roughly comparable to the impact of raising the piece rate by
24% between the beginning and end of the pay week. This suggests that the discount factor changes
24% between non-paydays and paydays. If we use the full estimation in Figure 2.2, this suggests
that relative to day 0 (the day after payday), the discount factor rises by approximately 5% each
day over the pay week cycle.
As a whole, these results are consistent with Prediction 2.1 above. Might they be driven by
other factors as well? First, perhaps the results reflect natural impatience as alluded to earlier.
Since payments are made weekly, the maximum gap between paydays and non-paydays is about
6 days and the average gap is 3 days. Could a reasonable discount factor produce the increase in
production of 8% on paydays? Recall that for a time consistent individual, the marginal cost of
eﬀort equals dT times the marginal benefit of eﬀort. We know from the calibration above, that the
payday increase is equivalent to a 24% increase in the piece rate or the marginal benefit of eﬀort.
This suggests that d3 ⇡1/(1.24) ⇡ .81. This implies a daily discount rate of 7 percent, which is
highly implausible. This calculus also rules out variants of impatience, such as credit constraints.
Second, suppose that there are transaction costs to simply showing up for work. Workers may then
appear to have higher output on paydays simply because they are more likely to attend. We cannot
address this problem by simply examining productivity conditional on attendance (as opposed to
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total output) on paydays since those who attend may be a selected sample.24 The results in column
(6), however, provide direct evidence that the ‘show up to collect the paycheck eﬀect’ does not
drive our results: we find increased productivity in the days before the payday. These pre-payday
eﬀects could not be explained by a transaction cost of attendance. Third, perhaps the payday eﬀect
is not about higher production on the payday but lower production on the day after. Perhaps
people take the day after oﬀ. Again the dynamics belie this explanation: we find an increase in the
days leading up to the payday and the payday eﬀect is neither concentrated on the payday nor the
day after. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, suppose that consumption and work eﬀort are
complements. People might work harder on paydays because they look forward to consumption that
day. A night out with friends might be more enjoyable after a hard day at work. Once again, it is
hard to see how this would explain the pre-payday eﬀects; one would require the complementarities
with consumption to depend (in a decreasing way) on prior days’ work eﬀort. Finally, rather than
looking to rule out explanations of the payday eﬀect in isolation, one should examine how they fit
the full set of facts, a point we return to in Section 2.5.25
Finally, testing Prediction 2.3 involves correlating heterogeneity in the payday eﬀect with de-
mand for dominated contracts. For this test to be valid, there must be heterogeneity in payday
eﬀects. We test this directly by interacting a worker fixed eﬀect with the payday dummy:
Yi,t =  0+ 1Paydayi,t+ 2Wi+ 3Paydayi,t⇤Wi+ 4Dt+ 5Si,t+ 6Yi,t 1+ 7Yi,t 2+mi,t. (2.3)
Paydayi,t ⇤Wi is a vector of interactions between the vector of worker dummies and the payday
dummy. All other variables are as defined above. An F-test for joint significance of the coeﬃcients
24 In Appendix Table D.4, we show regression results where the dependent variable is production conditional on
attendance. However, these results are diﬃcult to interpret. Since attendance is higher closer to paydays due to the
self-control benefits of paydays, the composition of workers in attendance is correlated with distance from payday.
For example, when workers face negative productivity shocks like sickness, they may be more likely to come into
work on paydays than non-paydays (i.e. the higher cost of eﬀort is more likely to be justified when benefits of eﬀort
are more immediate). Alternately, if low ability workers also have greater self-control problems, the mean ability of
the worker pool will be lower on paydays. Such selection problems could lead average production, conditional on
attendance to be lower on paydays than non-paydays because diﬀerent groups of workers are being compared across
days. This also applies to columns (5)-(8) of Appendix Table D.3, where we condition outcomes on attendance.
25 We find another piece of evidence consistent with our model. In India, festivals involve large expenditures by
households (Banerjee and Duflo 2006). Under convex eﬀort costs, time consistent workers should not show large
production spikes in the days leading up to festivals (which are perfectly foreseeable); time inconsistent workers,
however, would be expected to show such spikes. Indeed, we find that average production increases by 15% in the
week prior to major festivals (significant at 1%).
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 3 has a p-value < 0.001, suggesting significant heterogeneity in the payday eﬀect.
2.4.3 Demand for and Treatment Eﬀects of Dominated Contracts (Prediction 2.2)
For the contract treatments, we first analyze take-up of the dominated contracts. First, we focus
on days when the worker was present both the day before and the day of the Choice assignment.
Absent workers would not have a chance to choose for that day in Morning Choice or the day after
in Evening choice. Measured in this way 35% of the Analysis Sample chooses a positive target
(see Appendix Table D.5). Since this constitutes a selected sample, we also analyze take-up for all
4,193 Choice observations. We define target choice to be 0 if a worker was absent the day of Choice
assignment. This is sensible if we think that not showing up to work indicates a preference for a 0
production level. For consistency, we also define target choice to be 0 if a worker was absent the day
before Choice assignment, and therefore did not receive notice of assignment as per protocols and
could not select a target if assigned to Evening Choice. These conventions provide a lower bound
on the level of demand for dominated contracts by workers. Under this definition, the take-up rate
across observations is 28%, as is the mean of the workers’ take-up rates.
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Figure 3  
Take-up of Dominated Contracts: Distribution of 
Worker Means 
 
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of take-up rates of the dominated 
contract by workers. A worker's take-up rate is defined the proportion of times 
the worker selected a positive target when assigned to Choice (and was present 
the day before and day of Choice assignment). The distribution is shown for the 
101 workers in the Analysis Sample that were assigned to Choice at least once.  
 
Figure 2.3: Take-up of Dominated Contracts - Distribution of Worker Means
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of take-up rates of the dominated contract. A worker’s take-up rate is the
proportion of times the worker selected a positive target when assigned to Choice (and present the day before and
day of Choice assignment). The distribution is shown for the 101 workers in the Analysis Sample that were assigned
to Choice at least once.
Figure 2.3 plots a histogram and kernel density estimate of worker take-up rates. The figure
reveals substantial variation in demand for targets. Some workers (16% of the sample) always chose
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a target of 0. The bottom quarter of the distribution chose positive targets less than 10% of the
time. The top quarter of the distribution chose positive targets at least 60% of the time.
To test whether these targets are binding, we examine their impact on production by estimating:
Yi,t =  0 +  1Choicei,t +  2Targeti,t +  3Wi +  4Dt +  5Si,t +  6Yi,t 1 +  7Yi,t 2 + mi,t (2.4)
Choicei,t is an indicator for whether worker i was assigned to one of the Choice treatments on day
t; Targeti,t is an indicator for the Target Assignment treatment. As before, Yi,t measures production,
Wi, Dt, and Si,t are vectors of worker, date, and seating assignment dummies, respectively, and
Yi,t 1 and Yi,t 2 are controls for lagged production. Due to random assignment, E[Choicei,tmi,t] =
E[Targeti,tmi,t] = 0. The key coeﬃcient of interest is  1. It represents the Intent to Treat estimate
of giving workers the option to take-up the dominated contract.
In columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.4, we estimate variants of the above regression model for the
Analysis Sample. Column (1) shows Choice increased production by 111 fields on average (2% of
mean production). This eﬀect is significant at the 10% level. Being assigned to the low target did
not significantly increase production in the sample overall. In contrast, assignment to the medium
and high targets led to average production increases of 213 fields (4% of mean production) and 335
fields (6% of mean production) respectively. These estimates are significant at the 5% level.
Column (2) separately estimates Evening and Morning choice: Evening choice increases out-
put by 150 fields (3% of mean production, significant at the 5% level); Morning Choice increases
output by 73 fields, but is not significant. Columns (3) and (4) limit the analysis to those observa-
tions in which workers were assigned to the Control or Choice treatments—the Target Assignment
observations are excluded—and show similar results.
Columns (5)-(8) examine the impact of contract assignments on attendance using a linear prob-
ability model. Unlike the payday treatment, the contract treatments do not appear to impact
whether employees show up to work on average.
The Choice treatments increase production by about 2%, implying a local average treatment
eﬀect of approximately 6%. Using the piece rate treatment calibration logic from above, we can
lower bound the time inconsistency at 18%—that is, the diﬀerence in discounting of benefits between
the self that chooses the contract and the one that works to be at least 18%. This is a lower bound
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since the dominated contract may not achieve optimal eﬀort (from the perspective of today’s self). 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Treatment Effects of Contract Assignment on Worker Production 
 Dependent variable:  
Production  
Dependent variable: 
Attendance 
Observations 
All obs All obs 
Control 
& 
Choice 
Control 
& 
Choice  All obs All obs 
Control 
& 
Choice 
Control 
& 
Choice 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Assignment to choice 111 
(59)* 
 120 
(59)** 
  0.007 
(0.009) 
 0.007 
(0.009) 
 
Assignment to evening choice  150 
(69)** 
 156 
(69)** 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
 0.014 
(0.010) 
Assignment to morning choice  73 
(69) 
 84 
(69) 
   -0.00 
(0.01) 
  0.001 
(0.010) 
Assignment to low target 3 
(90) 
3 
(90) 
    -0.002 
(0.013) 
 -0.00 
(0.01) 
  
Assignment to medium target 213 
(91)** 
213 
(91)** 
    -0.006 
(0.013) 
 -0.01 
(0.01) 
  
Assignment to high target 335 
(150)** 
334 
(150)** 
    -0.005 
(0.019) 
 -0.01 
(0.02) 
  
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lag production controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  No No No No 
Observations 8423 8423 6310 6310  8423 8423 6310 6310 
R2 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60  0.15 0.15 0.11 0.11 
Dependent variable mean 5337 5337 5311 5311  0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Proportion choosing a positive 
target (cond’l on attendance) 
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35  0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Proportion choosing a positive 
target (target=0 when absent) 
0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28  0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Notes: This table estimates the treatments effects of the contracts on production. The dependent variable in columns 
(1)-(4) is production. Production is defined as the number of accurate fields completed by the worker in a day, and 
equals zero on days workers are absent. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is attendance. Attendance is a 
binary variable that takes the value of 1 when workers are present and 0 otherwise. The regressions in columns (1)-(2) 
and (5)-(6) include all observations in the Analysis sample. The regressions in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) include 
observations in which workers were assigned to the Control contract or to one of the Choice treatments (Evening 
choice or Morning choice). Each column shows the estimates from an OLS regression of the dependent variable on 
indicators for contract treatment. Assignment to choice is an indicator that equals 1 if the worker was assigned to one 
of the Choice treatments (Evening Choice or Morning Choice) and equals 0 otherwise. All regressions include worker, 
date, and seat fixed effects. In addition, columns (1)-(4) also include controls for lagged production. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
      The bottom 2 rows present the proportion of times workers chose a positive target when assigned to a Choice 
treatment. The first row limits the estimate to observations in which a worker was present the day of and day before 
Choice assignment. The second row includes all Choice observations and codes target choice as 0 if the worker was 
absent the day of or day before Choice assignment. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
Our rich production data allows us in principle to better understand the nature of the targets.
First, we calibrate how large the targets are. The average target chosen is 974 fields. To interpret
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this, we compute the probability that a worker would have failed to meet the chosen target if her
output distribution matched the distribution under control : this counterfactual represents what the
period 1 self would produce if not tied to a positive target by the period 0 self. Specifically, for obser-
vations where workers were in attendance, we estimate a regression of production on worker, date,
and computer fixed eﬀects; lag production controls; payday distance dummies; contract assignment
dummies; and log experience. For each of the 1,168 observations in which a worker was assigned to
Choice, selected a positive target, and was present, we predict the worker’s production under the
control contract on that day using the estimates from the above regression. To this predicted value,
we add the worker’s vector of residuals from the above regression to arrive at a vector of potential
production values, which we fit to a lognormal distribution. Evaluating the CDF of this distribution
at the chosen target level provides an estimate of the probability that the worker would have missed
her chosen target under the control contract.
Row 1 of Appendix Table D.6 displays the mean of worker averages for this statistic. Workers’
average probability that they would have missed their selected targets if they had been assigned to
the control contract is 9.1% in the sample as a whole. For about 60% of workers, the mean target
miss probability was 6% or less. The top quarter of the distribution selected targets associated with
16% or higher probability of incurring the penalty. In Row 2 of the table, we report the proportion of
times workers actually failed to reach their targets under Choice (conditional on choosing a positive
target). The mean worker missed her chosen targets 2.6% of the time. Columns (2)-(3) of the table
display these statistics separately for high and low payday impact workers. They indicate that the
workers that are most aﬀected by paydays also select considerably more aggressive targets. For high
impact workers, the average probability of missing selected targets under control is 11.8%—this is
60% higher than the average miss probability of low impact workers. In addition, while low impact
workers rarely actually fail to reach their chosen targets, high impact workers miss them over 5%
of the time on average.
Interpreting the aggressiveness of these targets is diﬃcult. When deciding on a target level,
time inconsistent workers would weigh the motivational benefits to their future selves against the
probability of incurring these costs. The penalty for missing one’s target is substantial: half of one’s
piece rate earnings for the day. If shocks generate uncertainty in output (see Section 2.4.5), then
choosing overly aggressive targets can be extremely costly—either due to the financial penalty, or
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from having to achieve the target even on days when the cost of eﬀort turns out to be high. One
might think that the model would give guidance as to the magnitude of targets we might expect.
But the marginal cost of eﬀort is unobservable, making it hard to make these predictions. For
example, if the penalty is large enough, ex post workers will always stretch to meet the goal. But
ex ante some of this stretching is ineﬃcient.
 4!
Figure 4 
Production Behavior Around Target Thresholds 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure graphs the coefficients and associated 
95% confidence intervals from regressions of hourwise 
production (production by worker i on date t in calendar 
hour h) on binary indicators of distance from when a 
worker achieved her target within a day and controls for 
worker, date, and seat assignment fixed effects. Standard 
errors are corrected to allow for clustering by worker-day. 
Figure 1 reports estimates from days when workers 
selected positive targets under Assignment to Choice and 
were present. Figure 2 reports estimates from days when 
workers were assigned to exogenous targets under Target 
Assignment and were present. The coefficients plotted in 
Panels A and B correspond to those shown in columns (2) 
and (5), respectively, of Table 8. 
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Figure 2.4: Production Behavior Around Target Thresholds
Notes: This figure graphs the coeﬃcients and associated 95% confidence intervals from regressions of hour-wise
production (production by worker i on date t in calendar hour h) on binary in icators of distance from when a
worker achieved her target within a day, and ontr ls for worker, date, and seat assignment fixed eﬀects. Standard
errors are corrected to allow for clustering by work r-day. Panel A reports estimate from days when workers selected
positive targets under Assignment to Choice and were present. Panel B reports estimates from days when workers
were assigned to exogenous targets under Target Assignment and were present. The coeﬃcients plotted in Panels A
and B correspond to those shown in columns (2) and (5), respectively, of Appendix Table D.7.
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One might also imagine that the targets would imply a bunching of production around the target
level. In fact, we find no such bunching. This is also true, however, for the exogenously assigned
targets in the Target treatments. To understand this behavior, we use the hourly data (where hours
are defined as calendar hours such as 8-9 am, 9-10 am, etc) to paint a qualitative picture of how
production changes as workers approach (and surpass) their targets. Of course since targets are
set endogenously, these numbers cannot be interpreted causally but are informative nonetheless. In
column (1) of Appendix Table D.7, we regress hourly production on a dummy that equals 1 for the
calendar hour in which the worker hit her target that day and 0 otherwise, along with worker, date,
and computer fixed eﬀects.26 In columns (2) and (3), we add a series of dummies for the hours
immediately before and after the target was hit; the omitted category is 4 or more hours before the
target was reached. These coeﬃcients are graphed in Panel A of Figure 2.4. In all specifications,
we see that output increases as workers reach the target and then falls oﬀ. We can reject that
production in the hour when the target was reached equals production in the hour after it was
reached at the 1% significance level.27 Interestingly, the fall oﬀ, though significant, is not huge.
Workers continue to work even after reaching the target. The target (self-imposed or externally
imposed) appears to serve as a way to get workers working early in the day, a rhythm they keep up
even after they hit the target.
As discussed in the payday results above, our interpretation of treatment eﬀects estimates relies
on the assumption that labor supply is separable across periods. In the case of the contract treat-
ments, if hard work under targets increases the cost of eﬀort on future days, this would change our
interpretation of the estimates in Table 2.4. To test for this concern, we exploit the random ordering
of contract treatment assignment. If eﬀort costs are not independent across periods, then today’s
26 Production is defined as 0 in hours when workers did not work. In cases where a worker did not manage to reach her
target during the day, the hour when she reached it is coded at 7 pm (which is when the oﬃce closed for the day).
Note that there are compositional issues in the sample of which the distance from the target dummies are estimated.
For example, workers who reach their targets at 5 pm are never observed 3 hours after the target is reached—the
value of the 3 hours after target dummy will always be 0 in these cases. This raises selection problems that make
it diﬃcult to interpret the coeﬃcients on the distance dummies. The comparison in which we are most interested
is between the hour when the target is reached and the hour right after. We observe workers in the hour after the
target is reached in 98.7% of cases; so while the selection problem undermines the validity of this comparison, it is
unlikely to drive the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients. In Appendix Figure D.3, we graph the proportion of worker-days
observed in each distance category.
27 As a benchmark, we repeat this analysis for the Assignment to Target observations in columns (4)-(6) of Appendix
Table D.7 and Panel B of Figure 2.4. We find similar patterns in how workers behave around the point at which
they hit the targets we exogenously impose on them.
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production should be lower if the worker was assigned to a high eﬀort treatment last period (such as
choice or assignment to the high target). In Appendix Table D.8, we explore various specifications
in line with this approach and find no evidence that there is dependence in eﬀort between periods.
For example, in column (1), we regress production on dummies for yesterday’s contract assignment.
We cannot reject that being assigned to choice or a target (relative to being assigned to control)
has no impact on the next day’s production. In fact, the coeﬃcient estimates in all specifications
are usually positive (though insignificant). In contrast, if there were intertemporal substitution,
these coeﬃcients should be negative. The positive (though insignificant) coeﬃcient could itself be
of interest. It could reflect some type of habit-formation in which working becomes easier if you
have been working recently.
Another potential concern arises from the block randomization design of the contract treatments.
Since workers are assigned to each treatment a fixed number of times within each 8- or 12-day
period, treatment assignment on a given day is correlated with the probability of future treatments
within each block. For example, conditional on receiving Choice today, a worker is less likely to
receive Choice (and more likely to receive the Control contract) tomorrow. This could induce a
mechanical correlation that aﬀects what is being captured by the coeﬃcients on the treatment
assignment dummies—a concern that would not arise under independent randomization. We test
for this concern in Appendix Table D.9. For each observation in the Analysis sample, we compute
the probabilities of receiving each contract assignment in that worker-day; these probabilities are
determined by the worker’s previous assignments in that randomization block. We then directly
control for these probabilities in a regression of production on the contract dummies. The results
indicate that the assignment probabilities have little predictive power and their inclusion has little
impact on the estimated treatment eﬀects. This is confirmed by an F-test of joint significance of
the probability controls—the test p-value is 0.45.
Finally, as we did for the payday treatment eﬀects, we check for heterogeneity in treatment
eﬀects of Choice. Using only Control and Choice observations, we regress production on: a dummy
for assignment to Choice; worker fixed eﬀects; interactions of each worker fixed eﬀect with the
Choice dummy; and date fixed eﬀects, computer fixed eﬀects, and lag production controls. The
p-value of the F-test of joint significance of the interaction coeﬃcients is 0.003. We interpret this
as evidence for heterogeneity in the individual treatment eﬀects of Choice.
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2.4.4 Correlation between Payday and Contract Eﬀects (Prediction 2.3)
The payday and contract results each support the predictions of time inconsistency models.
As noted above, we also see substantial heterogeneity among workers in the payday and contract
eﬀects. We now explore this heterogeneity by checking whether the two sets of eﬀects are corre-
lated—whether those that are most aﬀected by the payday treatments are also those that select
and derive the greatest benefits from the dominated contracts.
We define the payday impact measure as: [(mean production on paydays) (mean production
on non-paydays)]/(mean production in sample). We compute this diﬀerential for each worker in
the Analysis Sample, using only those observations in which the worker was assigned to the Control
contract. We then define a worker as having a high payday impact if her diﬀerential is above the
mean diﬀerential in the sample.28
In Table 2.5, we test whether workers with higher payday impacts are more likely to demand
the dominated contract. We use two outcome variables to measure take-up: the target level chosen
(which includes targets choices of 0) and a binary indicator that equals 1 if the worker chose a
positive target. Following the conventions described in Section 2.4.3, in this and future regressions,
we define both take-up dependent variables as 0 on days that the worker was absent the day before
or day of assignment to Choice. In each column, we regress the dependent variable on the high
payday diﬀerential dummy and controls. On average, workers that are more aﬀected by paydays
select a target that is 353 fields higher and are 13.8 percentage points more likely to select a positive
target. These coeﬃcients correspond to a striking 47% and 49% of the mean target level and take-up
rate, respectively, and are both significant at the 1% level.
In Table 2.6, we explore whether workers with high payday impacts derive more benefit from the
contracts. In column (1), we provide the estimates of the average treatment eﬀects of Assignment
28 In the results presented above, we also see production increases in the days leading up to paydays. We use the
payday-nonpayday diﬀerence for simplicity. In addition, since we can only compute this statistic for workers that
were assigned to the Control contract on both paydays and non-paydays during their employment, it cannot be
computed for some workers that were in the sample for shorter periods of time. This reduces our sample for this
analysis from 8,423 to 8,240 observations.
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to Choice and Assignment to a Target for reference. In column (2), we estimate:
Yi,t = ✓0 + ✓1Choicei,t + ✓2Choicei,t ⇤HighImpacti + ✓3Targeti,t + ✓4Targeti,t ⇤HighImpacti
+✓5Wi + ✓6Dt + ✓7Si,t + ✓8Yi,t 1 + ✓9Yi,t 2 + mi,t
.
(2.5)
HighImpacti is the indicator for whether worker i has an above average payday diﬀerential. We are
interested in the coeﬃcients on the interactions—✓2 and ✓4 . If the workers that are most aﬀected by
paydays are also those that benefit the most from the dominated contracts, then these coeﬃcients
will be positive.
 10!
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 
Heterogeneity in Take-up of Dominated Contracts:  
Correlation with Payday Impact 
Dependent variable 
Target level 
chosen 
Positive 
target 
indicator 
  (1) (2) 
High payday production impact 353 
(129)*** 
0.138 
(0.044)*** 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes 
Lag production controls Yes Yes 
Observations 4098 4098 
R2 0.22 0.20 
Dependent variable mean 759 0.28 
Notes: This table tests whether workers that are most affected by 
paydays are also more likely to demand the dominated contract. The 
dependent variables are two measures for take-up of the dominated 
contract. The first variable is the continuous measure of the target level 
selected by workers when assigned to Choice. The second variable is a 
binary indicator for whether the worker selected a target above zero 
when assigned to a Choice treatment. Both dependent variables are 
defined as 0 if a worker was absent the day before or day of Choice 
assignment. Each column shows results from an OLS regression of the 
dependent variable on an indicator for whether a worker had a high 
payday impact, computer fixed effects, and date fixed effects. High 
payday production impact is an indicator that equals 1 if the worker’s 
payday impact—defined as the difference between mean production on 
paydays and non-paydays under Control divided by mean production 
under assignment to Control—is above the sample average. Standard 
errors allow for clustering by worker and are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneity in Contract Treatment Effects - Correlation with Payday Impact 
Dependent variable Production Production Production Attendance Attendance Attendance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Assignment to choice 118 
(60)* 
 -69 
(74) 
 -146 
(84)* 
0.007 
(0.009) 
 -0.016 
(0.010) 
 -0.028 
(0.011)** 
Assignment to choice * 
High payday production impact 
 482 
(126)*** 
735 
(144)*** 
 0.058 
(0.019)*** 
0.091 
(0.022)*** 
Assignment to choice * 
Payday 
  401 
(179)** 
  0.064 
(0.024)*** 
Assignment to choice * Payday * 
High payday production impact 
   -1314 
(288)*** 
   -0.178 
(0.041)*** 
       
Assignment to a target 153 
(71)** 
 -35 
(86) 
 -48 
(96) 
 -0.003 
(0.010) 
 -0.019 
(0.012)* 
 -0.024 
(0.013)* 
Assignment to a target * 
High payday production impact 
 483 
(148)*** 
673 
(168)*** 
 0.042 
(0.022)* 
0.066 
(0.025)*** 
Assignment to a target * 
Payday 
  68 
(219) 
  0.026 
(0.029) 
Assignment to target * Payday * 
High payday production impact 
   -972 
(348)*** 
   -0.120 
(0.049)*** 
       
Payday    -183 
(153) 
   -0.009 
(0.021) 
High payday impact *  
Payday 
  1178 
(234)*** 
  0.164 
(0.032)*** 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lag production controls Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 8240 8240 8240 8240 8240 8240 
R2 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Dependent variable mean 5355 5355 5355 0.875 0.875 0.875 
Notes: This table reports estimates of how heterogeneity in treatment effects of the contracts correlates with effects of 
paydays. Columns (1)-(3) report results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is production. 
Production is defined as the number of accurate fields entered in a day and equals zero on days workers are absent. 
Columns (4)-(6) report results from OLS Linear Probability Models in which the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator for attendance. Columns (1) and (4) show regressions of the dependent variable on indicators for contract 
treatment. Columns (2) and (4) add interactions of each of the contract treatment indicators with an indicator for High 
payday production impact. High payday production impact is an indicator that equals 1 if the worker’s payday 
impact—defined as the difference between mean production on paydays and non-paydays under Control divided by 
mean production under assignment to Control—is above the sample average. For each of the contract treatments, 
columns (3) and (6) add a triple interactions of the contract treatment indicator with the High payday impact indicator 
and an indicator for whether the current day was the worker’s assigned payday (along with the pair wise double 
interactions between these variables). All regressions include worker, date, and seat fixed effects. In addition, columns 
(1)-(3) include controls for lagged production. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The results indicate that this is indeed the case. The average treatment eﬀects of Choice and
Target Assignment for workers with low payday impacts are statistically indistinguishable from 0.
In contrast, compared to the production of low impact workers, high impact workers produce about
480 fields more under Choice and Target Assignment on average. These coeﬃcients are significant
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at the 1% level and their magnitudes correspond to 9% of mean production. Using our estimate
of the return to education, providing high payday impact workers with simply the option to select
targets leads to production increases comparable to a one-year increase in education. In addition,
using our benchmark production elasticity of 0.33 (see Section 2.4.2), the local average treatment
eﬀect for high impact workers is comparable to a 64% increase in the piece rate wage.
In column (3), we explore how these treatment eﬀects vary on paydays versus non-paydays.
The payday impact statistic measures the extent to which a worker is aﬀected by aligning the
compensation period with the eﬀort period. It constitutes an imperfect proxy for the level of a
worker’s self-control problem. On non-paydays, when the eﬀort and compensation period are not
aligned, time inconsistency is likely to create greater distortions on eﬀort for workers with greater
self-control problems. We therefore see that it is these workers that benefit the most from the provi-
sion of targets on non-paydays. Specifically, on non-paydays, high payday impact workers produce
735 fields (14% of mean production) more under Choice than Control. At the same time—allowing
for heterogeneity in the extent to which both types of treatments help a worker overcome her time
inconsistency problem—the high diﬀerence workers are the ones that are most helped by paydays.
They therefore have less need for dominated contracts to solve the self-control problem on paydays
than those workers for whom paydays don’t produce large benefits. As a result, we see that on
paydays the Choice treatment is relatively more beneficial for workers with a low payday impact.
The estimated coeﬃcients on Target assignment in column (3) tell a similar story.
In columns (4)-(6), we repeat this analysis for attendance as the dependent variable. While
the average treatment eﬀects on attendance are indistinguishable from zero, we see in column (5)
that this masks substantial heterogeneity. The Choice treatment does not aﬀect attendance of low
payday impact workers, and increases the attendance of high impact workers by 5.8 percentage
points. This eﬀect is significant at 1%. If workers face a self-control problem in not just how hard
they work in the oﬃce, but also in the decision to show up to work (as implied by the payday
results), then this eﬀect is consistent with a model of time inconsistency with sophisticated agents.
There is a sizable fixed cost of attendance—for example, up to a 2-hour commute in each direction.
Workers that are sophisticated enough to pick targets are also sophisticated enough to know that
in the absence of a target, they will be tempted to exert low eﬀort. Consequently, they’re more
likely to go in when they can select targets, because they know their earnings on those days will
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justify paying the attendance fixed cost. This is consistent with the results in column (6), which
match the trends in column (3). Choice boosts attendance for high impact workers especially on
non-paydays, whereas on paydays the impact of Choice is relatively lower for high impact workers
than low impact ones.29
In Appendix Table D.11, we perform the analogous exercise for payday treatment eﬀects—we
examine whether those most impacted by the contract treatments have higher increases in eﬀort on
paydays. We find that treatment eﬀects under Choice and Target Assignment are highly predictive
of payday spikes. However, take-up of dominated contracts is not predictive of payday eﬀects.30
2.4.5 Morning and Evening Choice (Prediction 2.4)
In Table 2.7, we examine the impact of evening choice on take-up of dominated contracts. The
OLS specification is:
Takeupi,t =  0 +  1Evei,t +  2Wi +  3Dt +  4Si,t + mi,t, (2.6)
where Evei,t is an indicator that equals 1 if worker i was assigned to Evening Choice on date t
and equals 0 if the worker was assigned to Morning Choice. Takeupi,t measures take-up of the
dominated contract by worker i on date t. As before, we use two measures of take-up—the target
level chosen and a binary indicator for whether a positive target was chosen. Column (1) shows no
diﬀerence in take up of dominated contracts the evening before.
29 Is the large production eﬀect of Choice on high diﬀerence workers driven completely by the impact on attendance?
In Appendix Table D.10, we estimate the average treatment eﬀects of Choice on production and attendance as
395 fields and 4.4 percentage points, respectively, for high payday diﬀerence workers. For these workers, mean
production conditional on attendance is 5581. As a simple calibration, 5581*0.044 = 245 < 395. This implies
that the entire eﬀect of Choice on Production for these workers is not driven by attendance increases. In column
(3), we regress production conditional on attendance on the contract treatment dummies. While the coeﬃcients
are positive and significant, as discussed above, they are diﬃcult to interpret since attendance is an endogenous
outcome.
30 A diﬀerent interaction between dominated contracts and paydays may be interesting: is there greater or lower
demand for dominated contracts on paydays? One intuition suggests that self-control problems may be lower on
paydays but this need not be the case: this depends on whether the payday as a motivator is a substitute or a
complement for the dominated contract as a motivator. In our data we find no diﬀerence in demand for dominated
contracts on paydays versus non-paydays on average
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Why might this prediction fail? Ex post analysis and qualitative work suggest a hypothesis.
In choosing the night before, workers may fear uncertainty that may aﬀect productivity the next
day—uncertainty which may be realized after showing up to work, making workers less likely to
commit to a target the day before.
An important source of this volatility is network speed fluctuations.31 These fluctuations aﬀected
the rate at which workers could send data entered from an image to the central server and retrieve
the next image for entry. The wait time between images could range from one second to over five
minutes. Some computers in the oﬃce were more sensitive to network fluctuations than others. We
asked the oﬃce management staﬀ to consult workers in identifying the set of computers that were
perceived as more sensitive to network slowdowns. Management did not know the list would be
used for this purpose.
We then tested whether the computers identified as more uncertain are indeed more sensitive
to overall network fluctuations. In Appendix Table D.12, we show that these computers are more
sensitive and illustrate this in Appendix Figure D.5. When workers arrive to the oﬃce in the
morning, they receive new information on the network speed and can use this to inform their target
choice. This information is especially valuable for workers on bad computers, since network shocks
will greatly impact their productivity.
To test this, we estimate:
Takeupi,t =  0 +  1Evei,t +  2BadComputeri,t +  3Evei,t ⇤BadComputeri,t +  4Wi +  5Dt + mi,t
(2.7)
in columns (3)-(6) of Table 2.7. Columns (3)-(4) provide some evidence that workers assigned to
bad computers are less likely to demand targets in the sample as a whole. In columns (5)-(6), we
estimate the above OLS regression model. Our predictions hold strongly in these results. When
assigned to a good computer, selected targets are 168 fields higher on average in the evening than
the morning. However, when assigned to bad computers, selected targets are 82 fields lower on
average in the evening than the morning. These are sizable magnitudes (equivalent to 22% and
11%, respectively, of the mean target levels chosen by workers in the sample overall). The results
are similar if we use our binary measure of demand. Workers on good computers are 6.6 percentage
31 Appendix Figure D.4 displays substantial fluctuations in day-to-day output in the oﬃce.
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points more likely to pick a positive target in the evening than the morning. In contrast, those on
bad computers are more likely to demand targets in the morning than the evening.
A second source of uncertainty faced by workers stemmed from external constraints on time.
For example, as discussed in Appendix C, workers that lived in more remote areas faced long and
uncertain commute times. These impacted morning arrival time and therefore how much the worker
could produce in a day. In addition, some workers had duties or binding constraints on time outside
the oﬃce. This made it more diﬃcult to absorb production shocks. For example, if the network
unexpectedly slowed down, it would have been harder for workers with external constraints to stay
late in the oﬃce to ensure their targets were met. Much of the uncertainty from these sources was
resolved by the morning of the workday—by then employees knew their arrival time at the oﬃce
and would have had a better sense of duties at home for that day.
Thus, we expect workers with greater external constraints to be relatively more likely to demand
the dominated contract in the morning. To test this prediction, we estimate:
Takeupi,t = '0+'1Evei,t+'2Constrainti,t+'3Evei,t⇤Constrainti,t+'4Dt+'5Si,t+mi,t. (2.8)
Constrainti is a measure of the external constraints faced by worker i. In columns (7)-(10) of Table
2.7, we present results for two binary measures of the constraint variable. In columns (7)-(8), the
variable measures workers’ response to a question in the end-line survey that asked them to agree or
disagree with the statement: “The bus/train schedules really impact whether I can get to work on
time because if I miss one bus or train, the next one I can take is much later.” The high constraint
indicator takes a value of 1 if the worker’s response was “Agree Strongly” and 0 otherwise. The
results indicate that workers with more uncertain commute times select targets more often under
Morning Choice than Evening Choice, and the opposite is true for workers with less uncertain
commute times. The end-line survey asked four questions related to external constraints. For the
analysis in Columns (9)-(10), we compute a Constraint Index for each worker by averaging his or
her answers to the four questions. The high constraint indicator equals 1 if the worker’s constraint
index score was above the sample mean score and equals 0 otherwise. The results in columns (9)
and (10) are similar to those in columns (7) and (8), respectively.
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2.4.6 Learning over Time
As workers gain experience, do they learn about the value of the dominated contracts or perhaps
find other ways around their self-control problems? We examine how workers’ choices and treatment
eﬀects evolve with their experience. We define experiencei,t as the number of workdays worker i
has been in the Analysis Sample on date t.32
 5!
 
Figure 5 
How the Demand for Dominated Contracts Changes with Experience 
 
Notes: This figure shows how demand for the dominated 
contract evolves with worker experience. The x-axis measures 
worker experience, defined as the number of workdays the 
worker has been in the sample. The y-axis measures the 
proportion of workers that chose a positive target under 
assignment to Choice for each value of the experience variable. 
The closed and open circles show the value of this statistic 
separately for high payday impact workers and low payday 
impact workers, respectively. High impact workers are those 
for whom the mean payday production impact—the difference 
in production on paydays and non-paydays under control, 
divided by overall mean production under control—is higher 
than the sample average payday impact. The proportion of 
times positive targets were chosen is computed using Choice 
observations in the Analysis Sample in which the worker was 
present the day before and day of Choice assignment.  
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Figure 2.5: How Demand for Dominated Contracts Changes with Experience
Notes: This figure shows how demand for the dominated contract evolves with worker experience. The x-axis
measures worker experience, defined as the number of workdays the worker has been in the sample. The y-axis
measures the proportion of workers that chose a positive target under assignment to Choice for each value of the
experience variable. The closed and open circles show the value of this statistic separately for high payday impact
workers and low payday impact workers, respectively. High impact workers are those for whom the mean payday
production impact—the diﬀerence in production on paydays and non-paydays under control, divided by overall mean
production under control—is higher than th sample average payday impact. The proportion of times positive targets
were chosen is computed using Choice observations in the Analysis Sample in which the worker was present the day
before and day of Choice assignment.
In Figure 2.5, we explore how demand for the dominated contracts evolved with worker experi-
ence for high and low payday impact workers. For each value of the experience variable, we compute
the proportion of high impact workers that choose a positive target under assignment to Choice
(and were present the day of and day before Choice assignment); these values are plotted in closed
circles. The open circles plot the value of this statistic for the low impact workers. The figure shows
little initial diﬀerence in mean take-up rates between high and low impact workers. However, as
workers gain experience, we see a divergence. Over time, those that have the largest self-control
32 Recall that days during which workers are in training are not included in the Analysis Sample. As a result,
experiencei,t = 1 on worker i’s first day of contract randomizations. Note also that the experience variable suﬀers
from selective attrition.
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problems (as measured by our payday diﬀerence proxy) end up demanding the dominated contract
at substantially higher rates than the workers that do not have large payday impacts.33
We explore these trends more formally in Panel A of Table 2.8. In columns (1) and (2), we
regress each of our measures of take-up on the log of the experience variable and our standard
controls. In both columns, we cannot reject that mean demand for the dominated contract does
not change over time in the sample as a whole. In columns (3) and (4), we add the high payday
impact indicator and an interaction of high payday impact with log experience. The results are
consistent with the trends in Figure 6. As low impact workers gain experience, they decrease their
take-up of the targets; a 1% increase in experience is associated with about a 0.066 percentage point
decrease in take-up (significant at 5%). In contrast, we cannot reject that the demand among high
impact workers stays constant over time. The F-tests of whether the log experience coeﬃcient and
interaction coeﬃcient sum to zero are insignificant (with p-values of 0.493 and 0.895 in columns (3)
and (4), respectively). As a result, at higher values of experience, the high payday impact workers
exhibit substantially higher demand on average for the dominated contracts than the low impact
workers.
These results are consistent with a story in which workers initially try the dominated contracts.
Over time, they continually receive opportunities to observe their production under targets—both
through Target assignment and potentially also when on Choice assignment. Those workers for
whom the targets do not yield utility benefits stop selecting the dominated contract. In contrast,
the workers with large self-control problems see that the targets are helpful, and continue to select
them. Consistent with Test 3 of our model, this latter group of workers correlates with the group
that is most aﬀected by paydays.
Next, in Panel B of Table 2.8, we test whether the treatment eﬀects on production persist over
time. For reference purposes, in column (1), we first regress production on: log experience; dummies
for Choice assignment, Target assignment, and Payday; and our vector of standard controls. As
before, we define experience as the number of workdays the employee has been in the Analysis
Sample. Not surprisingly, we see that production increases strongly with experience. The remaining
results in column (1) are consistent with those presented in earlier tables.
33 The figure also shows that there is variation in the level of day-to-day take-up within each group of workers over
time. This is not surprising since the composition of workers assigned to Choice changes each day with the contract
randomizations. In addition, day-to-day shocks (such as network speed fluctuations) impact take-up.
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 Table 2.8: Trends Over Time 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Trends in Demand for the Dominated Contract 
Dependent variable 
Target level 
chosen 
Positive target 
indicator 
Target level 
chosen 
Positive target 
indicator 
Log experience  -102 
(96) 
 -0.025 
(0.032) 
 -128 
(88) 
 -0.066 
(0.030)** 
High payday production impact    -337 
(277) 
 -0.087 
(0.100) 
High payday production impact * 
Log experience 
  189 
(76)** 
0.062 
(0.026)** 
Observations 4098 4098 4098 4098 
Dependent variable mean 759 0.28 759 0.28 
F-test p-value: (Log experience) +  
(High payday difference * Log experience) = 0  
  0.493 0.895 
     
Panel B: Persistence in Treatment Effects Over Time (Dependent variable: Production) 
Sample Analysis  Analysis  Analysis  Full Payday 
Experience measure  Log experience 
Log 
experience 
> Two months 
experience 
Log  
experience 
Experience measure 257 
(66)*** 
176 
(73)** 
459 
(148)*** 
314 
(54)*** 
     
Assignment to choice 109 
(59)* 
 -269 
(174) 
27 
(76)  
Assignment to choice * 
Experience measure  
104 
(51)** 
144 
(114)  
     
Assignment to a target 145 
(70)** 
 -264 
(217) 
42 
(93)  
Assignment to a target * 
Experience measure  
113 
(62)* 
174 
(135)  
     
Payday 140 
(63)** 
131 
(179) 
225 
(82)*** 
110 
(169) 
Payday * 
Experience measure  
3 
(51) 
-142 
(116) 
11 
(45) 
Observations 8423 8423 8423 11744 
Dependent variable mean 5337 5337 5337 5665 
Notes: Panel A examines trends in demand for targets. It uses observations from the Analysis Sample in which the 
worker was assigned to a Choice treatment. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the target level 
selected, and is a binary indicator for whether the worker selected a positive target in columns (2) and (4). Both 
variables are defined as 0 if a worker was absent the day before or day of Choice assignment. Log experience is the 
log of the number of workdays an employee has been in the Analysis sample. High payday impact is a binary 
indicator that equals 1 if the worker’s payday impact—the difference between mean production on paydays and non-
paydays under Control divided by mean production under assignment to Control—is above the sample average. All 
regressions include seat and date fixed effects and lagged production controls. Regressions (1)-(2) also include 
worker fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by worker. 
     Panel B tests whether treatments effects on production persist over time. All columns show results from OLS 
regressions in which the dependent variable is production—the number of accurate fields completed by a worker in 
a day, and equals zero if the worker is absent. Regressions (1)-(3) use observations from the Analysis Sample; 
Regression (4) uses observations from the Full Payday Sample. Log experience is as defined above.  More than 2 
months in sample is a binary indicator for whether the worker has been in the sample for more than 2 calendar 
months. All regressions include lagged production controls and worker, date, and seat fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
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In column (2), we add interactions of log experience with each of the treatment variables of
interest: Choice, Target assignment, and Payday. We are interested in the coeﬃcients on the
interactions. If treatment eﬀects diminish over time—for example, once the novelty of the treatments
wears oﬀ—then these coeﬃcients will be negative. Instead, the results in column (2) reveal positive
interaction coeﬃcients. The interaction of log experience with Choice assignment is positive and
significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with the findings in Panel A, which indicate that the
workers that derive the largest benefits from the dominated contracts are the ones that are most
likely to select them over time. In addition, the interaction with Target assignment is also positive
and significant at the 10% level. The coeﬃcient on the payday interaction is essentially 0, indicating
that the payday eﬀect is constant over time on average.
In column (3), we repeat this exercise using a diﬀerent measure of experience: a binary indicator
for whether the worker has been in the Analysis Sample for more than two calendar months. The co-
eﬃcients Choice and Target interaction coeﬃcients are positive (and insignificant). The interaction
on the payday coeﬃcient is now negative, but insignificant. In column (4), we check for persistence
in the payday eﬀect in the full 11-month payday sample and again find no change in eﬀects over
time. Together, columns (2) to (4) provide compelling evidence that the treatment eﬀects of the
contract treatments and paydays persist over time, and some evidence that the eﬀects of Choice
increase over time.
Overall, we see that workers select and derive steady benefits from the dominated contracts
throughout the experiment. Similarly, the production increases on paydays persist week after week.
Given the long horizon of the study, our results imply that time inconsistency is a perpetual problem
in the workplace. They lend credence to our view that many workplace features can plausibly be
interpreted as arrangements that seek to solve self-control problems.
2.4.7 Heterogeneity in Treatment Eﬀects
How well do survey measures predict self-control? In Table 2.9, we use external measures
to explore interpersonal diﬀerences. Each column conducts this analysis for a diﬀerent potential
correlate; the correlate for each column is specified at the top of that column. In Panel A, we
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show coeﬃcient estimates from a regression of target level chosen on the correlate and controls.
In Panel B, we regress the binary take-up indicator on the correlate and controls. In Panel C, we
report estimates from a regression of production on: the correlate; dummies for Choice and Payday;
interactions of each of these dummies with the correlate; and controls.
In columns (1)-(3), we look for evidence on whether more able workers are diﬀerentially aﬀected
by self-control. The correlate in column (1) is a measure of worker productivity: whether the
worker’s mean production under assignment to the control contract is above the sample mean. In
column (2), the correlate is years of education. Both these correlates positively predict dominated
contract demand—for example, high productivity workers are 40% more likely to choose positive
targets under Choice. Interestingly, these measures do not positively predict treatment eﬀects
of choice, potentially indicating higher levels of sophistication among higher ability workers. In
columns (3), we look at a measure of IQ—the sum of the worker’s scores on the Raven’s Matrix
and Digit Span tests. IQ does not predict take-up or contract treatment eﬀects. In addition, none
of the ability correlates predicts treatment eﬀects of paydays.
The literature on psychology and economics has proposed a range of correlates of self-control
problems. In the remaining columns, we examine the predictive power of some of these correlates,
collected through the end-line surveys. In columns (4)-(6), we look at measures of self-control
problems based on self-reports by workers. The correlate in column (4) is the Self-control Factor,
obtained from a factor analysis on the end-line survey data. In column (5), we construct a Self-
Control Index from the end-line survey responses by averaging each worker’s responses to the 9 self-
control questions in the end-line survey. Both the Self-control Factor and Self-control index values
have been de-meaned in the analysis. In column (6), we use self-reports of addictive behaviors by
male workers. In this column, the correlate equals 1 if the worker said he had tried to quit drinking,
smoking, or chewing tobacco and failed, and equals 0 otherwise. Each of these three columns shows
similar results. These three correlates from the end-line surveys positively predict demand for the
dominated contract, and also positively predict treatment eﬀects of the contracts. However, among
these, only the coeﬃcients on the Self-control Factor are generally significant. None of the correlates
predicts the payday eﬀect.
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Table 2.9: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects - Correlates of Ability and Self-Control 
 Correlate of Ability  Correlate of Self-control Problems 
 
High 
produc-
tivity 
worker 
Years of 
education 
IQ  
test 
index 
score  
Self-
control 
factor 
Self-
control 
index 
Addictive 
behaviors 
dummy 
Proportion 
of 
impatient 
responses 
Proportion 
of 
preference 
reversals 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A:  Dependent Variable: Target Level Chosen (Choice observations) 
Correlate 472 
(159)*** 
120 
(43)*** 
 -1 
(5)  
124 
(74)* 
148 
(140) 
352 
(239) 
230 
(342) 
533 
(573) 
Observations 4187 4056 4089  3106 3106 2245 2454 2454 
R2 0.12 0.23 0.22  0.25 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.28 
          
Panel B:  Dependent Variable: Positive Target Indicator (Choice observations) 
Correlate 0.116 
(0.049)** 
0.029 
(0.015)* 
 -0 
(0)  
0.056 
(0.025)** 
0.057 
(0.046) 
0.139 
(0.082) 
0.070 
(0.115) 
0.143 
(0.189) 
Observations 4187 4056 4089  3106 3106 2245 2454 2470 
R2 0.11 0.19 0.19  0.22 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.23 
          
Panel C:  Dependent Variable: Production (Choice and Control observations) 
Correlate 237 
(93)** 
127 
(65)* 
13 
(6)**  
 -255 
(103)** 
 -209 
(148) 
 -247 
(395) 
 -1254 
(318)*** 
 -826 
(461)* 
Assignment to choice 1428 
(147)*** 
147 
(73)** 
150 
(73)**  
91 
(82) 
91 
(83) 
38 
(114) 
113 
(83)* 
116 
(83)* 
Assignment to choice * 
Correlate 
 -258 
(154)* 
51 
(45) 
 -1 
(5)  
167 
(92)** 
215 
(146) 
429 
(263) 
706 
(305)** 
765 
(447)* 
Payday 241 
(74)*** 
153 
(74)** 
181 
(71)**  
156 
(87)* 
156 
(87)* 
115 
(119) 
135 
(106) 
131 
(107) 
Payday * 
Correlate 
 -148 
(121) 
27 
(40) 
 -0 
(4)  
31 
(87) 
77 
(138) 
58 
(246) 
 -53 
(308) 
 -234 
(544) 
Observations 6304 6101 6149  4674 4674 3376 3701 3701 
R2 0.57 0.56 0.55   0.57 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.58 
Notes: This table tests whether correlates of ability and self-control explain heterogeneity in results. Columns (1)-(3) use 
measures of ability. The correlate in column (1) is an indicator for whether the worker's mean production under assignment to 
the control contract is above the sample mean.  The correlates in columns (2) and (3) are, respectively, years of education and 
composite IQ score, defined as the sum of the worker's score on the Raven's Matrix and Digit Span tests. Both education and 
IQ have been de-meaned. The correlates in columns (4)-(8) are various proxies for self-control. The column (4) correlate is 
the Self-control Factor, obtained from a principal factors analysis on the endline survey data. The column (5) correlate is a 
Self-Control Index, obtained by averaging each worker’s responses to the 9 self-control questions in the endline survey. Both 
the Self-control Factor and Self-control index have been de-meaned. The correlate in column (6) is computed for male 
workers; it equals 1 if the worker said he has tried to quit drinking, smoking, or chewing tobacco and failed, and equals 0 
otherwise. The correlates in columns (7)-(8) are computed from the discount rate exercise, in which workers traded off cash 
rewards between different time horizons. The column (7) correlate measures the proportion of times the worker chose the 
smaller immediate reward instead of the larger delayed reward. The column (8) correlate measures preference reversals—the 
proportion of times a worker chose the larger immediate reward in the short horizon, but then chose the smaller delayed 
reward when choosing among the same amounts in the long horizon.  
      The dependent variable in Panel A is the mean target level chosen by workers under Choice. The dependent variable in 
Panel B is a binary indicator for whether the worker selected a positive target under Choice. Both these dependent variables 
are defined as 0 if a worker was absent the day before or day of Choice assignment. Both Panels A and B report estimates 
from an OLS regression of the dependent variable on the specified correlate and date and computer fixed effects; columns (2)-
(8) also contain lag production controls. The dependent variable in Panel C is production—defined as the number of accurate 
fields entered in a day, and equal to zero on days workers are absent. Panel C reports estimates from a regression of 
production on: the specified correlate; Choice and Payday dummies; interactions of each of these dummies with the correlate; 
date and seat fixed effects; and controls for lagged production. In each regression, standard errors are corrected to allow for 
clustering by worker. Note that observations change between columns because not all workers provided education information 
or took the IQ tests, and because the endline survey and discount rate exercise were administered at the end of the project. 
 !
In columns (7)-(8), we look at outcomes from the discount rate exercise, in which we asked
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workers to trade oﬀ cash rewards between diﬀerent time horizons—a standard way of testing for
self-control problems in the literature. In column (7), we look at impatience. Our measure of
impatience is defined as the proportion of times in the 6 questions the worker chose the smaller
immediate reward rather than the larger delayed reward. In column (8), we look at preference
reversals. Here, our self-control correlate is defined as the proportion of times a worker chose the
larger immediate reward in the short horizon, but then displayed patience when choosing between
the same amounts in the long horizon. As in the case of the Self-control Index and Addictive
behaviors, these correlates do not appear to predict demand for the dominated contracts—the
coeﬃcients in Panels A and B are positive but significant. Also as before, we see in Panel C that
workers with greater self-control problems (as measured by these correlates) are less productive on
average. We also see evidence that these workers benefit more from the contract treatments. For
example, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between proportion of impatient responses and Choice
assignment is 706 and is significant at the 5% level. It indicates that workers that show impatience
in all 6 questions produce 706 more fields (13% of mean production) under Choice than Control.
As before, the correlates do not seem to predict payday behavior.
Overall, we find some support that proxies of self-control posed in the literature correlate with
behavior under the contract treatments. In contrast, none of these proxies is correlated with the
payday eﬀects. Thus, while these survey-based proxies have some predictive power, we find that
the strongest predictor of eﬀects under each set of treatments is workers’ behavior under the other
set of treatments (Section 2.4.4).
2.5 Alternative Explanations
The results are largely consistent with a self-control agency model. Could they be explained
without appealing to self-control? We will argue that while any one result could be explained by
other factors, it is hard to fit an alternative theory to the full pattern of results: the production
increases on paydays; demand for dominated contracts and treatment eﬀects of Choice; and the
correlation between the payday and contract eﬀects.
First, could workers be choosing dominated contracts because they are confused? The ex-
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periment was designed to minimize this possibility. During the training period, all workers were
subjected to targets. At the end of training, we administered a quiz that tested their comprehen-
sion of the contracts. The mean score was 93%, indicating that workers understood the contracts.34
Even after training, given the length of the experiment, workers receive (in both assignment and
choice treatments) a great deal of experience with these contracts. As a result, the qualitative exit
interviews with workers suggest they were well aware that the dominated contracts are dominated.
Second, could workers be choosing dominated contracts to signal ability to employers? It is not
clear that demand for the dominated contract actually should serve as a positive signal. Since the
employer observes production directly, there is no reason to believe a worker that can achieve high
production under the control contract should not appear more impressive than one that needs a
dominated contract to increase output. Still to mitigate this, we advertised the job as a one-time
employment opportunity. Of course that might not have worked fully. The stumbling block for
this—as with all the other explanations—is how it would explain both the payday eﬀect and the
correlation of dominated contract choice with the payday eﬀect.
Third, a diﬀerent psychological explanation could be that targets serve as non-monetary impact
of targets. It need not be, as we have modeled them, that targets are merely monetary motivators.
It is possible that the targets generate intrinsic motivation: the desire to hit the target alone may
motivate workers. With data such as ours, of course, one cannot separate intrinsic from extrinsic
motivation generated by the target. However, without time inconsistency it is unclear how this
would explain the payday findings or the correlation between payday and contract eﬀects. As a
result, while our data cannot rule out non-monetary motivations provided by the target, it does
suggest that time inconsistency is needed in this case as well.
Finally, while it may not explain choice of dominated contracts, could income targeting explain
the payday eﬀects? If workers target a fixed weekly income level, then small amounts of impatience
or the realization of shocks could lead workers to backload eﬀort closer to the payday. We can
test for such behavior directly in the data. Income targeting implies a sharp decrease in marginal
utility for income levels above the weekly target (see Camerer et. al. 1997). Two pieces of evidence
34 In Appendix Table D.13, we test whether quiz score is correlated with demand for the dominated contracts. If
workers mistakenly chose dominated contracts because they did not understand the contract treatments, then we
would expect quiz score to be negatively correlated with take-up. Instead, quiz performance positively predicts take-
up, although the coeﬃcients in columns (1)-(4) are insignificant. In addition, as noted above, education strongly
predicts take-up of the dominated contract.
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suggest this is not happening in our data. First, we saw in our test for intertemporal substitution,
exogenous production increases caused by target assignment do not lead to production decreases on
subsequent days (see Appendix Table D.8). Second, a targeting model delivers an even finer testable
prediction: an unexpected production increase today will lead to a larger reduction in tomorrow’s
eﬀort if the worker is closer to her payday, because there are fewer subsequent days over which the
adjustment needs to be made. We test for this in Appendix Table D.14. Under income targeting,
the interactions in columns (2) and (3) should be negative. However, the interactions are positive
(though largely insignificant). 35
2.6 Conclusion
These results are interesting because they may help us explain workplace arrangements. Agency
theory understands workplace arrangements—the existence of bosses, worker discipline and other
pejorative mechanisms (even physical punishment Chwe 1990)—in one of two ways. The first view
is that the firm exists to provide insurance. This insurance creates moral hazard. These workplace
arrangements exist to mitigate that moral hazard. The second view is summarized in a story of
Steven Cheung (1983): “On a boat trip up China’s Yangtze River in the 19th Century, a titled
English woman complained to her host of the cruelty to the oarsmen. One burly coolie stood over
the rowers with a whip, making sure there were no laggards. Her host explained that the boat
was jointly owned by the oarsmen, and that they hired the man responsible for flogging.” Joint
production necessitates the need for monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
Our results suggest a diﬀerent way to understand a diverse host of workplace arrangements.
Might certain contract features (such as nonlinear contracts) be thought of as partly reflecting self-
control benefits? Might discipline at the workplace or workplace rules be thought of as demand
35 We also test an additional prediction of income targeting. Since the impact of day-to-day shocks is adjusted within
the payweek to arrive at the weekly target, the variance in production among payweeks should be less than the
variance in production among weeks defined according to some other arbitrary cycle, such as calendar weeks. To
check this, we compare production across workers’ payweek cycles with production across 4 artificial weekly cycles,
created by shifting forward days from the worker’s actual pay cycle. For example, for a worker assigned to the
Saturday pay group, her true pay week is from each Monday to Saturday. The 4 artificial cycles for this worker would
be from Tuesdays to Mondays, Wednesdays to Tuesdays, Thursdays to Wednesdays, and Fridays to Thursdays.
For each worker, we then compute the standard deviation of weekly production across her actual payweeks and
across each of the 4 associated artificial weekly cycles. On average, the standard deviation of weekly production
for actual payweeks is 1838. The mean standard deviations for each of the 4 artificial cycles are lower than this,
ranging from 1731 to 1809. Overall, all 5 standard deviation estimates are close to each other (within 5% or less
from the payweek mean). This provides further support against weekly income targeting.
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for features to help workers avoid the temptation to shirk? Might the organization of production
itself, such as the presence of a boss and task division with deadlines serve to mitigate self-control
problems? Clark (1994) advances this interpretation of the industrial revolution for example. One
of the major changes in the organization of production in economic history has been the transition
from the putting out system (under which workers were paid piece rates according to work performed
and could choose production levels and work hours themselves) to the more rigid workplace system
that is the norm today (with features like assembly lines, production minimums, rigid work hours,
and hefty punishments for even momentary lapses in behavior). One interpretation is that increases
in capital since the industrial revolution place a premium on increasing labor productivity (Clark
1994). Finding ways of reducing worker self-control problems could be one response to this problem.
Under this view, the rise of the factory and its associated disciplinary infrastructure was in part an
attempt to solve self-control problems.
Indeed, the process of development—which entails movements from agriculture to manufactur-
ing, or from cottage industry to factory work—may increase labor productivity not just through
technological innovation, but also because the work arrangements associated with these advances
mitigate workers’ self-control problems. (See Clark 1994 and Kaur et al. 2010 for further exposition
of this view).
We may even need to enrich how we conceptualize the production function. Take the basic pre-
diction that the self-control problem increases as the returns to work are further in the future. This
mechanism suggests a new look at a variety of naturally occurring production function diﬀerences.
In agriculture in developing countries, should we view productivity in long-horizon crops diﬀerently
from productivity in short-horizon crops? Might farmers choose shorter horizon crops because eﬀort
distortions are smaller when eﬀort and compensation are more closely aligned? Might the move
from farm work to formal sector work with regular pay have self-control productivity benefits?
These arguments are, of course, speculative. However, given that we find strong evidence that
self-control problems distort worker eﬀort at economically meaningful magnitudes, a closer explo-
ration of these possibilities is warranted in future research.
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3 Multiple Market Failures and Allocative Eﬃciency in Villages
3.1 Introduction
A key distinguishing feature of poor countries is that, in contrast to rich counties, there is often
little distinction between the household unit and the firm. In rural areas, agricultural production
is largely undertaken on small family farms. In urban areas, large portions of the poor are self-
employed in small family businesses (Banerjee and Duflo 2006).
If markets are complete, this organizing feature of production will have little impact on aggregate
output: initial endowments will not aﬀect how factors are allocated in production. However, in the
presence of market failures, this feature can have potentially severe implications. Households with
smaller endowments (such as smaller farms) will use productive factors (such as labor and capital)
diﬀerently than households with larger endowments. This will lead to allocative ineﬃciency: the
marginal product of inputs will not be equalized across “firms”. This, in turn, will reduce aggregate
output.
This paper empirically examines how multiple market failures interact to create allocative inef-
ficiency in production. Using panel data on households in Indian villages, I focus on three markets
that are central to agricultural production—labor, land, and credit.
I begin by documenting failures in the labor market. Following the approach in Chapter 1, I
use rainfall shocks to demonstrate the presence of rigidity in wages for casual agricultural laborers.
Specifically, positive rainfall shocks increase labor demand, leading to wage increases. Once these
shocks have dissipated, however, wages do not return to their prior levels—they remain high in
subsequent years. Chapter 1 shows that when a positive shock in one year is followed by a non-
positive shock in the subsequent year, this leads to labor rationing. Thus, lagged rainfall shocks
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can be used to predict when the ration in the labor market is more likely to bind.
Due to separation failures, labor rationing may lead small farms to use labor more intensively
than large farms (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986; Bardhan and Udry 1999). This implies that
gains from trade can potentially be realized by redistributing land from large to small farms until
the marginal product of labor is equalized across farms. In villages, land transfers are typically
achieved through hiring (i.e. leasing or sharecropping) land. Such hiring arrangements are common
(accounting for 20% of cultivated land) and their prevalence varies considerably from year to year.
In years when labor market rigidities are more likely to bind, there is a substantial increase in
land transfers from large to small farms. Specifically, when a lagged positive shock is followed by
a non-positive shock this year, there is a 63% increase in land hiring by households with below-
average initial landholdings. In contrast, there is no increase in land hiring when a lagged positive
shock is followed by a positive shock in the current year. This indicates that these landholding
changes are not driven by wealth eﬀects of lagged positive shocks, but stem from a response to
labor market failures. These results are consistent with the prediction that failure in one market
alone is not enough to create distortions—transactions in other markets can be used to restore
allocative eﬃciency.
I then turn to examine the implications of multiple market failures. Hiring land requires sub-
stantial capital outlays (Shaban 1987). Given that the delay between the main harvest and the
next major planting season is typically 5 months or longer, farmers cannot necessarily self-finance
these outlays from prior harvest profits (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2010). Thus, the acquisition
of land by poor households requires the presence of well-functioning credit markets.
Consistent with this, land markets are relatively more responsive to labor market frictions in
areas with better financial services. In years when labor rigidities bind, a one standard deviation
increase in banking access leads to a 30% increase in land hiring by small farmers. These results
hold for three separate measures of banking access (taken from Jayachandran 2006). The banking
measures do not diﬀerentially predict land hiring responses to other sequences of rainfall shocks.
This implies that banking is not simply capturing, for example, regional diﬀerences in the extent to
which rainfall constitutes a labor demand shock. These results are consistent with the prediction
that when there are multiple market failures (i.e. labor and credit), it will not necessarily be possible
to achieve allocative eﬃciency.
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These findings relate most closely to the empirical literature on missing markets and separation
failures. Most of this literature has focused on testing the implications of separation failures—for
example, by checking whether the number of adults in a household predicts labor use on its farm
(see Rosenzweig 1988 and Behrman 1999 for reviews). This is primarily because it is diﬃcult to
identify variation in market failures. By using rainfall variation to isolate changes in rationing of
hired labor, I directly test for the impact of labor market failures and explicitly examine interactions
with other markets.
The results also contribute to the literature on land markets in developing countries. First,
variation in take-up of sharecropping arrangements is typically understood through, for example,
interpersonal diﬀerences in risk aversion. The above findings indicate that market-level conditions
are also important determinants of these arrangements. Second, sharecropping has been viewed
as providing reduced eﬀort incentives (relative to land ownership), with potentially negative con-
sequences for output (Shaban 1987). The results in this paper indicate that sharecropping can
potentially increase the return to labor inputs because it involves land transfers from households
where the marginal product of labor is higher to those where it is lower. In addition, if the margin
of labor adjustment on sharecropped land is from being a hired laborer on someone else’s land to
farming one’s own sharecropped land, the net incentive eﬀects on eﬀort are potentially ambiguous.
Consequently, viewing sharecropping as a response to labor market failures provides additional ways
to understand land arrangements in developing countries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the conceptual prediction and
presents the empirical tests. Section 3.3 describes the data and defines rainfall shocks. The results
are presented in Section 3.4, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Predictions and Empirical Tests
Following Chapter 1, sequences of lagged and current rainfall shocks can be used to identify
periods when labor rationing is more likely in village labor markets. Specifically, a positive rainfall
shock in the current year—which constitutes a positive transitory labor demand shock—leads to
an increase in the agricultural wage in the current year. If there is a non-positive shock in the
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subsequent year, under rigidities, the wage will not adjust back downwards.1 This result from
Chapter 1 can be verified using the following simplified regression model:
wihvt = ↵1S
{+,0}
vt + ↵2S
{+,+}
vt + ↵3S
{0,+}
vt + 'Xihvt + ⌘t +  hv + "ihvt, (3.1)
where widst is the log of the nominal wage of worker i in household h in village v of year t; Xihvt
is a vector of controls; ⌘t is a vector of year fixed eﬀects; and  hv represents fixed eﬀects for each
village-landclass. Landclass is the category of landownership into which the household belongs; each
household is categorized into one of 4 landclass groups—landless laborers and the 3 terciles of the
village’s landholding distribution.
Each of the remaining 3 covariates is an indicator for the realization of a particular sequence
of shocks. The indicators take the form S{i,j}vt , where i denotes village v’s shock in year t   1 and
j denotes the village’s shock in year t. The i and j take the values 0 or +, which correspond to
the realization of a non-positive shock (referred to as “no shock”) and a positive shock, respectively.
Each indicator equals 1 if that particular sequence of shocks was realized and equals 0 otherwise.
For example S{+,0}vt , equals 1 if village v had a positive shock last year and no shock this year, and
equals 0 otherwise. The sequence S{0,0}vt , which is the case when the village experienced no shock
last year and no shock this year, is omitted and serves as the reference case. Shocks are drawn from
an iid distribution each year and are uncorrelated with the residual error, "idst. Thus, each of the
coeﬃcients on the indicator functions in equation (3.1) represents the reduced form average eﬀect
of that particular sequence of shocks on year t wages relative to S{0,0}dt .
2
Under the null of no rigidities, only current shocks should predict wages: for S{i,j}dt , the sign of
the coeﬃcient should be determined solely by j. However, under rigidities, a lagged positive shock
will have persist wage eﬀects: it will positively predict current wages:
Prediction 3.1: Wage distortions from lagged positive shocks:
1 As in Chapter 1, this strategy presumes that these shocks have no persistent productivity impacts—they last only
for 1 agricultural year.
2 Note that, unlike in Chapter 1, this specification does not distinguish between zero and negative shocks—it groups
them into one category. This substantially simplifies the specification without compromising the ability to conduct
the relevant tests. In addition, this simpler specification allows for analysis using data with more limited geographic
and timeseries variation than that used in Chapter 1, since it requires observing 4 rather than 9 categories of shocks
over time for each labor market. This is helpful given the data used for analysis (described below).
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↵1 > 0 under suﬃciently severe downward rigidities
Note that regardless of the presence of rigidities, contemporaneous positive shocks should increase
wages relative to the reference case: ↵2 > 0 and ↵3 > 0.
Since wages are higher under S{+,0}dt than S
{0,0}
dt —while labor demand is the same under both
sequences—farmers will demand less hired labor under S{+,0}dt than S
{0,0}
dt . In the absence of any
other changes in factor allocation, households with larger landholdings will demand less hired labor,
while those with small landholdings (who are net suppliers of hired labor) will face labor rationing.
In response, this latter group is likely to increase labor supply to its own farms until the marginal
return from labor use on the family farm equals the marginal disutility from foregone leisure. As
a result, labor will be ineﬃciently allocated: the marginal product of labor on large farms will be
higher than that on small farms. This is the classic separation failure result (e.g. Benjamin 1992).
This will result in lower aggregate production.
However, allocative eﬃciency can potentially be regained (or at least increased) by redistributing
other factors of production. Specifically, in the absence of frictions in the land market, land can be
transferred from large farms to small ones until the marginal product of labor is equalized across
farms in the village. Such transfers will raise aggregate output and therefore constitute potential
gains from trade 3. In villages, land sales are extremely uncommon, due to substantial frictions
in obtaining deed changes and a general unwillingness among farmers to permanently sell land.
Land transfers are therefore typically achieved through leasing or sharecropping arrangements.4
The following model tests whether labor market rigidities lead to land transfers from large to small
households:
3 If farm-specific human capital is an important input in production, or if there are substantial economies of scale
in production, reallocation of land in this way will not necessarily increase aggregate output. These predictions
assume that such considerations are suﬃciently small relative to the importance of the level of physical labor used
in production.
4 Given incentive diﬀerences, sharecropping households may supply fewer labor inputs per acre than leasing or owning
households (Shaban 1987). However, when land is transferred, on the margin, the change is from a small farmer
working as a hired laborer on someone else’s land to working on his own sharecropped plot of land. Given potential
agency issues with hired labor, the net impact on eﬀective eﬀort supplied is unclear. More generally, if the incentive
distortions from sharecropping are severe, then the below tests will fail to find an eﬀect on land transfers even in
the presence of labor market rigidities.
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Lhvt =  i1S
{+,0}
vt +  
ii
1 largehv ⇤ S{+,0}vt +  i2S{+,+}vt +  ii2 largehv ⇤ S{+,+}vt
+  i3S
{+,0}
vt +  
ii
3 largehv ⇤ S{+,0}vt + 'Xihvt + ⌘t +  hv + "ihvt
. (3.2)
Lhvt is the net amount of land that is sharecropped or leased by household h in village v in year t.
largehv is an indicator that equals 1 if the household’s initial landholding (at the beginning of the
study period) is above the sample average and equals 0 otherwise. Note that largehv only appears
in the interaction terms because its level eﬀect is absorbed by the landclass-village fixed eﬀects,  hv.
All other covariates are the same as above.
Prediction 3.2: Land re-allocation from large to small farms:
 i1 > 0 and 0 <  ii1 =  2 i1
A concern with this test is that land increases among small farmers may be due to a wealth eﬀect.
Specifically, the lagged positive shock could allow credit constrained small farmers to finance land
acquisition in the next year. However, this case, land re-allocation should occur under both S{+,0}dt
and S{+,+}dt . In contrast, if reallocation is due to the labor market failure, it should be higher under
S{+,0}dt than S
{+,+}
dt .
Auxiliary Prediction 3.2A: Distinguishing labor market failures from wealth
eﬀects:
 i1 >  
i
2
The acquisition and operation of leased or sharecropped land requires substantial capital outlays
by farmers: up front rental payments (in the case of lease contracts) and working capital costs
for seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation, labor, and animal inputs (Shaban 1987). Harvest profits
from Kharif (the main agricultural season) are realized in November-January, while substantial field
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operations for the next Kharif season do not begin until May-July. Given this gap, farmers are often
unable to retain profits from the previous year to purchase inputs for the next year (Duflo, Kremer,
Robinson). As a result, they are heavily reliant on credit to finance farm operations.
This suggests that credit access will be an important determinant of whether small farmers
acquire land in response to the labor market failure. In the absence of credit access, land reallocation
will be diﬃcult to initiate (in the case of lease arrangements) and will not lead to increases in
aggregate output (due to an inability of small farmers to pay for variable inputs). Thus, gains from
trade in land will not be realized. This is consistent with the prediction that when there is a failure
in more than one market (in this case, labor and credit), then it will not necessarily be possible to
reallocate factors of production to achieve eﬃciency.
The following model adds a triple interaction of landholding and credit access with each shock
category:
Lhvt =  i1S
{+,0}
vt +  
ii
1 creditv ⇤ S{+,0}vt +  iii1 largehv ⇤ S{+,0}vt +  iv1 creditv ⇤ largehv ⇤ S{+,0}vt
+  i2S
{+,+}
vt +  
ii
2 creditv ⇤ S{+,+}vt +  iii2 largehv ⇤ S{+,+}vt +  iv2 creditv ⇤ largehv ⇤ S{+,+}vt
+  i3S
{0,+}
vt +  
ii
3 creditv ⇤ S{0,+}vt +  iii3 largehv ⇤ S{0,+}vt +  iv3 creditv ⇤ largehv ⇤ S{0,+}vt
+ 'Xihvt + ⌘t +  hv + "ihvt
(3.3)
The primary coeﬃcients of interest are those in the first row:  i1 to  iv1 . Land reallocation should
be especially likely when credit access is higher:
Prediction 3.3: The role of credit access in enabling land adjustments:
 ii1 > 0 and  iv1 < 0
Note that while the level of credit access is endogenous and will be correlated with the error
term, rainfall shocks are iid within each village. As a result, E[creditvS
{+,0}
vt ⇤ "ihvt] = 0 and
E[creditvlargehvS
{+,0}
vt ⇤ "ihvt] = 0. Thus,  ii1 and  iv1 capture causal eﬀects.
However, the interpretation of these estimates is subject to a concern: rainfall may be a more
important productivity shock in areas with higher credit access. For example, areas with better
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credit availability may grow crops that are more sensitive to rainfall variation. This diﬀerential
productivity eﬀect could give rise to the results in Prediction 3.3 even if credit has no direct eﬀect
on land hiring. Two auxiliary tests can be used to rule out this concern. First, if credit is a proxy for
the importance of rainfall as a labor market shock, then the interactions of credit with S{+,+}vt and
S{0,+}vt should also be significant (and move in the same direction as the interaction with S
{+,0}
vt ).
Second, the addition of triple interactions of S{+,0}vt with the landholding indicator and agricultural
measures (e.g., crops grown, proportion of irrigated land) should reduce the predictive power of the
credit interactions.
Auxiliary Predictions 3.3A-B: Distinguishing credit access from diﬀering ef-
fects of rain shocks across villages:
3A)  ii1 >  ii2 and  ii1 >  ii3
3B) When triple interactions of S{+,0}vt with landholding and agricultural indicators are
added to model (3.3), Prediction 3 will continue to hold.
3.3 Data and Definitions
Wage and land data are taken from the ICRISAT Village Level Studies. This is a panel dataset
covering ten Indian villages in five districts in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, and Maharashtra. It spans the years 1975-1984. Three villages are covered for all ten
years, and the remaining villages were added in later years, for a total of 62 village-year observations.
Forty households were randomly selected in each village: ten landless households, and ten households
sampled from each tercile of the village’s landholding distribution. The wage variable is constructed
from Schedule K, which reports wages for casual agricultural employment. Household-level land data
is constructed from Schedule Y, which includes plot-level details of each household’s farm operations,
including land ownership status. The land panel has been balanced so that any household (including
landless households) which has owned or operated land in any year in the village is included in each
year, with landholding defined as 0 when no land was used/operated. Demographic variables are
taken from Schedule C, which captures household characteristics.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
  Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Unit of 
observation 
Obser-
vations Source 
Wages and Landholding      
 Log nominal daily wage 1.140 0.549 Individual-months 4,406 ICRISAT 
 Hired land (acres) 0.872 3.287 Household-years 1,726 ICRISAT 
 Within-HH standard deviation 
in hired land (acres) 
1.148 2.379 Households 336 ICRISAT 
       
Financial Access      
 Bank credit per capita (1981) 100 43 District 5 1981 Indian Census 
 Bank deposits per capita (1981) 154 73 District 5 1981 Indian Census 
 Bank branches (1975-1984) 85 40 District-years 37 Reserve Bank of India 
       
% of Observations in Each Rainshock Category    
 {t-1=Shock, t=No shock} 0.290  -- Village-years 62 Indian Meteorological Dept 
 {t-1=Shock, t=Shock} 0.210  -- Village-years 62 Indian Meteorological Dept 
 {t-1=No shock, t=Shock} 0.226  -- Village-years 62 Indian Meteorological Dept 
 {t-1=No shock, t=No shock} 0.274  -- Village-years 62 Indian Meteorological Dept 
Notes:   
1. This table presents means and standard deviations for variables used in the analysis.   
2. Hired land is computed as sharecropped land plus hired land in a village-year. 
3. Potential rainfall sequences are displayed in the form {t-1=X, t=Y}. X corresponds to last year's rainfall shock and 
Y corresponds to the rainfall shock in the current year. Shock is defined as rainfall in the first month of the monsoon 
above the 60th percentile of the village's usual distribution in that month; no shock is defined as rainfall below the 
60th percentile in that month.  The percentage of village-years for which each particular sequence of shocks was 
realized is reported.  
 
To proxy for the level of financial services in an area, three district-level measures of banking
access are used. The first two are average credit per capita and deposits per capita in the village’s
district, taken from the 1981 Indian Census. The third measure is the number of bank branches per
capita, taken from the Reserve Bank of India. This latter variable changes from year to year, while
the first two are constant across the sample. These are the same three measures of financial access
used by Jayachandran (2006).
Rainfall data is taken from the IMD Gridded Daily Rainfall dataset, constructed by the Indian
Meteorological Department. Rainfall estimates are provided for 1-by-1 degree latitude-longitude
grids by interpolating from 1,803 regional weather stations located across the country. The coordi-
nates of each village (provided in the ICRISAT data) are matched to their nearest node in the rain
data. As in Chapter 1, the measure of interest is rainfall in the first month when the monsoon could
arrive in a village, which ranges from May to June for the ICRISAT villages. Measuring rainfall in
this month proxies for both high monsoon rainfall levels and early monsoon arrival—both of which
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constitute positive shocks. Rainfall distributions are computed for each village separately, using the
years 1950 (the first available year in the IMD dataset) to 1984. A positive rainfall shock is defined
as rainfall above the 60th percentile of the village’s 1950-1984 rainfall distribution for the relevant
month. A non-positive shock, or no shock, is defined as rainfall below the 60th percentile of the
village’s rainfall distribution.5
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Wage Distortions (Prediction 3.1)
Table 3.2 verifies the finding in Chapter 1 that lagged positive shocks positively predict current
wages, indicating the presence of wage rigidity in the ICRISAT data. Column (1) shows a regression
of the log of the daily nominal wage on the set of shock sequences, and year and village fixed eﬀects.
Column (2) shows the specification in regression model (3.1), with the full set of standard controls.
The results are similar in both columns. Consistent with Prediction 3.1, a village that received a
positive shock last year and no shock this year has about 10% higher wages than a village that
received no shock in both years. One cannot reject that current wages are the same regardless
of whether the shock occurred in the previous year or current year—the F-test for equality of the
coeﬃcients on the three shock categories has a p-value of 0.542.
Since the subsequent analysis will focus on diﬀerences among small and large landowners, Col-
umn (3) tests whether the wage eﬀects of shocks vary with landholding status. The regression adds
interactions of each shock sequence with an indicator for whether the household has above average
landholding. Each interaction is insignificant, and the F-test for joint significance of the interaction
terms has a p-value of 0.430. Thus, to the extent that shocks aﬀect labor market opportunities for
large and small farmers, these eﬀects do not operate through diﬀerences in the wage.
5 Note that this is diﬀerent than the cut-oﬀs used in Chapter 1, in which a positive shock is defined as rainfall above
the 80th percentile, a negative shock is defined as rainfall below the 20th percentile, and no shock is defined as
rainfall between the 20-80th percentiles. Defining positive shocks in this manner is not feasible in the ICRISAT
data: given the relatively small geographic and timeseries variation, rainfall above the 80th percentile is seldom
observed, and two consecutive years of rainfall above the 80th percentile are quite rare.
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Table 3.2: Rigidity in Agricultural Wages 
Dependent variable: Log nominal daily wage 
    (1) (2) (3) 
 {t-1=No shock;  t=No shock} (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
     
1 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} 0.127 
(0.039)*** 
0.102 
(0.036)*** 
0.095 
(0.039)** 
2 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} x 
     Large landholding 
  0.047 
(0.053) 
     
3 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock} 0.193 
(0.086)** 
0.160 
(0.079)** 
0.157 
(0.079)* 
4 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Large landholding 
  0.014 
(0.054) 
     
5 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock} 0.153 
(0.056)*** 
0.131 
(0.047)*** 
0.135 
(0.046)*** 
6 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Large landholding 
   -0.021 
(0.041) 
     
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effects? Yes No No 
Village-landclass fixed effects? No Yes Yes 
Demographic controls? No Yes Yes 
Observations 4,406 4,406 4,406 
Dependent variable mean 1.140 1.140 1.140 
F-test p-value: Coeff 1 = Coeff 3 = Coeff 5 0.559 0.542 0.449 
F-test p-value: Coeff 2 = Coeff 4 = Coeff 6 = 0  --  -- 0.430 
Notes:  
1. This table tests for rigidity in agricultural wages. The dependent variable is the log of the nominal 
daily agricultural wage for casual labor.  
2. Rainfall shocks are defined as Shock (corresponding to rainfall above the 60th percentile) and No 
shock (corresponding to rainfall below the 60th percentile). The shock covariates are of the form {t-
1=X, t=Y}; they are indicators that equal 1 if the village experienced shock X in the previous year 
and  shock Y in the current year. 
3. Large landholding is an indicator that equals 1 if the household's landclass category (as defined in 
the ICRISAT data) is below the sample average, and equals 0 otherwise.  
4. Demographic controls consist of a gender dummy, fixed effects for the household's caste ranking 
(as defined in the ICRISAT data), and fixed effects for the education category of the household head. 
5. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by district-year. 
 
 3.4.2 Land Reallocation in Response to Labor Market Rigidities (Prediction 3.2)
There are active markets for sharecropping and fixed-rent leasing in the ICRISAT villages. 25%
of households are involved in sharecropping or leasing, and these arrangements account for about
20% of total cultivated area in the ICRISAT sample (Shaban 1987). As reported in Table 3.1, the
mean amount of hired land (defined as sharecropped or leased land) in a household-year is 0.872
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acres. In addition, there is considerable variation in the amount of land hired by a given household
from year to year. The within-household standard deviation in hired land is 1.148 acres—132% of
the mean hired landholding. This suggests that households actively adjust their farm size through
changes in hired land.
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Table 3.3: Land Adjustments in Response to Labor Market Failures 
Dependent variable: Net hired land (acres) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
1 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} 0.547 
(0.267)** 
0.518 
(0.279)* 
0.446 
(0.313) 
2 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} x 
     Large landholding 
 -0.768 
(0.273)*** 
 -0.838 
(0.294)*** 
 -0.807 
(0.317)** 
     
3 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock}   -0.189 
(0.251) 
 -0.318 
(0.363) 
4 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Large landholding  
  -0.286 
(0.246) 
 -0.251 
(0.275) 
     
5 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock}    -0.149 
(0.256) 
6 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Large landholding 
  0.063 
(0.299) 
     
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Village-landclass fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations: household-years 1,726 1,726 1,726 
Mean sharecropped or leased landholding (acres) 0.872 0.872 0.872 
F-test p-value: Coeff 2 = Coeff 4  -- 0.035** 0.035** 
Notes:  
1. This table tests whether households alter landholdings in years when labor market rationing is more 
likely. The dependent variable is net hired land: (land sharecropped or leased in) minus (land sharecropped 
or leased out) in each household-year. 
2. Rainfall shocks are defined as Shock (corresponding to rainfall above the 60th percentile) and No shock 
(corresponding to rainfall below the 60th percentile). The shock covariates are of the form {t-1=X, t=Y}; 
they are indicators that equal 1 if the village experienced shock X in the previous year and  shock Y in the 
current year. 
3. Large landholding is an indicator that equals 1 if the household's landclass category (as defined in the 
ICRISAT data) is below the sample average, and equals 0 otherwise.  
4. Each regression includes year fixed effects, village-landclass fixed effects, a gender dummy, fixed 
effects for the household's caste ranking (as defined in the ICRISAT data), and fixed effects for the 
education category of the household head. 
5. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by district-year. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 examines whether variation in hired land is explained by labor market rigidities. The
dependent variable is net hired land, defined as (total land sharecropped in or leased in) minus
(total land sharecropped out or leased out). Column (1) presents a regression of net hired land on
S{+,0}vt , an interaction for whether the household’s initial landholding (at the start of the study in
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1974) is above the sample average, and standard controls. Consistent with Prediction 3.2, in years
where labor market rigidities are more likely to bind, small landholders hire 0.547 acres of additional
land on average—this corresponds to a striking 63% of the mean amount of hired land. In contrast,
large landowners decrease their landholding by hiring out land. The estimated decrease in hired out
land is 0.221 acres, but one cannot reject that Coeﬃcient2 = 2*Coeﬃcient1 (F-test p-value: 0.429).
Column (2) adds the sequence S{+,+}vt , and Column (3) adds all sequences for the full specification
shown in regression model (3.2). These columns allow for tests of Auxiliary Prediction 3.2A. If the
increase in hired land is due to wealth eﬀects from the lagged positive shock, then hired land should
increase under S{+,+}vt (Coeﬃcient 3) as well. However, in both columns, small farmers do not
increase their hired land when a lagged positive shock is followed by a positive shock in the current
year—in fact, the coeﬃcients are negative, though insignificant. The F-test for the equality of
the coeﬃcients on S{+,0}vt and S
{+,+}
vt has a p-value of 0.035. Thus, small farmers increase their
landholding only in years when lagged positive shocks are likely to cause labor market rigidities to
bind.
3.4.3 Impact of Credit Access on Land Adjustments (Prediction 3.3)
Table 3.4 examines whether land adjustments are more likely in areas with better access to
financial services. Columns (1)-(3) present results from a regression of net hired land on a triple
interaction of S{+,0}vt with the large landholding indicator and a measure of banking access. Each
of the three columns uses a diﬀerent measure of banking access: credit per capita, deposits per
capita, and banks per capita, respectively. Each measure has been normalized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1.
As before, on average, small landholders increase their landholding by about half an acre in
years when labor rigidities are more likely to bind (Coeﬃcient 1). This increase is larger in areas
with more financial access (Coeﬃcient 2). For example, a one standard deviation increase in credit
per capita leads to a 0.258 acre relative increase in hired land. This corresponds to 30% of the mean
amount of hired land. Similarly, the amount of land hired out by large landowners is greater in
areas with better financial access (Coeﬃcient 4). These results are consistent with Prediction 3.3.
111
Column (4) repeats the specification in Column (1), but without village-landclass fixed eﬀects so
that the main coeﬃcients on banking access and landholding can be viewed.
Columns (5) provides a test of Auxiliary Prediction 3.3A. It shows estimates for regression model
(3.3), with triple interactions included for all three shock sequences. Increases in credit access are
not associated with increases in hired land among small farmers under S{+,+}vt or S
{0,+}
vt . In fact,
both coeﬃcients are negative. In addition, as a whole, banking access does not predict eﬀects of
these shocks on hired land; the F-test for joint significance of Coeﬃcients 6, 8, 10, and 12 has a
p-value of 0.243. In contrast, as in the earlier regressions, banking access continues to predict the
eﬀects of S{+,0}vt on hired land; the F-test for joint significance of Coeﬃcients 2 and 4 has a p-value
of 0.027.
To test Auxiliary Prediction 3.3B, a series of crop controls to the basic specification shown in
Column (1). Four crop indicators capture each major category of crops defined in the ICRISAT
data: cereals (e.g. rice and maize), pulses (e.g. lentils), oilseeds (e.g. groundnuts), and fiber crops
(e.g. cotton). For the first year that each household appears in the sample, a crop indicator was
constructed that equals 1 if the household grew the given category or crops and 0 otherwise.6 There
is substantial variation in which crops are grown in each village; this variation is captured by these
crop indicators. A triple interaction between the banking measure, the landholding dummy, and
each of these 4 crop indicators was added to the specification in Column (1). The results from this
regression are displayed in Column (6). If variation in banking is simply proxying for diﬀerences
in crops across villages, then the inclusion of these additional controls should render Coeﬃcients
2 and 4 insignificant. However, there is little change in these coeﬃcients relative to Column (1)
and they continue to have predictive power; the F-test for joint significance of Coeﬃcients 2 and
4 has a p-value of 0.045. The results are similar if triple interactions with other controls, such as
the proportion of land with irrigation, are included. Together, Columns (5)-(6) provide evidence
that the banking measures are not just reflecting diﬀerences in the importance of rainfall as a labor
market shock across areas.
6 These indicators were based on only the first year in the sample (rather than re-defined for each year) since crop
planting decisions are likely endogenous to rainfall conditions. Since rain shocks are iid in each year, initial planting
decisions will be uncorrelated with future shocks.
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneity in Land Adjustments: Banking Access 
Dependent variable: Net hired land (acres) 
Measure of Banking Credit 
 per capita 
Deposits  
per capita 
Number 
of Banks 
Credit 
 per capita 
Credit 
 per capita 
Credit 
 per capita 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} 0.502 
(0.117)** 
0.497 
(0.123)** 
0.514 
(0.219)* 
0.421 
(0.098)** 
0.433 
(0.170)* 
0.483 
(0.161)* 
2 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} x 
     Banking measure 
0.258 
(0.036)*** 
0.252 
(0.042)*** 
0.311 
(0.329) 
0.197 
(0.060)** 
0.124 
(0.084) 
0.256 
(0.107)* 
3 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} x 
     Large landholding 
 -0.588 
(0.245)* 
 -0.589 
(0.155)** 
 -0.753 
(0.382) 
 -0.557 
(0.239) 
 -0.500 
(0.264) 
 -1.034 
(0.387)* 
4 {t-1=Shock;  t=No shock} x 
     Banking measure x 
     Large landholding 
 -0.617 
(0.098)*** 
 -0.661 
(0.036)*** 
 -0.266 
(0.433) 
 -0.619 
(0.109)*** 
 -0.680 
(0.139)** 
 -0.980 
(0.217)** 
5 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock}      -0.316 
(0.287) 
 
6 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Banking measure 
     -0.441 
(0.114)** 
 
7 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Large landholding 
    0.016 
(0.203) 
 
8 {t-1=Shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Banking measure x 
     Large landholding 
     -0.022 
(0.108) 
 
9 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock}      -0.088 
(0.293) 
 
10 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Banking measure 
     -0.153 
(0.135) 
 
11 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Large landholding 
    0.232 
(0.214) 
 
12 {t-1=No shock;  t=Shock} x 
     Banking measure x 
     Large landholding 
     -0.223 
(0.123) 
 
 Banking measure    0.668 
(0.036)*** 
  
 Large landholding    0.208 
(0.243) 
  
 Banking measure x 
     Large landholding 
    -0.123 
(0.163) 
  
Village-landclass fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crop triple interactions? No No No No No Yes 
F-test p-value: crop interactions  --  --  --  --  -- 0.191 
Observations: household-years 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 1,726 
Mean hired landholding (acres) 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 
Notes:  
1. This table tests whether land adjustments depend on credit access. The dependent variable is net hired land: (land 
sharecropped or leased in) minus (land sharecropped or leased out) in each household-year. 
2. Rainfall shocks are defined as Shock (rainfall above the 60th percentile) and No shock (rainfall below the 60th 
percentile). The shock covariates are of the form {t-1=X, t=Y}; they are binary indicators that equal 1 if the village 
experienced shock X in the previous year and shock Y in the current year. 
3. Banking measure is one of three measures of banking access. The specific measure used in each regression is 
reported at the top of the table. Each measure has been normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
4. Large landholding is an indicator that equals 1 if the household's landclass catgory is below the sample average.  
5. Each regression includes fixed effects for year, village-landclass, household caste category, and education category 
of the household head, and a gender dummy. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by district-year. 
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter empirically examines land responses to labor market frictions. It uses rainfall
shocks to demonstrate the presence of wage rigidity and identify years in which labor rationing
is more likely to occur in a village. Households respond to labor rationing by reallocating land
from large to small farms. However, their ability to make land adjustments is hindered in areas
with poor credit access—highlighting a way in which multiple market failures distort allocative
eﬃciency in production. These results provide support for the presence of separation failures in
village economies. They are consistent, for example, with the view that labor rationing leads to
more intensive use of labor inputs by small farms compared to large ones.
The findings have important policy relevance. They suggest that correcting failures in one
market can have indirect benefits on other market distortions as well. Specifically, improvements in
credit access will improve farmers’ ability to mitigate distortions from labor market failures.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Chapter 1 Model Proofs
This appendix presents proofs of the model propositions in Chapter 1 Section 1.2. Before proceeding,
it is useful to specify an allocation mechanism by which workers are matched to firms. This is needed
to formalize the impact of oﬀ-equilibium deviations on firm profits. I assume all firms simultaneously
post a wage. Firms satisfy labor demand in descending order of posted wages. If multiple firms post
the same wage, those firms proceed in random order. This ensures that the firms oﬀering the highest
wage receive priority in hiring. For simplicity, I assume each firm hires the available workers with
the lowest   values that are willing to work for it. This maximizes gains from trade in the narrow
sense that for a given wage oﬀer, those workers that would benefit the most from employment (the
lowest   workers) are the ones that get the job.
Proof of Proposition 1.1: Market Clearing in Benchmark Case
First, I show that the market clearing condition must hold in the benchmark case.
(i) Suppose there is excess labor supply: JL⇤ < 1
 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
. Then firm j can cut its wage to
some w⇤   ✏ and still hire L⇤ workers. To see this, define   as the slack in the market:
  = JL⇤   1
 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
. At wage wj = w⇤   ✏, by the allocation mechanism defined above,
the supply of workers available to j equals the mass of workers that would be willing to
work for j minus the mass of workers employed by the other (higher-wage) firms:
LAvailj = max
n
1
 
u
⇣
w⇤ ✏
p
⌘
  (J   1)L⇤ , 0
o
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Firm j can cut wages by ✏ and still hire L⇤ workers as long as ✏ satisfies the following
condition:
L⇤  1
 
u
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w⇤ ✏
p
⌘
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=) 1J
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     1
 
u
⇣
w⇤ ✏
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⌘
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Such a wage cut will strictly decrease j’s wage bill while holding revenue constant,
thereby strictly increasing profits. Thus, there cannot be excess labor supply.
(ii) Suppose there is excess labor demand: JL⇤ > 1
 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
. This implies that each firm is
hiring strictly less labor than demanded by its first order condition. If firm j raises its
wage infinitesimally above w⇤ to w⇤ + ✏, it will be able to fully satisfy its labor demand
by the allocation mechanism. In what follows, denote LFOCj (wj) as j’s labor demand
under wage wj (this is determined by j’s first order condition, (1.5)). This upward wage
deviation will be profitable if profits from w⇤ + ✏ are higher than profits from w⇤, i.e. if
the following inequality holds:
✓pf
 
LFOCj (w
⇤ + ✏)
   (w⇤ + ✏)LFOCj (w⇤ + ✏) > ✓pf ✓ 1
J 
u
✓
w⇤
p
◆◆
  w⇤ 1
J 
u
✓
w⇤
p
◆
.
Note that:
lim
✏!0 ✓pf
⇣
LFOCj (w
⇤ + ✏)
⌘
  (w⇤ + ✏)LFOCj (w⇤ + ✏)
= ✓pf
⇣
LFOCj (w
⇤)
⌘
  w⇤LFOCj (w⇤)
> ✓pf
⇣
1
J 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘⌘
  w⇤ 1
J 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
.
The equality on the second line follows from the continuity of the first order condition
and continuity of f(•). The inequality on the third line is due to the fact that at w⇤,
LFOCj (w
⇤) maximizes profits. This implies that there exists some ✏¯ > 0 such that for
all ✏ < ✏¯, profits from deviating to w⇤ + ✏ will be higher than maintaining wages at w⇤.
Next, I show that no firm will deviate from the w⇤ pinned down by conditions (1.5) and (1.6).
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(i) Suppose firm j raises its wage to some wj = w⇤ + ✏. It follows from the first order
condition, (1.5), that the firm will demand labor LFOCj < L⇤. However, it could have
hired LFOCj workers under wage w⇤, with a lower wage bill and higher profits. This
deviation cannot be profitable.
(ii) Suppose firm j lowers its wage to some wj = w⇤   ✏. The supply of workers available
to j equals the mass of workers that would be willing to work for j minus the mass of
workers employed by the other (higher-wage) firms:
LAvailj = max
n
1
 
u
⇣
w⇤ ✏
p
⌘
  (J   1)L⇤ , 0
o
= max
n
1
 
u
⇣
w⇤ ✏
p
⌘
  J 1
J 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
, 0
o
.
Note that at w⇤   ✏, LAvailj < L⇤ < LFOCj by the above and the first order condition.
This deviation will not be profitable iﬀ ⇡j (w⇤, L⇤)  ⇡j
⇣
w⇤   ✏, LAvailj
⌘
  0.
(a) If LAvailj = 0, then ⇡j
⇣
w⇤   ✏, LAvailj
⌘
= 0 and profits are trivially weakly
higher from maintaining w⇤.
(b) If LAvailj > 0, then profits from maintaining w⇤ will be higher for J suﬃ-
ciently large. First, rewrite:
⇡j (w⇤, L⇤)  ⇡j
⇣
w⇤   ✏, LAvailj
⌘
= p✓
h
f (L⇤)  f
⇣
LAvailj
⌘i
  ✏
J 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
= F (J)  ✏
J 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
,
where F (J) is defined as the diﬀerence in output from L⇤ and LAvailj . Note
that:
@
@J
F (J) =
1
J2 
u
✓
w⇤
p
◆
p✓
h
f 0
⇣
LAvailj
⌘
  f 0 (L⇤)
i
> 0
by the concavity of f(•). Next, implicitly define eJas:
F (1) =
✏eJ u
✓
w⇤
p
◆
.
Cutting wages to w⇤ ✏ will not be a profitable deviation for any J such that
117
F (J)   ✏
J 
u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
> 0. The following shows this will hold for any J   eJ .
For any positive number X:
F ( eJ +X) > F ( eJ) (since @@JF (J) > 0)
> F (1) (since @@JF (J) > 0)
= ✏eJ u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
(by definition of eJ)
> ✏
( eJ+X) u
⇣
w⇤
p
⌘
.
Thus for J suﬃciently large, profits from maintaining w⇤ will be higher than from
deviating to w⇤   ✏. This is consistent with the assumption stated in the model that J
is arbitrarily large. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 1.2: Downward rigidity at the reference wage
I prove each of the two parts of Proposition 1.2 in turn.
1) For ✓ 2 (✓0R, ✓R):
Define ✓0R =
wR
pf 0
⇣
1
(J 1) u
⇣
 wR
p
⌘⌘ . For ✓ 2 (✓0R, ✓R), no firm will deviate from wage oﬀer wR:
(a) Suppose firm j deviates by raising the wage to wj > wR. It follows from the first order
condition, (1.7), that the firm will demand labor LFOCj < L. However, it could have
hired LFOCj workers under wage wR, with a lower wage bill and higher profits. This
deviation cannot be profitable.
(b) Suppose firm j deviates by lowering the wage to wj 2 ( wR, wR). By the firm’s first
order condition (1.7), j0s labor demand will increase, but the supply of labor available
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to j will decrease to some LAvailj : 0 < LAvailj < L (wR, ✓, p) . Then:
⇡j
⇣
wj , LAvailj
⌘
= p✓f
⇣
 LAvailj
⌘
  wjLAvailj
< p✓f
⇣
 LAvailj
⌘
  wR
⇣
 LAvailj
⌘
(since wj > wR )
< p✓f
 
L (wR, ✓, p)
   wRL (wR, ✓, p) (by FOC at wR)
= ⇡j
 
wR, L (wR, ✓, p)
 
.
This deviation is not profitable.
(c) Suppose firm j deviates by lowering the wage to wj   wR. Since ✓ > ✓0R, the definition
of ✓0R above implies:
L (wR, ✓, p) >
1
(J   1) u
✓
 wR
p
◆
.
As a result, the supply of labor available to j is:
LAvailj = max
n
1
 
u
⇣
wj
p
⌘
  (J   1)L¯ , 0
o
 max
n
1
 
u
⇣
 wR
p
⌘
  (J   1)L¯ , 0
o
(since wj  wR )
= 0 (by the expression for L above).
The profits from cutting to wj   wR are therefore 0. This deviation is not profitable.
The first order condition (1.7) implies that for ✓ 2 (✓0R, ✓R), L (wR, ✓, p) < L (wR, ✓R, p). This is
because the wage remains fixed at wR, while ✓ < ✓R, and f(•) is concave. Since by the definition of
✓R, JL (wR, ✓R, p) =
1
 
u
⇣
wR
p
⌘
, this implies that for ✓ 2 (✓0R, ✓R), JL (wR, ✓, p) < 1 u
⇣
wR
p
⌘
. Thus,
there will be excess labor supply in the market.
Finally, note that lim
 !0
✓0R = lim !0
wR
pf 0
⇣
1
(J 1) u
⇣
 wR
p
⌘⌘ = 0.
2) For ✓   ✓R:
The definition of ✓R and Proposition 1 imply: w (wR, ✓R, p) = w⇤ (✓R, p) = wR. Since @w
⇤(✓,p)
@✓ > 0
for all ✓, w⇤ (✓R, p)   wR for ✓   ✓R. The below arguments show that for ✓   ✓R, no firm will want
to deviate from w (wR, ✓, p) = w⇤ (✓, p):
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(a) Suppose firm j raises its wage to some wj = w (wR, ✓, p) + ✏ > wR. Since wj > wR, j’s
first order condition (1.7) coincides with the benchmark case. This deviation cannot be
profitable by the same logic as part (i) of the proof of Proposition 1 above.
(b) Suppose firm j lowers its wage to some wj = w (wR, ✓, p)   ✏   wR. (Note that this
implies ✓ > ✓R). The firm’s choice of labor demand at wj is given by first order condition
(1.7). This deviation cannot be profitable by the same logic as part (ii) of the proof of
Proposition 1 above.
(c) Suppose firm j lowers its wage to some wj = w (wR, ✓, p) ✏ < wR. Define LFOC, j implic-
itly as: p✓ f 0
⇣
 LFOC, j
⌘
= wj . In addition, define LFOC,Bj implicitly as: p✓f 0
⇣
LFOC,Bj
⌘
=
wj . Note that by condition (1.8), LFOC, j < L
FOC,B
j . At wj , j’s optimal labor demand
will correspond to LFOC, j . There are 2 possibilities:
1) If LFOC, j > LAvailj , then the amount of labor hired by the firm will correspond to
LAvailj (the available labor supply). Then:
⇡j
⇣
wj , LAvailj
⌘
= p✓f
⇣
 LAvailj
⌘
  wjLAvailj
 p✓f
⇣
LAvailj
⌘
  wjLAvailj (since   < 1)
< p✓f (L⇤)  w⇤L⇤ (by Proposition 1.1 proof)
= p✓f
 
L
   wL
= ⇡j
 
w,L
 
2) If LFOC, j  LAvailj , then the amount of labor hired by the firm will correspond to
LFOC, j . Then:
⇡j
⇣
wj , L
FOC, 
j
⌘
= p✓f
⇣
 LFOC, j
⌘
  wjLFOC, j
< p✓f
⇣
LFOC, j
⌘
  wjLFOC, j (since   < 1)
< p✓f
⇣
LFOC,Bj
⌘
  wjLFOC,Bj (by FOC condn (1.5))
< p✓f (L⇤)  w⇤L⇤ (by Proposition 1.1 proof)
= p✓f
 
L
   wL
= ⇡j
 
w,L
 
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Thus, such a downward deviation cannot be profitable.
Since w (wR, ✓R, p) = w⇤ (✓R, p) for ✓   ✓R, this implies L (wR, ✓R, p) = L⇤ (✓R, p) because labor
demand under the first order conditions (1.5) and (1.7) coincides for w   wR. As a result, condition
(1.6) implies JL (wR, ✓, p) = 1 u
⇣
w(wR,✓,p)
p
⌘
for ✓   ✓R. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 1.3: Distortions from reference wage increases
Since, from Proposition 1.2, @✓
0
S
@  > 0 and lim !0
✓0S = 0, for   suﬃciently small, it follows that
w (wS , ✓, p) = ws for ✓  ✓S .
First note that for ✓ 2 (✓R, ✓S):
w (wR, ✓, p) = w⇤ (✓, p) by Proposition 1.2
< w⇤ (✓S , p) by Corollary 1.1
= wS by definition of ✓S
.
In addition, for ✓  ✓R, w (wR, ✓, p)  wR < wS , where the first inequality follows from Proposition
1.2. Together, the above imply that w (wR, ✓, p) < ws for ✓ < ✓S .
Since Proposition 1.3 assumes w (wS , ✓, p) = wS for ✓ < ✓S , this implies: w (wR, ✓, p) < wS =
w (wS , ✓, p) for ✓ < ✓S . Then, L (wS , ✓, p) < L (wR, ✓, p) for ✓ < ✓S by the firm’s first order
condition (1.7). ⌅
Proof of Proposition 1.4: Inflation will mitigate distortions from nominal rigidity
Suppose that w
⇣
wR, e✓, ep⌘ = wR and JL⇣wR, e✓, ep⌘ < 1 u✓w(wR,e✓,p˜)p ◆. As the price level rises
above ep, holding the wage fixed at wR, the first order condition (1.7) implies that labor demand
will rise, while (1.2) implies that labor supply will fall. There will be a p0 > ep at which aggregate
labor demand will be exactly equal to aggregate supply. This p0 is pinned down by the following
condition:
p0e✓f 0✓ 1
J  ¯
u
✓
wR
p0
◆◆
= wR.
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Note that at p0 and e✓, wR is the market clearing wage. This implies that: w ⇣wR, e✓, p0⌘ =
w⇤
⇣e✓, p0⌘ = wR. In addition, for any p00   p0:
w
⇣
wR, e✓, p0⌘ = wR by definition of p0.
= w⇤
⇣e✓, p0⌘
 w⇤
⇣e✓, p00⌘ since @w⇤@p > 0
= w
⇣
wR, e✓, p00⌘ by Proposition 1.2 since w⇤ ⇣e✓, p00⌘   wR
.
Thus, 8p   p0, w
⇣
wR, e✓, p⌘ = w⇤ ⇣e✓, p⌘ . In addition, this implies L⇣wR, e✓, p⌘ = L⇤ ⇣e✓, p⌘ since
w
⇣
wR, e✓, p⌘   wR and also implies market clearing by Proposition 1.2. ⌅
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Table B.1: Test for Serial Correlation in Rainfall 
Dependent variable: District's rainfall deviation in the current year 
 Sample 
 
World Bank data districts 
(1956 - 1987)  
NSS data districts 
(1982 - 2008) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
District's rainfall deviation in the 
previous year 
 -0.048 
(0.035) 
 -0.056 
(0.033)*  
 -0.018 
(0.033) 
 -0.016 
(0.030) 
District and year fixed effects? No Yes  No Yes 
Observations: district-years 8,672 8,672   15,392 15,392 
Notes:  
1. This table tests for serial correlation in rainfall.  The unit of observation in each regression is a 
district-year.  Regressions (1)-(2) perform the analysis for the districts in the World Bank dataset 
for rainfall over the years 1956-1987.  Regressions (3)-(4) perform the analysis for the districts in 
the NSS dataset for rainfall over the years 1986-2007.    
2. The dependent variable is a district's rainfall deviation, which equals the rainfall level in inches 
in the first month of the monsoon minus the district's mean rainfall level in that month in the 
sample. 
3. Each column shows results of an OLS regression of the dependent variable on the district's 
rainfall deviation in the previous year.  The regressions in columns (2) and (4) also include year 
fixed effects and district fixed effects. 
4. Standard errors in each regression are corrected to allow for clustering by geographic region, as 
defined in the NSS data. 
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Table B.2: Test for Differential Impact of Rainfall Shocks by Season 
 Dependent Variable 
 Log nominal 
wage 
% Days Worked 
in Agriculture 
 (1) (2) 
Positive shock 0.046 
(0.014)*** 
0.026 
(0.012)** 
Positive shock x 
     Harvest quarter (October-December) 
 -0.015 
(0.017) 
 -0.013 
(0.012) 
Positive shock x 
     Post-harvest quarter (January-March) 
 -0.023 
(0.022) 
 -0.008 
(0.015) 
Positive shock x 
     Lean quarter (April-June) 
0.021 
(0.017) 
 -0.027 
(0.019) 
   
Drought 0.023 
(0.018) 
 -0.023 
(0.011)** 
Drought x 
     Harvest quarter (October-December) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
 -0.004 
(0.011) 
Drought x 
     Post-harvest quarter (January-March) 
 -0.018 
(0.022) 
 0.015 
(0.014) 
Drought x 
     Lean quarter (April-June) 
 -0.003 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
   
Harvest quarter (October-December) 0.035 
(0.010)*** 
0.010 
(0.006) 
Post-harvest quarter (January-March) 0.060 
(0.011)*** 
 -0.054 
(0.008)*** 
Lean quarter (April-June) 0.086 
(0.011)*** 
 -0.097 
(0.011)*** 
   
F-test p-value: Joint significance of interaction terms 0.118 0.546 
Year and district fixed effects? Yes Yes 
Obs: individual-years 154,476 1,002,005 
Dependent var mean 3.244 0.483 
Notes: 
1.This table tests whether rainfall shocks have differential effects by season over the 
agricultural year.   
2. Observations are from the NSS data. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the log of the 
nominal daily agricultural wage. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the percentage of 
days over the interview reference period that the worker was employed in agricultural 
activities. 
3. Positive shock is an indicator that equals 1 if the district experienced rainfall in the first 
month of the monsoon above the 80th percentile and equals 0 otherwise. Drought is an 
indicator that equals 1 if the district experienced rainfall below the 20th percentile and equals 
0 otherwise. 
4. Each column shows results from an OLS regression of the dependent variable on rainfall 
shocks, dummies for quarter of the year, and interactions of each shock with quarters. The 
monsoon quarter (July-September) is omitted. Each regression contains year and district fixed 
effects and a dummy for gender.  Regression (2) also contains a quadratic function of acres 
per adult in the household.   
5. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Table B.3: Specification Check - Effect of Shocks on Equilibrium Wages 
Dependent Variable: Log Nominal Agricultural Wage 
      Source:  
World Bank Data (1956-1987)   
Source:  
NSS Data (1982-2008) 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
1 Positive shock 0.021 
(0.009)** 
0.022 
(0.009)** 
0.021 
(0.010)** 
  0.041 
(0.010)*** 
0.042 
(0.010)*** 
0.041 
(0.012)*** 
2 Drought  -0.003 
(0.011) 
 -0.003 
(0.011) 
 -0.006 
(0.012)  
0.026 
(0.012)** 
0.018 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.016) 
          
3 Lag positive shock  0.019 
(0.009)** 
0.021 
(0.010)**  
 0.044 
(0.011)*** 
0.021 
(0.014) 
4 Lag drought  0.009 (0.009) 
0.003 
(0.011)   
 -0.002 
(0.013) 
 -0.000 
(0.015) 
          
5 Positive shock x 
     Lag positive shock   
 -0.028 
(0.018)    
0.006 
(0.030) 
6 Drought x 
     Lag drought   
 -0.011 
(0.022)    
 -0.029 
(0.034) 
7 Positive shock x 
     Lag drought   
0.039 
(0.020)*    
0.017 
(0.031) 
8 Drought x 
     Lag positive shock   
0.023 
(0.021)    
0.086 
(0.026)*** 
          
F-test p-value: joint signif 
of Coeff 3, 5, & 8   
0.042**    0.000*** 
F-test p-value: joint 
significance of Coeff 3-8   
0.020**    0.000** 
          
District and year FE? Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls? No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs: district-years 7,296 7,296 7,296   --  --  -- 
Obs: individual-years  --  --  --  154,476 154,476 154,476 
Dependent var mean 1.197 1.197 1.197   3.261 3.261 3.261 
Notes:  
1.This table tests for the impacts of sequences of shocks on the agricultural wage.   
2. The dependent variable is the log of the nominal daily agricultural wage.  
3. Positive shock is an indicator that equals 1 if the district experienced rainfall above the 80th percentile in the 
current year and equals 0 otherwise. Drought is an indicator that equals 1 if the district experienced rainfall 
below the 20th percentile in the current year and equals 0 otherwise. Lag positive shock (Lag drought) is an 
indicator that equals 1 if the district experienced a positive shock (drought) in the previous year and equals 0 
otherwise. 
4. Each regression contains year and district fixed effects.  Regressions (4)-(6) from the NSS data also include 
fixed effects for calendar quarters of the year and a dummy for gender.   
5. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Table B.4: Persistence of Lagged Shocks 
Dependent Variable: Log Nominal Daily Agricultural Wage 
  Source:  
World Bank Data (1956-1987)   
Source:  
NSS Data (1982-2008) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Positive shock this year 0.021 
(0.009)** 
0.022 
(0.009)** 
0.022 
(0.009)*** 
  0.041 
(0.010)*** 
0.042 
(0.010)*** 
0.041 
(0.009)*** 
Positive shock 1 year ago  0.019 
(0.009)** 
0.020 
(0.009)**  
 0.044 
(0.011)*** 
0.042 
(0.011)*** 
Positive shock 2 years ago   0.030 (0.009)***  
  0.007 (0.013) 
Positive shock 3 years ago   0.028 (0.010)***  
   -0.012 (0.011) 
        
Drought this year  -0.003 
(0.011) 
 -0.003 
(0.011) 
 -0.005 
(0.010)  
0.026 
(0.012)** 
0.018 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.011)* 
Drought 1 year ago  0.009 (0.009) 
0.009 
(0.009)   
 -0.002 
(0.013) 
 -0.001 
(0.013) 
Drought 2 years ago   0.006 (0.009)    
 -0.009 
(0.013) 
Drought 3 year ago   0.008 (0.009)    
0.004 
(0.014) 
        
District and year FE? Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs: district-years 7,296 7,296 7,296   --  --  -- 
Obs: individual-years  --  --  --  154,476 154,476 154,476 
Dependent var mean 1.197 1.197 1.197   3.261 3.261 3.261 
Notes:  
1.This table tests for the persistence of lag shocks on the agricultural wage.   
2. The dependent variable is the log of the nominal daily agricultural wage. Columns (1)-(4) use observations 
from the World Bank data. Columns (5)-(7) use observations from the NSS data. 
3. Positive shock is an indicator that equals 1 if the district experienced rainfall above the 80th percentile and 
equals 0 otherwise. Drought is an indicator that equals 1 if the district experienced rainfall below the 20th 
percentile and equals 0 otherwise. Each covariate is an indicator for whether the district experienced a positive 
shock or drought in the current or in a previous year, as described in the table. 
4. Each regression contains year and district fixed effects.  Regressions (4)-(6) from the NSS data also include 
fixed effects for calendar quarters of the year and a dummy for gender.   
5. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Table B.6: Effect of Shocks on Employment 
Dependent Variable: Agricultural Employment Rate 
      (1) (2) 
 Shockt-1 Shockt   
1 Zero Zero Omitted Omitted 
     
2 Drought Zero 0.011 
(0.008) 
Omitted 
      
3 Zero Positive 0.016 
(0.009)* 
    
4 Drought Positive  -0.008 
(0.016) 
    
5 Positive Positive 0.030 
(0.014)** 
0.011 
(0.007)* 
          
6 Zero Drought  -0.016 
(0.009)* 
    
7 Drought Drought  -0.006 
(0.014) 
 -0.017 
(0.007)** 
     
8 Positive Drought  -0.031 
(0.011)*** 
 -0.034 
(0.011)*** 
     
9 Positive Zero  -0.012 
(0.008) 
 -0.015 
(0.008)* 
     
District and year FE? Yes Yes 
Additional controls? Yes Yes 
Observations: individual-years 1,002,005 1,002,005 
Dependent variable mean 0.483 0.483 
Notes:  
1. This table tests for the impacts of sequences of shocks on the employment rate.  
Observations are from the NSS data.  The dependent variable is the % of days in the past week 
in which the worker was employed in agricultural work (own farm work plus hired out work). 
2. Shocks are defined as drought, zero, or positive, and correspond to rainfall below the 20th, 
between the 20th-80th, and above the 80th percentile, respectively.  The covariates are 
indicators that equal 1 if a given sequence of shocks was realized and zero otherwise.  The 
sequences are presented as the shock in the previous year and the shock in the current year.   
3. Column (1) omits the sequence {Zero, Zero} and includes separate dummies for each of the 
remaining 8 combinations of shocks.  The remaining columns group shocks into categories 
with similar predictions.  Column (2) also omits the sequence {Drought, Zero}; combines 
rows 3-5 into one indicator function for whether the district experienced a contemporaneous 
positive shock; and combines rows 6-7 into an indicator function for whether the district had a 
zero shock or drought last year followed by a contemporaneous drought. 
4. Each regression also contains year fixed effects, district fixed effects, fixed effects for 
calendar quarters of the year, a gender dummy, and a quadratic function of acres per adult in 
the household.   
5. Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by region-year. 
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Appendix C: Chapter 2 Study Details (Context and Protocols)
Production Task
Workers entered information from scanned images into fields on their screen (see Appendix Figure
D.2). Once a worker finished entering data from an image, the software automatically sent the data
to a central server and fetched the next image. This meant workers could not select the images on
which they worked. Output was measured as the number of accurate fields entered. The data entry
software displayed both the total and accurate number of fields entered so far that day (with about
a 15 minute delay), so employees always had real time information on their own output.
Workers faced some uncertainty in production due to shocks. Two types of shocks are particularly
relevant in our context. First, the oﬃce experienced network speed fluctuations that impacted
productivity. Some computers were more sensitive to these fluctuations than others. As a result,
workers were randomly assigned to seats in the oﬃce and these assignments changed every 1-3
weeks. Second, many employees commuted from surrounding villages using buses and trains, with
some traveling up to two hours in each direction. Those from more remote locations faced increased
uncertainty in morning arrival times and therefore production.
Paydays
Workers received their wages in cash on their assigned payday. Once they finished work for the day,
they reported to the oﬃce manager, who computed and paid out their earnings for the previous
week (including that day). If employees were absent on their payday, they could collect their owed
earnings when they returned to work at no penalty.
Contract Treatments
Workers were paid piece rates based on output. The control contract paid Rs. 0.03 for each accurate
field entered, regardless of production amount. The dominated contract paid Rs. 0.03 per accurate
field if the worker met the day’s production target, and Rs. 0.015 per accurate field otherwise.
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Under the Assignment to a Target treatment, workers were assigned to low, medium, and high
targets. These were set at 3,000, 4,000, and 5,000 accurate fields, respectively. In the first month of
randomizations, these corresponded to the 30th, 50th, and 70th percentiles, respectively, of worker
production under the control contract. During the last month of contract randomizations, we
changed these levels to 4,000, 5,000, and 6,000 accurate fields to correspond to increases in worker
production over time.
Before leaving work each day, employees were required to report to an oﬃce staﬀ member in
a separate area of the oﬃce. At that time, they were told their contract assignment for the next
day. For example, employees were informed of Wednesday’s assignment on Tuesday evening. If
the assignment was Evening Choice, they also selected their target for Wednesday at that time.
If the assignment was Morning Choice, then they selected their target upon arriving in the oﬃce
Wednesday morning. This exchange was confidential and took place away from other workers.
Oﬃce Structure and Timeline
The oﬃce was open each day from 8:45 am to 6:30 pm, five to six days per week except holidays.
Employees could choose when they worked, except for two 15-minute periods each day when work
activity was halted for “server maintenance”. In accordance with the norms of the firm with which
we worked, employees were given tea in an outside area at 11 am and 3:30 pm each day. Workers
could select the length of their tea breaks and lunch breaks. They were also free to check email,
play computer games, or leave the oﬃce at any time.
The project ran for 15 months. During the first 2 months, the management staﬀ established
protocols, recruited subjects, and trained the new hires. After this, the contract and payday ran-
domizations ran for 4 months. There was then a 2-month break while the oﬃce underwent changes
to the data entry software and task. During this time, workers were generally not paid the standard
piece rates and there were no contract randomizations. The contract and payday randomizations
then resumed for another 4 months. In the final 3 months of the project, we ran end-line activities
and surveys. We did not randomize workers into the four contract treatments during this time,
but we continued to adhere to the payday assignments. Thus, the contract treatments ran for an
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approximate total of 8 months and the payday treatments for 11 months.
Sample construction
The oﬃce held 64 data entry operators at a time. Due to employee turnover, 111 workers partici-
pated in the experiment. When an employee quit, the management staﬀ hired a replacement from
a database of persons that had submitted applications for the job. As in the initial recruitment,
workers were hired in order of application date. The gender composition of employees was kept
fixed—if a female quit, the worker hired to replace her was a female. Each new worker “inherited”
all the assignments of his or her predecessor—payday group, vector of contract assignments, and
seating assignment. The payday and seat assignments took eﬀect immediately. New hires began
their scheduled contract assignments after completing training.
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Appendix D: Chapter 2 Supplementary Figures and Tables
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Appendix igure 1 
Treatment Design 
Notes:  This chart provides an overview of the treatment design.  One-third of workers were assigned to each of the three payday 
groups. This assignment was done once for each worker, when the worker joined the firm, and remained fixed for the duration of the 
project. Workers were orthogonally assigned to each of the four contract treatments exactly 25% of the time. The assignments 
changed daily. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2 
Workers’ Data Entry Screen 
 
Notes: The figure displays a screen shot of a typical data entry screen.  Workers viewed scanned images of 
records in the top half of their screen and entered information from these images into the appropriate fields 
at the bottom half of the screen.  Identifying information from the records has been covered for 
confidentiality. 
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Figure D.1: Experiment Design
Notes: This chart provides an overview of the treatment design. One-third of workers were assigned to each of the
three payday groups. This assignment was done once for each worker, when the worker joined the firm, and remained
fixed for the duration of the project. Workers were orthogonally assigned to each of the four contract treatments
exactly 25% of the time. The assignments changed daily.
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Figure D.2: Workers’ Data Entry Screen
Notes: The figure displays a screen shot of a typical data entry screen. Workers viewed scanned images of records in
the top half of their screen and entered information from these images into the appropriate fields at the bottom half
of the screen. Identifying information from the records has been covered for confidentiality.
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Appendix Figure 3 
Proportion of Observations around Target Thresholds 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows in what proportion of worker-days we observe 
workers at a given distance from when they reach their targets. The x-axis 
measures distance in hours from when a worker reached her target for the 
day. The y-axis measures the proportion of observations for which that 
distance falls between 8 am – 6 pm (the hours of operation of the office). 
Panel A computes these statistics for observations in which workers were 
assigned to Choice, chose positive targets, and were present. Panel B 
computes these statistics for observations in which workers were assigned to 
a Target and were present. 
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Figure D.3: Proportion of Observations around Target Thresholds
Notes: This figure shows in what proportion of worker-days we observe workers at a given distance from when they
reach their targets. The x-axis measures distance in hours from when a worker reached her target for the day. The
y-axis measures the proportion of observations for which that distance falls between 8 am – 6 pm (the hours of
operation of the oﬃce). Panel A computes these statistics for observations in which workers were assigned to Choice,
chose positive targets, and were present. Panel B computes these statistics for observations in which workers were
assigned to a Target and were present.
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Figure D.4: Production Volatility
Notes: This figure shows how production varies across days in the Analysis Sample. Residual production is defined
as the residual from a regression of production on a vector of worker dummies and lagged production controls. The
x-axis measures the day number of the experiment and the y-axis measures the mean of the production residuals for
that day.
Figure D.5: Correlation of Computer Production Volatility with Oﬃce-level Shocks
Notes: This figure shows the relative production volatility of good and bad computers. Residual production is defined
as the residual from a regression of production on a vector of worker dummies and lagged production controls. The
x-axis measures the mean of the production residuals across all observations within a day. The open circles plot
the mean production residual of workers assigned to good computers within a day. The closed circles plot the mean
production residual of workers assigned to bad computers.
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Table D.1: Randomization Example 
  Worker 1 Worker 2 Worker 3 Worker 4 Worker 5 
Day 1 Evening Choice Evening Choice Control Target Evening Choice 
Day 2 Morning Choice Control Evening Choice Morning Choice Control 
Day 3 Control Evening Choice Morning Choice Control Target 
Day 4 Morning Choice Morning Choice Control Morning Choice Control 
Day 5 Target Target Morning Choice Target Morning Choice 
Day 6 Control Control Evening Choice Control Evening Choice 
Day 7 Target Control Target Target Morning Choice 
Day 8 Morning Choice Evening Choice Target Control Target 
Day 9 Control Target Control Morning Choice Control 
Day 10 Target Target Evening Choice Evening Choice Morning Choice 
Day 11 Evening Choice Morning Choice Morning Choice Evening Choice Evening Choice 
Day 12 Evening Choice Morning Choice Target Evening Choice Target 
Day 13 Evening Choice Control Evening Choice Evening Choice Control 
Day 14 Morning Choice Target Target Morning Choice Evening Choice 
Day 15 Target Evening Choice Morning Choice Morning Choice Evening Choice 
Day 16 Target Control Control Target Control 
Day 17 Evening Choice Morning Choice Target Evening Choice Target 
Day 18 Morning Choice Morning Choice Evening Choice Evening Choice Target 
Day 19 Target Control Target Target Morning Choice 
Day 20 Control Target Control Control Target 
Day 21 Control Morning Choice Morning Choice Morning Choice Evening Choice 
Day 22 Evening Choice Evening Choice Morning Choice Target Morning Choice 
Day 23 Morning Choice Evening Choice Control Control Control 
Day 24 Control Target Evening Choice Control Morning Choice 
Notes: This table provides an example of the daily contract randomizations. The four contract treatments 
were: Assignment to the Control contract; Assignment to a Target (at either the low, medium, or high target 
level), Evening Choice, and Morning Choice. The table shows the contract treatment assignments for five 
workers over a 24-day period of the study. Workers were assigned to each of the four treatments exactly 3 
times over each 12-day period. The order of the assignments was random and changed every 12 days. The 
vectors of treatment assignments were independent across workers. 
 
 
 
Table D.2: Randomization Balance 
 Payday Treatments  Contract Treatments  
 
Tuesday 
Payday 
Thursday 
Payday 
Saturday 
Payday  
Control 
Contract 
Target 
Assignmt 
Evening 
Choice 
Morning 
Choice  
Total 
Proportion of 
observations 0.33 0.33 0.34  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25  1.00 
Number of 
observations 2,788 2,809 2,826  2,117 2,113 2,088 2,105  8,423 
Notes: This table shows how many observations from the Analysis Sample are in each treatment cells. The 
Payday Treatments randomly assigned workers into one of three payday groups—Tuesday, Thursday, and 
Saturday—which determined on which day of the week they were paid their weekly earnings. Workers were 
randomized into four contract treatments: linear control contract, dominated contract with an exogenously set 
Target, evening choice (in which workers chose their preferred contract the evening before the workday), and 
morning choice (in which workers chose their preferred contract the morning of the workday). Workers were 
randomly assigned to each of the 4 contract treatments 3 times over every 12 workdays. 
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Table D.4: Production Conditional on 
Attendance over the Pay Cycle 
Dependent variable: Production 
| Attend=1 
Production 
| Attend=1 
Sample Analysis Sample 
Payday 
Sample 
  (1) (2) 
Payday 35 
(69) 
44 
(65) 
1 day before payday 268 
(68)*** 
242 
(64)*** 
2 days before payday 218 
(85)** 
169 
(81)** 
3 days before payday 205 
(81)** 
193 
(78)** 
4 days before payday 25 
(90) 
38 
(80) 
5 days before payday 37 
(85) 
63 
(80) 
Lag production controls Yes Yes 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 7376 10341 
R2 0.74 0.73 
Dependent variable mean 6093 6432 
Notes: This table reports the effects of paydays and 
distance from paydays on worker production 
conditional on attendance, defined as the number of 
accurate fields completed by the worker in a day 
(conditional on the worker being present). Each column 
shows results from an OLS regression of the dependent 
variable on indicators of distance from payday, lag 
production controls, and worker, date, and seat fixed 
effects. Column (1) reports results from observations in 
the Analysis sample in which workers were present. 
Column (2) reports results from observations in the 
Payday sample in which workers were present. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table D.5: Take-up of Dominated Contracts: Summary Statistics 
Statistic Worker-day 
means 
Worker  
means 
  (1) (2) 
Proportion choosing a positive target (conditional on attendance) 0.35 
(0.48) 
0.36 
(0.31) 
Proportion choosing a positive target (target=0 when absent) 0.28 
(0.45) 
0.28 
(0.26) 
Number of observations 4193 
worker-days 
101 
workers 
Notes: This table reports the proportion of times workers selected positive targets when assigned to a 
Choice treatment. The first row of the table summarizes choice behavior when the worker was present 
both the day before and the day of Choice assignment. The second row of the table includes absentee 
observations, and defines target choice to be 0 if a worker was absent the day before or day of Choice 
assignment. Column (1) presents means for the Analysis sample of 4,193 choice observations as a 
whole. Column (2) summarizes the worker means for each statistic, computed over the 101 workers 
that were assigned to Choice at least once during their employment. Standard deviations for each 
statistic are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table D.6: Magnitude of Chosen Targets: Summary Statistics 
Statistic 
All workers 
High payday 
impact 
workers 
Low payday 
impact 
workers 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Probability of missing chosen target if assigned to 
control contract 
0.091 
(0.120) 
0.118 
(0.146) 
0.073 
(0.096) 
Proportion of times chosen target was actually missed 0.026 
(0.122) 
0.052 
(0.187) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
Number of observations: worker-days 1132 514 618 
Number of observations: workers 78 31 47 
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations of statistics that describe the aggressiveness of 
targets chosen by workers. Row 1 reports the probability that workers would have missed their chosen 
targets if they had been assigned to the control contract that day. This is computed as follows. For 
observations where workers were in attendance, we estimate a regression of production on worker, date, 
and computer fixed effects; lag production controls; payday distance dummies; contract assignment 
dummies; and log experience. For each observation in which a worker was assigned to Choice, selected a 
positive target, and was present, we predict the worker's production under the control contract on that day 
using the estimates from the above regression. To this predicted value, we add the worker's vector of 
residuals from the above regression to arrive at a vector of potential production values, which we fit to a 
lognormal distribution. Evaluating the CDF of this distribution at the chosen target level gives an estimate 
of the probability that the worker would have missed her chosen target under the control contract.  Row 2 
reports the actual proportion of times workers' production fell below their chosen targets.  Both rows 
summarize worker means of these statistics.  Column (1) presents these statistics for the workers that 
chose a positive target at least once and for whom the payday difference can be computed; columns (2) 
and (3) report these statistics separately for high and low payday difference workers. High payday impact 
workers are those whose payday impact measure—defined as the difference between mean production on 
paydays and non-paydays under Control divided by mean production under assignment to Control—is 
above the sample average.    
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and computer fixed effects; lag production controls; payday distance dummies; contract assignment 
dummies; and log experience. For each observation in which a worker was assigned to Choice, selected a 
positive target, and was present, we predict the worker's production under the control contract on that day 
using the estimates from the above regression. To this predicted value, we add the worker's vector of 
residuals from the above regression to arrive at a vector of potential production values, which we fit to a 
lognormal distribution. Evaluating the CDF of this distribution at the chosen target level gives an estimate 
of the probability that the worker would have missed her chosen target under the control contract.  Row 2 
reports the actual proportion of times workers' production fell below their chosen targets.  Both rows 
summarize worker means of these statistics.  Column (1) presents these statistics for the workers that 
chose a positive target at least once and for whom the payday difference can be computed; columns (2) 
and (3) report these statistics separately for high and low payday difference workers. High payday impact 
workers are those whose payday impact measure—defined as the difference between mean production on 
paydays and non-paydays under Control divided by mean production under assignment to Control—is 
above the sample average.    
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Table D.7: Hourly Production around Target Thresholds 
Observations 
Self-Chosen Targets  
(Assignment to Choice)  
Exogenous Targets  
(Assignment to a Target) 
Dependent variable Hourwise prodn 
Hourwise 
prodn 
Hourwise 
prodn  
Hourwise 
prodn 
Hourwise 
prodn 
Hourwise 
prodn 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
3 hours before target reached  135 (19)*** 
 -13 
(15)   
189 
(14)*** 
48 
(12)*** 
2 hours before target reached  236 (23)*** 
14 
(87)   
224 
(16)*** 
80 
(14)*** 
1 hour before target reached  432 (22)*** 
88 
(20)***   
398 
(16)*** 
176 
(16)*** 
Hour in which target was 
reached 
597 
(51)*** 
934 
(33)*** 
498 
(30)***  
543 
(25)*** 
722 
(26)*** 
510 
(25)*** 
1 hour after target reached  664 (29)*** 
223 
(28)***   
439 
(19)*** 
247 
(19)*** 
2 hours after target reached  584 (26)*** 
170 
(24)***   
336 
(43)*** 
206 
(22)*** 
3 hours after target reached 
 
588 
(34)*** 
198 
(31)***   
313 
(27)*** 
226 
(25)*** 
4+ hours after target reached 
 
270 
(21)*** 
133 
(18)***   
54 
(20)*** 
164 
(20)*** 
Worker's mean production 
under control in current hour   
0.90 
(0.02)***    
0.85 
(0.02)*** 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,948 13,948 13,948  20,174 20,174 20,174 
R2 0.26 0.29 0.42  0.24 0.27 0.41 
Dependent variable mean 847 847 847  730 730 730 
F-test p-value: 
(Hour in which target 
reached) = 
(1 hour after target reached) 
  0.00 0.00     0.00 0.00 
Notes: This table describes production levels around the hours in which workers achieved their targets.  
     The dependent variable in each regression is hourwise production, defined as production by worker i on day t 
in calendar hour h. For each date in the sample, there are 11 calendar hours, which correspond to the times the 
office was open and it was possible for employees to work: the first hour is 8-9 am and last is 6-7 pm. 
Production is coded as 0 if a worker did not work in a certain hour.  
     The table displays 8 binary variables that capture distance from when the target was reached. For example, 
the “Hour in which target was reached” is an indicator variable that equals 1 in the calendar hour in which a 
worker achieved her target for the day, and equals 0 otherwise. In cases where workers failed to achieve their 
target, the hour in which they reached their target is coded as the hour after the office closed (7-8 pm). 
“Worker’s mean production under control in current hour” is a covariate that equals the sample mean of worker 
i's production in hour h on days in the Analysis Sample when worker i was assigned to the Control contract and 
was present. The last row of the table displays p-values from an F-test of whether the coefficient on Hour in 
which target was reached equals the coefficient on 1 after target reached in the regression shown in that column. 
Standard errors are corrected to allow for clustering by worker-day. 
      Columns (1)-(3) report estimates from days when workers selected positive targets under Assignment to 
Choice and were present. Columns (4)-(6) report estimates from days when workers were assigned to exogenous 
targets under Target Assignment and were present. 
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Table D.8: Test for Inter-temporal Substitution in Effort across Days 
Dependent variable: Production 
Observations: Today's assignment 
All 
contracts 
Control & 
Choice 
Control 
only 
Control 
only 
Control 
only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Assigned to choice yesterday 1 
(67) 
7 
(78) 
193 
(163)   
Assigned to a target yesterday 19 
(77) 
12 
(87) 
243 
(179)   
Assigned to a high target yesterday    372 (267)  
Assigned to choice the past 2 days 
in a row     
54 
(144) 
Assigned to a target the past 2 days 
in a row     
 -74 
(274) 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8423 6310 2117 2117 2117 
R2 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.55 
Dependent variable mean 5337 5311 5283 5283 5283 
Notes: This table tests for evidence on whether there is inter-temporal substitution in worker effort 
across days.  The dependent variable in each column is production, which is defined as the number of 
accurate fields completed by worker i on date t, and equals 0 if the worker was absent.  
     The observations in column (1) are all the observations in the Analysis sample. Column (2) restricts 
analysis to those observations in which a worker was assigned to the Control contract or to Choice on 
day t. Columns (3)-(5) further restrict analysis to only those observations in which a worker was 
assigned to the Control contract on date t. 
      Columns (1)-(3) show results from an OLS regression of production on an indicator for whether 
worker i was assigned to Choice on date t-1, and an indicator for whether worker i was assigned to a 
Target on date t-1. Column (4) shows an OLS regression of production on an indicator for whether 
worker i was assigned to the High Target on date t-1. Column (5) shows an OLS regression of 
production on an indicator for whether worker i was assigned to Choice on dates t-1 and t-2, and an 
indicator for whether worker i was assigned to a Target on date t-1 and t-2. All regressions include 
controls for worker, date, and seat fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table D.9: Predictive Power of Contract Assignment Probability 
Dependent variable Production Production Production 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Assignment to evening choice 150 
(69)** 
 161 
(78)** 
Assignment to morning choice 73 
(69) 
 131 
(76)* 
Assignment to low target 3 
(90) 
 20 
(100) 
Assignment to medium target 213 
(91)** 
 207 
(102)** 
Assignment to high target 334 
(150)** 
 405 
(159)** 
Pr(evening choice)  106 
(161) 
 -65 
(182) 
Pr(morning choice)   -155 
(158) 
 -296 
(176)* 
Pr(low target)   -63 
(203) 
 -93 
(225) 
Pr(medium target)  260 
(207) 
43 
(234) 
Pr(high target)   -88 
(373) 
 -487 
(396) 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Lag production controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8423 8423 8423 
R2 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Dependent variable mean 5337 5337 5337 
F-test of joint significance of 
probability controls (p-value): 
  0.39 0.45 
Notes: This table tests whether probability of assignment to a contract treatment predicts 
output. The dependent variable in each regression is production, which is defined as the 
number of accurate fields completed by worker i on date t, and equals 0 when a worker is 
absent. Column (1) reports results from an OLS regression of the dependent variable on 
dummies for each contract assignment treatment. Column (2) shows a regression of 
production on the probabilities of worker i receiving each contract treatment on date t. The 
probabilities are computed using the worker’s previous assignments within the 
randomization block. Column (3) shows a regression of production on all the treatment 
assignment dummies and probability controls. All regressions include controls for lagged 
production and worker, date, and seat fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The bottom row of the table reports the p-value of an F-test of joint significance 
of the 5 probability controls in columns (2) and (3). 
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Table D.10: Contract Effects - High Payday Impact Workers 
Dependent variable Production Attendance 
Production | 
Attend=1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Assignment to choice 395 
(116)*** 
0.044 
(0.016)*** 
144 
(73)** 
Assignment to a target 452 
(121)*** 
0.023 
(0.019) 
376 
(83)*** 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Computer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Lag production controls Yes No Yes 
Observations 3216 3216 2706 
R2 0.53 0.14 0.72 
Dependent variable mean 4696 0.84 5581 
Notes: This table estimates the treatments effects of the contracts on production for high 
payday impact workers. The table uses observations from only those workers in the 
Analysis sample whose payday production impact measure was above the sample 
average. The payday production impact measure is computed as the difference between 
the worker’s mean production on paydays and non-paydays under Control divided by 
mean production under assignment to Control. The dependent variable in column (1) is 
production. Production is defined as the number of accurate fields completed by the 
worker in a day, and equals zero on days workers are absent. The dependent variable in 
columns (2) is attendance—a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 when workers 
are present and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in column (3) is production 
conditional on attendance—it equals production when a worker is present and is 
missing otherwise. Each column shows the estimates from an OLS regression of the 
dependent variable on indicators for Choice and Target assignment. All regressions 
include fixed effects for each date in the sample, each worker in the sample, and each 
seating assignment. In addition, columns (1) and (3) also include controls for lagged 
production. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table D.12: Sensitivity of Bad Computers to Production Shocks 
Dependent variable Production 
residual 
Production 
residual 
  (1) (2) 
Bad computer indicator  -139 
(72)* 
 -130 
(79) 
Mean of day's residual production 0.454 
(0.097)***  
Bad computer indicator * 
Mean of day's residual production 
0.261 
(0.116)**  
Mean of day's residual production for bad computers 
 
0.373 
(0.098)*** 
Bad computer indicator * 
Mean of day's residual production for bad computers  
0.263 
(0.117)** 
Mean of day's residual production for good computers 
 
0.088 
(0.087) 
Bad computer indicator * 
Mean of day's residual production for good computers  
 -0.020 
(0.099) 
Observations 8423 8423 
R2 0.024 0.024 
Dependent variable mean 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table reports estimates on whether workers assigned to bad computers are more sensitive 
to productivity shocks. The table shows results from OLS regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the residual from a regression of production on a vector of worker dummies and lagged 
production controls. Column (1) shows a regression of the production residual on: an indicator for 
whether the worker was assigned to a computer identified by workers and management as being 
likely to become slow during network fluctuations; the mean residual production for that day (by 
averaging the dependent variable across the observations for that day, excluding the worker’s own 
observation); and an interaction of the 2 covariates. Column (2) shows a regression of the production 
residual on the bad computer indicator; the mean of residual production that day, computed 
separately for the good and bad computers (excluding the worker’s own observation); and 
interactions of these latter two covariates with the bad computer indicator. Standard errors are 
clustered by computer (seat) assignment. 
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Table D.13: Correlation between Contract Quiz Score and Demand for Dominated Contracts 
Dependent Variable: Target level 
chosen 
Positive 
target 
indicator 
Target level 
chosen 
Positive 
target 
indicator 
Target level 
chosen 
Positive 
target 
indicator 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Scored 100% on quiz 175 
(182) 
0.001 
(0.058) 
        
Quiz score (percentage) 
  
280 
(682) 
 -0.11 
(0.21)   
Education (years)     233 
(49)*** 
0.059 
(0.015)*** 
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Seat fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3582 3582 3582 3582 3582 3582 
R2 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.14 
Dependent variable 
mean 
804 0.29 804 0.29 804 0.29 
Notes: This table tests whether a worker's score on the contracts quiz, which tested comprehension of the contracts 
treatments and was administered before workers began randomizations, is correlated with demand for the dominated 
contract. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show estimates of OLS models in which the dependent variable is the target level 
selected by a worker when assigned to Choice. Columns (2), (4), and (6) show estimates of OLS Linear Probability 
Models in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the worker selected a target above zero 
when assigned to a Choice treatment. Both dependent variables are defined as 0 if a worker was absent the day 
before or day of Choice assignment. Columns (1)-(2) show regressions of the dependent variable on an indicator that 
equals 1 if the worker scored 100% on the contracts quiz, and equals 0 if the worker scored below 100%. Columns 
(3)-(4) show regressions of the dependent variable on the continuous measure of the worker's percentage score in the 
quiz. Columns (5)-(6) show regressions of the dependent variable on years of education. All regressions include date 
and seat fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by worker. In 3 instances, workers who initially scored below 
80% on the quiz were re-trained and retook the quiz before the start of contract randomizations; their quiz score in 
the data equals their score on their second quiz. Due to a clerical error, the quiz was not administered to all workers. 
Observations are for those workers in the Analysis sample that took the contracts quiz. 
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Table D.14: 
Test for Income Targeting: Production Increases Before Paydays 
Dependent variable Prodn Prodn Prodn 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Payday 200 
(90)** 
110 
(145) 
105 
(129) 
1 workday before payday 331 
(99)*** 
181 
(147) 
268 
(132)** 
Assigned to Target yesterday 
 
 -99 
(103) 
 -76 
(92) 
Payday *  
Assigned to Target yesterday  
259 
(191) 
179 
(169) 
1 workday before payday *  
Assigned to Target yesterday  
341 
(205)* 
122 
(185) 
Lag production controls Yes No Yes 
Observations 4344 4344 4344 
R2 0.61 0.52 0.61 
Dependent variable mean 5352 5352 5352 
Notes: This table tests for income targeting by workers within their payweeks. 
All regressions report estimates from observations from the Analysis Sample in 
which the worker was assigned to the Control contract or to a Target on the 
previous day. All columns report estimates from an OLS model where the 
dependent variable is production. Production is defined as the number of 
accurate fields entered in a day and equals 0 when the worker is absent. Payday 
is an indicator variable for whether the current day is the worker’s assigned 
payday. 1 workday before payday is an indicator for whether the current day is 1 
workday before the worker’s assigned payday. Assigned to Target yesterday is 
an indicator that equals 1 if the worker was assigned to a target yesterday, and 
equals 0 if the worker was assigned to the control contract yesterday. All 
regressions include controls for worker, date, and seat fixed effects. Columns (1) 
and (3) also include controls for lag production. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
 !
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